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ABSTRACT 
Cicero Among the Stars: 
Natural Philosophy and Astral Culture at Rome 
Ashley Ariel Simone 
This dissertation examines Cicero’s contribution to the rise of astronomy and astrology in the 
literary and cultural milieu of the late Republic and early Empire. Chapter One, “Rome’s Star 
Poet,” examines how Cicero conceives of world building through words to connect Rome to 
the stars with the Latin language. Through a close study of the Aratea, I consider how Cicero’s 
pioneering of Latin astronomical language influenced other writers, especially his 
contemporaries Lucretius and Catullus. In Chapter Two, “The Stars and the Statesman,” I 
examine Cicero’s attitudes towards politics. By analyzing Scipio’s Dream and astronomy in 
De re publica, I show how Cicero uses cosmic models to yoke Rome to the stars. To 
understand the astral dimensions of Cicero’s philosophy, in Chapter Three, “Signs and Stars, 
Words and Worlds,” I provide a close reading of Cicero’s poetic quotations in context in the 
De natura deorum and De divinatione to show how Cicero puts the Aratean cosmos to the test 
in Academic fashion. Ultimately, I argue that Cicero profoundly shaped the Roman view of 
the stars and cemented the link between cosmos and empire. 
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INTRODUCTION 
pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram, 
os homini sublime dedit caelumque videre 
iussit et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus 
Although other animals gaze downwards at the earth, 
he gave to humankind a sublime visage and ordered 
them to lift their faces aloft to the stars.  1
Ov. Met. 1.84–6 
People have always looked to the sky for inspiration, imagining a world that is above our own. 
Looking at the stars reminds us that the world is more marvelous, more ordered yet more 
mysterious than we often recognize in the bustle of day-to-day life, even as its operation of days 
and nights rely on the stars above as the cosmic markers of our own daily rhythms. Yet the 
omnipresence of hand-held devices and digital clocks has made us forgetful of this reality, and 
thanks to the effects of the light of electric cities (as well as environmental pollution), most of us 
have very little sense of what the night sky must have looked like to people before such 
inventions of the industrial and digital revolution. Yet for the ancients, the sky’s sweeping 
expanse held a more definitive and immediate role. The structure of the cosmos represented 
stability and order. By the time of Aristotle (4th c. BCE), a two-sphere model of the universe was 
dominant,  in which the earth lies at the center of the cosmos (the first sphere) and a second 2
hollow celestial shell, inscribed with the constellations (the second sphere) encloses the entire 
 All translations are mine unless otherwise noted.1
 While other theories were posited of a rotating earth (Heraclides of Pontus, 4th c. BCE) and a heliocentric model 2
(Aristarchus of Samos, 3rd c. BCE), the two-sphere model prevailed. See Kuhn (1957) 83–99, Evans (1998) 35–6, 
and Volk (2009) 25 n. 25.
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world.  The outer shell revolves around the earth, completing approximately one revolution in 3
the course of a day, and in its regularity signifies the stability and predictability of the universe. 
In between the sphere of the earth and the fixed outer sphere lies a series of concentric spheres, 
along which each of the seven planets (which includes the sun and moon, as well as Mercury, 
Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn) travel along their prescribed orbits, which are conceived of as 
circular spheres (see figure 1).  Although the planets, on a geocentric model of the cosmos, 4
appear to move erratically, forwards and then backwards,  the overall portrait of the universe 5
 See Jones (2016) 24 for an accessible and engaging introduction to the two-sphere model (who also provides 3
beautiful diagrams). Pl. Phaed. 108c is the first sure account we have of a spherical earth, on which see Furley 
(1987) 14–26. The term “two-sphere model” is Kuhn’s (1957 (27)), who offers a lucid introduction to ancient 
cosmology. Aristotle furthers the argument for a spherical earth in his De Caelo. According to Diogenes Laertius, 
Anaximander (6th c. BCE) was the first to construct a celestial sphere (Diog. Laert. 2.2), and according to Strabo, he 
was the first to make a map of the earth (Strab. 1.1.11). See also Volk (2009) 23–8 for an overview of the two-sphere 
universe.
 Different celestial models have the planets in different orders. In Plato’s Timaeus, for example, Timaeus says that 4
the earth is at the center, with the moon next, followed by the sun, followed by Venus and Mercury, which move at 
the same speed as the sun but with a contrary motion, thus producing the appearance of retrograde motion. Timaeus 
then passes over the rest of the planets, which are notoriously difficult to describe with precision (Pl. Ti. 38d–e).
 Explaining planetary motion, or “saving the phenomena,” is extremely difficult on a geocentric model of the 5
cosmos. On this planetary problem, see Gee (2013) 7–12.
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Figure 1
conveys ideals of beauty and design: the predictable risings and settings of the constellations, at 
fixed times of year, provide a sense of immutability and stability. This model of the cosmos 
prevailed at Rome.  6
 To better understand how the ancients (and the people of the Middle Ages, who 
subscribed to the same cosmic model) viewed the cosmos, C. S. Lewis offers the following 
thought experiment: 
What it really was I can, here and now, only suggest. The thing really needs to be learned 
not from a lecture but (you are scientists) by an experiment; an experiment on one’s 
imagination. It is a simple one. Go out on any starry night and walk alone for half an hour, 
resolutely assuming that the pre-Copernican astronomy is true. Look up at the sky with 
that assumption in your mind. The real difference between living in that universe and 
living in ours will then, I predict, begin to dawn on you (Lewis (1966) 47). 
Seeing the stars in all of their vibrancy with their nighttime celestial fire is in and of itself a 
philosophical act, inviting reflection on our place in the world, the existence (or not) of the gods, 
and our destinies. Perhaps, then, it is no surprise that the earliest philosophers began with 
cosmology.  In addition to these philosophical promptings, the stars also represent the markers of 7
time, and thus also have an extremely important practical role as keepers of time and markers of 
seasons. Indeed, it was not until the reform of Caesar’s calendar in 46 BCE that the months were 
standardized in such a way as to actually keep pace with the movements of the heavens, such that 
 See Soubiran (1979) 172–7 and Bowen (2013) 299–327.  6
 Homer’s cosmology indicates that in the 8th c. BCE, the world was imagined to be a disc (Il. 18.483–9), and 7
Mimnermus (7th c. BCE) portrays Hephaestus using a boat to travel from West to East (fr. 12.5–9 West), while 
Steischorus has Helios ride in a golden cup (fr. S17=185 PMGF). The early Greek philosophers offered their own 
cosmic models. Anaximander (6th c. BCE) conceives of the cosmos as akin to a stone column and the stars as a 
wheel of fire, like an aulos with holes through which the stars appear (Hippol. Ref. 1.6.1–7), and that the earth 
remains in place because of its equal relationship to all extremities (Arist. Cael. 2.13 295b11–6; Diog. Laert. 2.1). 
Anaximenes imagined the world to be flat, around which the heavenly bodies turn, like a felt cap on a head (Hippol. 
Ref. 1.7.4–6). On ancient cosmology, see Zhmud (2006) 23; Gregory (2007) 7–11; and Algra (1999) 45–65.
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the seasonal reality and the calendar synchronize:  Julius Caesar’s move to reform the calendar 8
was just one sign that the nascent empire was exerting its control over nature itself. Plutarch 
records in his Life of Caesar (735):  
The adjustment of the calendar, however, and the correction of the irregularity in the 
computation of time, were not only studied scientifically by him, but also brought to 
completion, and proved to be of the highest utility. For not only in very ancient times was 
the relation of the lunar to the solar year in great confusion among the Romans, so that the 
sacrificial feasts and festivals, diverging gradually, at last fell in opposite seasons of the 
year, but also at this time people generally had no way of computing the actual solar year; 
the priests alone knew the proper time, and would suddenly and to everybody’s surprise 
insert the intercalary month called Mercedonius. Numa the king is said to have been the 
first to intercalate this month, thus devising a slight and short-lived remedy for the error in 
regard to the sidereal and solar cycles, as I have said in his Life. But Caesar laid the 
problem before the best philosophers and mathematicians, and out of the methods of 
correction which were already at hand compounded one of his own which was more 
accurate than any. This the Romans use down to the present time, and are thought to be 
less in error than other peoples as regards the inequality between the lunar and solar years. 
However, even this furnished occasion for blame to those who envied Caesar and disliked 
his power. At any rate, Cicero the orator, we are told, when some one remarked that Lyra 
would rise on the morrow, said: “Yes, by decree,” implying that men were compelled to 
accept even this dispensation.  9
Caesar’s standardization of the calendar was seen as political and imperial overreach, extending 
control even to the celestial realm, by some such as Cicero, who complained of the constellations 
rising at a dictator’s decree, as recorded in the passage above. And indeed, as Ovid would say, 
the boundaries of urbs and orbis had become unified into a single outline,  eliding the realms of 10
nature and city, of cosmos and imperium. Rome was not the first to concretize the analogy 
between city and sky: it is, perhaps, in the very nature of cities to look to the stars to fashion 
themselves as coterminous with the celestial realm. Yet in Rome, whose roots were more rustic 
 See Feeney (2007); Hannah (2005); Michels (1967); Brind-Armour (1983); and Schmid (2005).8
 Translation is Loeb (Perrin (1919)).9
 Romanae spatium est urbis et orbis idem, Fast. 2.684.10
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and traditional, grounded in the soil and the hearty Latin language, the conflation of the cosmic 
and political realms was something rather new. To be sure, there were intimations of it before: 
Romulus, the founder of Rome, after all, ascended into heaven after a portentous eclipse, and the 
foundations of the city were laid not only with fraternal blood but also an augural dispute. 
 For the Romans, the stars as a sign of state identity and purpose arrived rather late. 
Astrologers (along with philosophers and other groups) were expelled from Rome in 139 BCE,  11
and apart from a few passing remarks that indicate some astral influence at play—namely Cato 
forbidding the consultation of diviners, Ennius’ mention of astrologers and their prophecies, and 
a speaking monologue of the star Arcturus in a play of Plautus —little evidence points to the 12
stars shaping Roman imagination and cultural identity in a significant way before the first 
century (although our evidence is of course limited).  Yet by the time of Julius Caesar, who 13
famously became a star, as Ovid unforgettably captured at the end of his Metamorphoses 
(15.843–51), those in power were promoting (or at least encouraging) the idea of Rome as the 
 Valerius Maximus, writing during the reign of Tiberius, refers to the expulsion of astrologers and devotees of Zeus 11
Sabazius by the praetor peregrinus Cornelius Hispalus from Rome in 139 BCE (1.3). Ripat (2011) investigates why 
astrologers were expelled from Rome eight (and perhaps as many as eleven) times between 139 BCE and 175 CE. 
Ripat points out that we have no information about the practicalities of how such expulsions were conducted, and 
questions whether astrologers held such a dominant role as scholars often assume (cf. Cramer (1954)). She also 
rightly points out that the division between expert and “lay” astrologers was not precise, and similarly, that astrology 
is not neatly divided from other forms of divination, which would make expulsions of astrologers as such difficult. 
Rather, Ripat (2011) suggests that the impetus behind such expulsions was to rid Roman societies of practices 
perceived as un-Roman. And, as Barton (1994) 33 points out, “the story of astrology at Rome is part of the story of 
how Greek learning was adopted by the Romans.”
 Cato the Elder (3rd–2nd c. BCE) exhorts the farmer not to consult diviners, including Chaldeans (Agr. 1.5.4). 12
Ennius’ Iphigenia contains the first instance of the word astrologi in Latin (fr. 82 Manuwald). In Rud. 1–29 Arcturus 
opens the play with a monologue, in which the star appears as humanity’s guardian. There are a few other 
indications of the importance of astrology in the Republic: Athenio, in the 2nd c. BCE Sicilian slave revolt, used 
astrology to predict the success of the revolt, and to say that he would be king. Octavius, a supporter of Sulla, was 
found dead with an astrological diagram affixed to his body (Plut. Mar. 42.4–5).
 See Bouché-Leclercq (1963); Riess (1933); Boyancé (1975); Barton (1994) 27–71; and Volk (2009) 127–37.13
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cosmic center of the world.  The poetry of the Augustan poets, perhaps most notably Vergil and 14
Ovid, as well as their successors, Lucan and Seneca, captured this new stellar reality of Rome, 
although perhaps in different ways: while Vergil and Ovid reinforced the connection between 
cosmos and empire (although not in a straight-forward or simplistic way),  Seneca and Lucan 15
showcased the connection through the sort of sympathy the cosmos felt when the seams of the 
city and the lives of her people came apart under the Neronian regime.   16
 In addition to these works of literature, at the same time, the spatial landscape of Rome 
was changing, in large part thanks to the building projects of Augustus, who, Suetonius famously 
records, found Rome a city of brick and left it a place of marble.  Recent studies have shown 17
that the spaces we inhabit have a profound impact on the way that we view the world, and 
indeed, shape the very way our cognitive processes inform our ways of seeing.  The power of 18
spaces, then, allowed Augustus to turn the Roman city into a cosmos in miniature, which seems 
to correspond to the way the city was laid out. Among Augustus’ numerous building projects was 
the so-called Horologium, which was erected to serve as a sort of solar marker. Although the 
scholarship around this monument is vexed (Was it actually a sundial? Or just a solar meridian? 
 On the comet and the propaganda (or lack thereof) surrounding it, see Pandey (2013). Pandey argues that 14
Augustus did not manipulate public perception by using the comet as propaganda, but rather, that Ovid retrojected 
the symbol into the early days of Augustus’ principate. For a different view, see Ramsey and Licht (1997); Gurval 
(1997); and Syme (1939).
 Approaches to reading Augustan-era poets as “pro-” or “anti-Augustan” has largely given way to a scholarly 15
consensus that these authors are engaged in a complex imperial framework that is not so simplistically divided. 
Kennedy (1992) and (1993) provided a watershed moment in the debate.
 See, for example, Volk (2006) 183–200 on cosmic dissolution in Thyestes, which she reads as anti-Neronian. See 16
Hine (2006) 42–72, who argues for a political dimension to Seneca’s Natural Questions. On the connection between 
cosmos and state in Lucan, see Lapidge (1979) and Sklenář (1999) 281–96.
 Urbem neque pro maiestate imperii ornatam et inundationibus incendiisque obnoxiam excoluit adeo, ut iure sit 17
gloriatus marmoream se relinquere, quam latericiam accepisset, Suet. Aug. 28.
 See Lefebvre (1974); Harvey (1996); and Mitchell (1994). 18
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To what extent was it integrated into the rest of the Campus Martius?) —its overall message 19
was clear: the city of Rome is the center of the world, in control of time and its keepers, the stars 
themselves. 
 Where does Cicero fit into this picture? In this dissertation, I hope to show how Cicero 
played a pivotal role in Rome’s development into a cosmic state. When we think of Cicero, an 
extremely skilled orator and stylist and rather self-centered politician generally comes to mind. 
Cicero is often the first prose author beginning Latin students encounter, and as a classic 
schoolroom text, certain stereotypes naturally attach to him for both students and their teachers. 
In the following chapters, I offer an alternative portrait of Cicero, demonstrating how throughout 
his life and across genres Cicero maintained a persistent and unique interest in the stars and the 
cosmos, and moreover, their relationship to life on the ground, in particular, political life. From 
his earliest poetry to the outpouring of philosophy at the end of his life, Cicero appealed to the 
natural order, I will argue, as an analogue to the state and a benefit to it. At the same time, as a 
committed Skeptic, Cicero couched these views in poetry and dialogues, and, in several cases, 
embedded the former in the latter, thus making the picture of his views even more complex.  
 An obvious yet extremely important methodological limitation in my approach must be 
addressed: we possess more writings of Cicero than any other author in antiquity. Thus, any 
attempt to understand the milieu of the 1st. c. BCE will largely be dependent upon him. Put 
differently, how can we be sure that Cicero was as influential in shaping the idea of Rome-qua-
cosmos, as I suggest? On the one hand, we could take a highly agnostic view, resigning ourselves 
to the fact that, barring more papyrological and archaeological discoveries, we simply cannot 
 For different views, see Buchner (1982), Schmid (2005), and Heslin (2007). 19
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know how influential Cicero was. On the other, we might propose that we make the best of the 
evidence that we do have, and since much of that evidence is filtered through Cicero’s viewpoint, 
we might as well look at the past through our Cicero-colored-lens and learn as much as we can.  
 I believe that we can find a middle way between the extremes of these two approaches. 
Ingo Gildenhard, in his monograph A Creative Eloquence, faces a similar problem in assessing 
Cicero’s originality and influence. Aside from arguments about Cicero’s wide-sweeping 
creativity and survival into modernity, Gildenhard considers how Cicero both influences and 
departs from the standards of the “Roman field of power” (Gildenhard  2010: 13–4).  
The key benchmark for assessing the profile of Cicero's ideas is the logic of Roman 
practice—in other words, the shared convictions that informed interactions in the Roman 
field of power. Over the last three decades, our understanding of this body of cultural 
knowledge has made a quantum leap forward, and we now have a much better sense than 
before of (for instance) the factors that defined the public identity of members of the 
ruling elite, the cluster of norms and values by which the senate and people lived, and 
Rome's civic religion. And very often the ideas that Cicero endorses and advocates can be 
shown to vary from, indeed be at variance with, the ‘mainstream’ assumptions that 
sustained the political culture of late republican Rome. There are, then, good reasons to 
believe that his was more of a one-off voice than most, even though it is quite possible, 
indeed likely, that in each individual instance I have either overstressed or underestimated 
the extent to which his rhetorical choices deviated from shared norms and expectations. 
But ultimately, the precise calibration of the degree of Cicero's originality in any one 
specific instance is, arguably, of less interest and import than conveying an overall sense 
of the rhetorical construction of reality that is on display in his oratory. 
While my concern is not Cicero’s oratory, but rather his cosmology, I nevertheless adopt a 
similar approach to Gildenhard (2010) in evaluating Cicero’s originality and his relationship to 
constructing a new Roman reality through his words. 
 My method is also heavily influenced by Yelena Baraz’ monograph A Written Republic 
(2012), which argues that Cicero’s late philosophical writings not only served as a substitute for 
political engagement, but moreover, became an alternative way of engaging in Roman politics 
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altogether. The idea that Cicero’s philosophy is in some sense synonymous with Roman civic 
engagement suggests that words have the power to enact “real-world” effects—in this case, 
politically. Although the realms of otium and negotium, the pursuits of the active and 
contemplative life, traditionally remain distinct, Cicero, with his world-building through words, 
bridges the divide. Even more strikingly, he uses cosmology—the quintessential “useless” 
pursuit—in service of strengthening Rome and serving her.  
 The issue of Cicero’s philosophical allegiances and the status of Roman philosophy is 
equally important for my approach. In his 2015 monograph, Cicero: The Philosophy of a Roman 
Skeptic, Raphael Woolf argues that Cicero’s skeptical approach to philosophy allows him to test 
one idea against another in dialogic format, inviting the readers to engage in a philosophical 
exercise themselves. Rather than espousing a single viewpoint, Cicero puts ideas in conversation 
with one another and allows us readers to determine what we think for ourselves. I follow Woolf 
(2015) closely in my readings of Cicero’s dialogues. I here also offer a brief word on Roman 
Philosophy. Although for many years the notion of Roman philosophy was something of an 
oxymoron, in recent decades, it has been understood as a unique contribution to the philosophical 
tradition.  Cicero is on the frontlines for his substantial contribution to Roman philosophy; 20
however, most studies have focused on his ethics, largely passing by his contribution to natural 
philosophy. Thus, another aim of my dissertation is to enlarge our understanding of Cicero-qua-
philosopher by underscoring his interest in cosmology and the stars. 
 My dissertation falls into three chapters, which are organized around his poetry, politics, 
and philosophy, although these categories are rather porous. For one thing, Cicero self-quotes his 
 See Griffin and Barnes (1989) and (1997). See also Williams and Volk (2016).20
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own poetry in his dialogues, which means I treat his Aratea and De consulatu suo in the first and 
third chapters, though for different purposes. I also proceed chronologically with Cicero’s 
writings, through his early, middle, and late periods. 
 Chapter One, “Rome’s Star Poet,” considers the contribution of Cicero’s poetry, 
specifically the Aratea, to developing astral culture and literature at Rome. The Aratea, a 
translation of the 3rd c. Hellenistic poem by Aratus, describes the constellations of the night sky 
in the fixed sphere.  I begin the chapter by considering the proliferation of Latin translations of 21
Aratus’ poem, of which Cicero’s was the first. I next turn to Cicero’s Aratea itself, arguing that 
the Aratea is, for Cicero, a demiurgic text, in which he pioneers a new astral language in Latin in 
order to create a new world made out of words, thereby attaching Rome to the stars. I then 
examine features of the poem itself, especially its highly visual nature, as well as its propensity 
to word play, before turning to the second section of the chapter, in which I consider the Aratea’s 
influence on contemporary poetry, specifically Lucretius’ De rerum natura. Following the cue of 
Emma Gee (2013) and James Zetzel (1998), I show how Cicero and Lucretius engage in a 
literary and philosophical exchange, in which Lucretius utilizes the Aratean language pioneered 
by Cicero in service of his Epicurean worldview.  
 In Chapter Two, “The Stars and the Statesman,” I come to the most important dialogue of 
the 50s, Cicero’s De re publica, arguing that the astronomy of the dialogue should be read as an 
integral part of the text itself. I establish my reading of the De re publica as a true dialogue in 
which no single voice has the final say. Following Woolf (2015) and Atkins (2013), I suggest that 
 The Aratea is complemented by De signis, a translation of the second half of Aratus’ poem, which treats 21
meteorological signs. I turn to De signis in Chapter Three, but for the purposes of Chapter One I focus primarily on 
the Aratea. The De consulatu suo is also treated in Chapter Three.
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we should allow the tensions in the text to inform our reading, rather than locating Cicero’s true 
voice in Scipio or Laelius. Using a framework that I call the “Horizontal” and the “Vertical,” I 
show how the dialogue carefully navigates between life on the ground and the promise of life 
amongst the stars, ultimately arguing that the stars and the state are inextricably linked. To 
demonstrate this, I look at the major instances of astral and cosmological material in the 
dialogue, including: the appearance of the portent of the double suns; the two celestial models, 
one static and one with moving parts; the invocation of Aratus; and most famously, the beautiful 
cosmic ending of the dialogue—Scipio’s Dream.  
 The third and final chapter, “Signs and Stars, Words and Worlds,” falls into two main 
parts, with the first providing a close reading of the Aratea in context of De natura deorum, and 
the second offering an analysis of De signis and De consulatu suo in De divinatione. Both dating 
from the late period of Cicero’s philosophical output, the De natura deorum and De divinatione 
concern the involvement of the gods (or lack thereof) in the creation and government of the 
cosmos. In a sense, the two dialogues seem to reach opposing conclusions. The De natura 
deorum ends with the persona of Cicero admitting that he finds the Stoic arguments of Balbus 
closer to the appearance of truth, thus leaving us readers with the suggestion that Cicero is 
persuaded that the gods are involved in the beneficent design and maintained order of the 
universe. In De divinatione, however, the persona of Cicero (now older), arguing fiercely against 
the Stoic arguments of his brother Quintus, rejects divination, the notion that the gods 
communicate with human beings through natural signs and other means, such as dreams. 
Divination and a divinely ordered cosmos would seem to go hand-in-hand: if the gods have 
designed the world and imbued it with meaning, then it would stand to reason that the gods also 
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use the natural order to communicate with humankind. How do we resolve this seeming 
paradox? On my reading, we should allow the tension to draw us into philosophical engagement 
with the two dialogues, reading them on their own and against one another. I suggest that Cicero 
puts the Aratean (by which I mean divinely designed and ordered) cosmos to the test, and invites 
his readers to engage in a similar philosophical exercise. Nevertheless, I maintain that in both 
dialogues Cicero plays with a parallel between the order of the written word and the order of the 
cosmos. Words, after all, are a form of “signs.” This sort of semiotic approach accords with 
Cicero’s fundamental Skeptical approach but still permits him hope that the stars promise a 
transcendent order, a hope which must have been all the more urgent after suffering the loss of 





CHAPTER ONE: ROME'S STAR POET 
…sublimi feriam sidera vertice. 
…I shall strike the stars with the top of my head. 
Hor. C. 1.1.36 
1.1 Introduction 
The year is 43 BCE, one year after the assassination of Julius Caesar at the feet of Pompey’s 
statue. Caesar’s adopted son, Octavian who would become Augustus, has reconciled with his 
rival Mark Antony and passed a proscription against his adoptive father’s enemies. On December 
7, 43 BCE, two men intercept Cicero in his litter, kill him, and cut off his head and hands, 
leaving behind a stump of a body, just as had happened to Pompey five years before.   22
 43 is also the birth year of Publius Ovidius Naso, who a little more than fifty years later 
would also suffer at Augustus’ hands, being exiled for a carmen et error.  If Cicero’s death 23
portends the end of the Republic, Ovid’s birth heralds the beginning of a new age of Rome. Born 
in the first year of Augustus’ regime, Ovid is the first truly Augustan poet.  
 Like his poetic predecessors Horace and Vergil, Ovid wrote a lot about Rome, the 
cosmos, and her position in it. Augustan poetry is replete with cosmic and astral imagery: 
Vergil’s Eclogues anticipate the return of the golden age and the promised child (Ecl. 4), and the 
Aeneid shows the cosmic vistas of Rome’s future in the underworld (Aen. 6). Horace’s Odes 
promise a world free from civil war and discord, a world in which a poet can brush against the 
stars (Carm. 1.1). Writing in the fullness of the Augustan principate, Ovid begins his 
 See Plut. Cic. 48.22
 Ov. Tr. 207.23
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Metamorphoses with cosmology and ends with Caesar’s catasterism, poetically exploring the 
realization of a regime characterized by astral and cosmic control.  
 What do we make of such cosmically inflected poetry? The Romans were crazy about the 
stars.  All ancient societies were, at least to a certain extent. In our post-industrial age, it is easy 24
to forget how much they depended on the stars for navigation and to mark the seasons. But even 
by ancient standards, the Romans were especially interested in the stars. One example of this 
cultural phenomenon is the popularity of Aratus at Rome. 
 Aratus wrote a 1,154 line didactic poem in dactylic hexameter on the constellations and 
meteorological phenomena, which became one of the most celebrated pieces of literature in 
antiquity and a benchmark of the Hellenistic style. In the late 4th c. BCE, he was born in Cilicia 
(modern-day Turkey) and later, according to tradition, studied in Athens under Zeno, the founder 
of the Stoic school. Aratus became so famous for his poetic skill that the Macedonian king 
Antigonus Gonatas summoned him to his court, where, as the story goes, he was charged with a 
seemingly impossible task: rendering Eudoxus’ prose treatise on the constellations into stunning 
verse.  25
 Aratus rose to the occasion. He set to work crafting a poem that reveals that the universe 
is ordered and intelligible, full of Zeus and charged with meaning. The stars are not mere flashes 
of light, but signs that speak, connecting the realms of the human and the divine through astral 
semiotics. True, the Golden Age has passed, but in its place we enjoy a world in which we can 
 On the Roman star craze, see Volk (2015) esp. 259–80.24
 For an overview of Aratus’ life, see Kidd (1997) 3–5 and Fantuzzi (2006). We have five Vitae of Aratus, which are 25
contradictory at some points but agree on essential points, including Aratus’ origin in Cilicia, his relationship to 
Zeno, and his presence at Antigonus Gonatas’ court in Pella, the capital of Macedon and birthplace of Alexander the 
Great.
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look at the stars and enter their divinely-inspired cosmic story. This is not a Hesiodic violent 
cosmos, but one of hope. We are, after all, Zeus’ offspring.  Moreover, Aratus embedded his 26
own “signs” into his poem, crafting verbal designs that mirror the stellar pictures of the sky.  27
This caught the attention of Aratus’ contemporaries, including Callimachus, who praised the 
poem for being leptos, a word that is all-but impossible to translate but basically means “light,” a 
stylistic term that came to be associated with Aratus’ poetic style and Alexandrian aesthetics.  28
 Over time, Aratus became coterminous with the night sky itself.   Two and a half 29
centuries after his death, Ovid wrote “Aratus will always exist, along with the moon and the 
sun,” (cum sole et luna semper Aratus erit, Am. 15.16), suggesting that Aratus achieved 
immortality along with his stellar poem. As long as we look up at the sky, we will see it with 
Aratus’ eyes. In fact, Ovid himself translated the Phaenomena into Latin, though his version has 
regrettably been all but lost.  But Ovid was not the first to translate Aratus. That honor belongs 30
to Cicero. 
 Phaen. 5.26
 See Hunter (1995) and Volk (2012).27
 Scholars used to think that λεπτός was a Callimachean buzzword, but Cameron and Volk have demonstrated that 28
the word is actually Aratean, and that it becomes a trait of the Alexandrian ideal because of the ΛΕΠΤΗ acrostic. See 
Cameron (1995) 321–8; Volk (2009) 205–8; and Volk (2015) 254–5. The word λεπτός first occurs in Aratus, 
whereas the “slender muse” opening Callimachus’ Aetia is λεπταλέην.
 On Aratus and his importance for the Roman imagination, see Gee (2013) and Lewis (1992). 29
 Five lines survive; see fr. 1 and 2 in Courtney (2003).30
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 As a young man, Cicero inaugurated a long-standing tradition of translating the 
Phaenomena into Latin verse.  It seems the poem was a success: Plutarch records that Cicero (at 31
least in his day) was Rome’s leading poet.  Cicero’s Aratea carmina shows a careful attention to 32
the commentary and scholiast traditions, and while the extant fragments are relatively faithful 
translations of the original,  Cicero makes some striking expansions and departures from the 33
Greek, demonstrating that the project was more than a rote schoolboy exercise. Furthermore, 
Cicero returned to the poem throughout his life, as we see in his letters and dialogues, suggesting 
that it held special significance for him.  34
 What do we make of this? Aratus was at the center of Rome’s star craze, and Cicero, the 
evidence suggests, played a crucial role in bringing the Phaenomena to Rome. If this were all we 
knew, it would be enough to seriously consider Cicero’s role in shaping the cosmic imagination 
of his age and Augustus’, all the more so given Plutarch’s testimonium that Cicero was a top-
notch poet. But I think we can actually say more. In this chapter, I argue that Cicero’s poetic 
project of pioneering technical astronomical Latin helped create a new Roman astral culture. 
 Cicero penned the Aratea as a youth, based on evidence from the De natura deorum (45/44 BCE), in which his 31
character Balbus says that he “translated [the Aratean verses] as a youth” (quae a te admodum adulescentulo 
conversa, Nat. D. 2.104). There is some debate about whether Cicero translated the entire poem at that time, or only 
the section on the constellations. In a letter to Atticus in 60 BCE, Cicero writes, “Await my Prognostica poem along 
with some little orations shortly” (Prognostica mea cum oratiunculis propediem exspecta, Att. 2.1.11). The question 
is, did Cicero translate the weather signs section (i.e. Prognostica) in 60 BCE for the first time, or was he simply 
sending Atticus a copy of that section from the entire poem which he had initially translated? And if the latter 
hypothesis is correct, was it the original translation or a revised version? On the issue of dating the poem, see 
Pellacani (2015) 8–15 and Soubiran (1972) 10.
 Plut. Cic. 2.32
 Approximately half of Cicero’s Aratea survives. 480 consecutive lines of the poem are directly transmitted in the 33
manuscript tradition (fr. 34 Pellacani), and another 110 lines are preserved as quotations, many quoted by Cicero 
himself. In the De natura deorum, the Stoic character Balbus quotes approximately 90 lines (Nat. D. 2.104–14). 
Cicero also quotes his Aratea in Rep. 1.56; Leg. 2.7; Orat. 152; and Acad. 2.66. He also quotes the Prognostica 
portion in Div. 1.13–5. The continuous Aratea manuscripts consist of two main families (see Pellacani (2015) 30–8).
 Cicero first translated (part of?) the poem as a youth then revisited it in 60 (as evinced by Att. 2.1.11), and 34
mentioned it in his philosophical works of the 50s and quoted it at length in his philosophical works of the 40s.
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This chapter falls into two parts. In the first, I consider how Cicero portrays his Aratea. 
translation as a cosmogonic act that creates a new cosmic order: Rome. I look at the popularity of 
Aratus at Rome, Cicero’s poetic reputation over time, and Cicero’s role in the art of translation 
from Greek to Latin, and the vividness of the Aratea itself. The second explores how Cicero fit 
into the poetic milieu of his day by analyzing his influence on his famous contemporary, 
Lucretius.  
 A word of caution: I do not mean to say that Cicero was the only source of the cosmic 
and astral material in Latin poetry. For one thing, the interplay of literary, cultural, and 
imaginative influence are more like a web than a line. Furthermore, Cicero constitutes so much 
of our evidence for that period that it is difficult to study it without looking through his eyes, 
which unavoidably colors our view. As everybody knows, Cicero thought a lot of himself, and so 
it is easy for our lens to be distorted. 
 These limitations aside, in this chapter it is my aim to show that Cicero was a more 
important poet at Rome than is generally realized, and furthermore, that while we can never 
completely understand the way poets interacted with one another, we can see some patterns of 
influence and engagement. As I hope to show, Cicero was at the heart of the creation of the 
cosmic imagination at Rome, and he started this with his Aratea. In the course of this chapter, we 
will begin to see why it is that astral themes are so important in Cicero’s life-long intellectual 
development and how they both contribute to and respond to the rise of astral culture at Rome. 
1.2 Aratus at Rome 
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We get a glimpse of just how widespread Aratus was in the book of Acts. Walking around Athens 
and seeing many idols, Paul engages in debates in the synagogues and in the Agora, preaching 
the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. After some Stoics and Epicureans probe him further, 
Paul stands on the Areopagus and delivers a speech about the nature of God, his role in the 
cosmos, and his relationship to humankind (17:28). Paul calls into question the Athenians’ 
impulse to create an altar to an unknown god by quoting the beginning of Aratus’ Phaenomena, 
in which Aratus tells us that Zeus (= God) is not “unspoken” (ἄρρητον, Phaen. 2). Why, then, 
would he require a nameless altar? If, as Paul and Aratus say, “we are his offspring” (τοῦ γὰρ καὶ 
γένος ἐσµέν, 17:28 = τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος εἰµέν, Phaen. 5), then God/Zeus can be known. Paul 
invokes Aratus to argue that there is a fundamental relationship between the human and the 
divine: the whole order of the cosmos, the seasons, the stars, and the boundaries of the natural 
order, “speak” the name of god. 
 The assumption that the interlocutors on the Areopagus (as well as the readers of the text) 
would recognize the quotation demonstrates the sort of cultural currency that Aratus’ 
Phaenomena had in the Roman Empire. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Paul draws upon 
Aratus to enter into a dialogue with the Stoics and Epicureans in particular. It is attractive to 
think that Aratus and the worldview that he communicates participated in wider philosophical 
debates about the intelligibility of the universe and the fundamental relationship between the 
divine and the human: Can god(s) be known? Is the cosmos truly kosmos (as the Stoics think), or 
is the natural world a random yet marvelous accident (as the Epicureans hold)?  
 The popularity of Aratus at Rome specifically is attested to by a proliferation of 
translations. St. Jerome (347–420 CE), the great translator of the Bible into Latin, remarks in a 
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discussion of Acts 17:28 that Aratus has been translated into Latin “by many that it would take 
too long to list” (et multi, quos enumerare perlongum est, In Tit. 1, 12 = PL 26, 607 Migne). Of 
course, such translation was not strictly necessary since the educated could read Greek. 
Nevertheless, beside Cicero, we know of or have record of several translations: Varro of Atax 
(mid-1st c. BCE), Ovid (1st c. BCE/1st c. CE), Germanicus (early 1st c. CE), Avienus (mid-4th 
c. CE), and the prose translation Aratus Latinus (7th/8th c. CE), as well as the adaptation of 
Vergil in the Georgics (1.351–415).   35
 The proliferation of Aratea translations speaks to deeper cultural currents. Bringing Greek 
literature into Latin lies at the heart of the Roman literary project, but we do not have other 
examples of another single text being translated so frequently. Why, then, did translating Aratus 
in particular become such a commonplace? I will not attempt to answer this question fully, as 
there have been good recent studies on the topic,  but I would like to suggest two reasons why 36
the Phaenomena became such a phenomenon itself in the Roman world: (i) its cosmic worldview 
and (ii) its aesthetic appeal.  
The Cosmic Worldview 
As we see in Acts, Aratus stands for a world that has meaning and is intelligible. The poem 
begins from Zeus (Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώµεσθα, Phaen. 1) in the model of Hesiod’s “Let us begin to sing 
from the Muses of Helicon” (Μουσάων Ἑλικωνιάδων ἀρχώµεθ᾽ ἀείδειν, Th. 1),  but the Zeus 37
 See Zehnacker (1989) and Taub (2010).35
 See Gee (2013), Volk (2015), Pellacani (2015), and Bishop (2019).36
 Cf. Hes. Th. 36 Μουσάων ἀρχώµεθα. For other parallels of this formulaic opening phrase, see Kidd (1997) 162–3.37
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that appears in Aratus is a very different type of god from Hesiod’s. Aratus presents a Zeus who 
is “kind” (ἤπιος, Phaen. 5), making himself known (albeit indirectly) through visible signs. He is 
a father to humans in more than just title, for he reveals his concern for his offspring by 
communicating with them. Aratus’ communicative Zeus stands in contrast to Hesiod’s Zeus, who 
despite being “the father of men and gods” (πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, Op. 59), hides good things 
from humans, forcing them to toil (Op. 47–9):  
ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς ἔκρυψε χολωσάµενος φρεσὶν ᾗσιν, 
ὅττί µιν ἐξαπάτησε Προµηθεὺς ἀγκυλοµήτης. 
τούνεκ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐµήσατο κήδεα λυγρά· 
But Zeus hid it, enraged in his heart because crooked-counseled Prometheus deceived 
him, wherefore he contrived grievous troubles for humankind. 
Hesiod’s Zeus is associated with anger (χολωσάµενος, Op. 47) and misery (κήδεα λυγρά, Op. 
49). He operates by secrecy, concealing things (ἔκρυψε, Op. 47) that are useful for humans (such 
as fire) and making baneful things seem beneficial (such as Pandora). Aratus, on the other hand, 
offers a Zeus who works for the benefit of mankind and makes good things known to all humans 
through nature itself, especially astronomical and environmental signs. Rather than confounding 
divine-mortal communication, Aratus’ Zeus benevolently promotes the transmission of 
information.  Richard Hunter (1995) puts it well:  38
 Granted, Aratus elsewhere depicts a barrier in communication between Zeus and humankind “For not yet do we 38
mortals know all from Zeus, but much still remains hidden, whereof, what he will, even hereafter will he reveal; for 
openly he aids the race of men, manifesting himself on every side and showing signs on every hand” (πάντα γὰρ 
οὔπω/ ἐκ Διὸς ἄνθρωποι γινώσκοµεν, ἀλλ᾿ ἔτι πολλὰ/ κέκρυπται, τῶν αἴ κε θέλῃ καὶ ἐσαυτίκα δώσει/ Ζεύς· ὁ γὰρ 
οὖν γενεὴν ἀνδρῶν ἀναφανδὸν ὀφέλλει,/ πάντοθεν εἰδόµενος, πάντη δ᾿ ὅ γε σήµατα φαίνων, Phaen. 768–772).This 
gap in communication, however, is not permanent, as emphasized by the adverb “not yet” (οὔπω, Phaen. 768), 
suggesting that at some point “all things from Zeus” (πάντα…ἐκ Διὸς, Phaen. 768-9) could be known by mankind. 
Furthermore, Zeus does not actively hide information, and for this reason I think the passive verb “is 
hidden” (κέκρυπται, 770) is salient. After all, it is in the nature of Zeus to help humans openly (ἀναφανδὸν ὀφέλλει, 
Phaen. 771). Even when there is a misinterpretation of a divine sign, humans can rest assured that the natural 
semiotics are reliable and that communication between the human and the divine can occur, albeit at times 
imperfectly.
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The Works and Days presents us with an all-powerful and all-seeing Zeus (cf., e.g., 267–
9) who is concerned with justice, but whose mind (νόος) is changeable and hard-to-know 
(483–4), and who has hidden from men the means of a life free from toil (42 
κρύψαντες…). The themes of concealment and hiddenness are, of course, most 
prominent in the myths of Pandora and the Five Ages. The Zeus of the Phainomena, 
however, while also being all-seeing and concerned with justice, openly assists mankind 
through the omnipresence of ‘signs’ (Phain. 10–13). 
Beyond an anthropomorphized god, Aratus’ Zeus is more of a force or divine mind that orders 
the cosmos for the benefit of humankind in all spheres of life, from the harbors to the 
marketplaces (Phaen. 2–4).  
 This cosmic Zeus has led many scholars to identify the Phaenomena as a Stoic poem.  39
The omnipresence of Zeus in the different ambits of the cosmic order (earth, sea, sky) evokes the 
Stoic concept of pneuma and also suggests an underlying rational order to all things, which fits 
nicely with Stoic doctrine. The impulse to read the Phaenomena as a Stoic poem is made all the 
greater by the tradition that Aratus was himself a student of early Stoicism. Allegedly, Aratus 
studied under Zeno (Vita 3), the founder of the Stoa, which, if true, suggests that Aratus may 
have incorporated some of his Stoic education into his poem. Furthermore, the Hymn to Zeus by 
Cleanthes (330–230 BCE), Zeno’s successor and Aratus’ contemporary, shares many of the 
themes in the Phaenomena, including the benevolence of Zeus and his connection to humankind.  
 The direction of influence, however, is not clear, and the Stoicism of Cleanthes does not 
necessitate Aratus’. For my part, I view the Phaenomena as part of an emerging philosophical 
discourse which included Stoicism; however, given that Stoicism was still in its infancy, it seems 
likely to me that Aratus was shaping that conversation even as he was being shaped by it. It is 
 Sale (1966); Effe (1977) 440–56; Hunter (1995); Gee (2013); Čulik-Baírd (2018); and Bishop (2019).39
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important to note that nothing in the Phaenomena is explicitly Stoic,  and given the cultural 40
exchanges that were happening in the Hellenistic world at the time, it is possible that other 
religious and philosophical influences were at play in the Phaenomena’s conception.  Whatever 41
the case may be, the Phaenomena conveys a world view of physical unity, including a divine 
reason governing the cosmos and stars.  
 What importance did Aratus’ benevolent Zeus and his signifying cosmos hold for Rome 
in particular? It is worth noting that the poem came into Latin by Cicero’s pen during an 
important period in the history of Rome’s relationship to Greece.  The conquest of the East had 42
imported many Greek ideas to Rome, including the tenets of various philosophical schools. After 
Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix sacked Athens, many Greek cultural riches came to Rome, 
including the library of Apellicon, which (according to Plutarch) contained volumes of Aristotle 
and Theophrastus.  It was during this same period that Cicero translated the Aratea,  which as 43 44
we have seen, conveyed a philosophical worldview about the order of the cosmos and the 
relationship between human and the divine.  
 The cosmos of the Phaenomena probably held a certain allure for a people who had been 
racked by the turmoil of the Social Wars and the dictatorship of Sulla. The unease of life on the 
ground prompted the people to look to the stars for some semblance of stability. To put it simply, 
Aratus’ world represented the order and harmony they wanted for Rome. Furthermore, 
 See Volk (2015) 258.40
 See Schmid (2005) 119–202.41
 For the transmission of Greek literary culture to Rome, see Feeney (2016).42
 Plut. Sulla 26, although Aristotle was surely known in Rome before 86 BCE, on which see Barnes (1997), esp. 43
64–66.
 Nat. D. 2.104.44
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astronomy is a prestigious pursuit, not only because of its “high” subject matter, but also because 
of its associations with power and knowledge. Given Rome’s expansion in this period and 
eagerness to be Greece’s cultural equal, harnessing the stars would have also appealed to 
imperialist sensibilities. After all, Aratus’ poem was a prestige object that allows you to hold the 
entire cosmos in your hands, as it were. And Cicero placed it in Rome’s open palms. 
The Aesthetic Appeal 
In addition to its philosophical appeal, the Phaenomena also embodied a highpoint of 
Alexandrian aesthetics. The poem is replete with literary learning and word plays, hallmarks of 
the Hellenistic style. Two of the most famous of these plays are the pun on Aratus’ name at the 
beginning of the poem (Phaen. 2) and the LEΠTH acrostic (Phaen. 783–7), and as we will see, 
they both became part of the literary reception of Aratus. The Phaenomena famously begins thus 
(1–2):  
Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώµεσθα, τὸν οὐδέποτ᾿ ἄνδρες ἐῶµεν 
ἄρρητον·   
Let us begin from Zeus, whom we humans never leave unnamed.  
The poem heralds Zeus as the one whom humans speak of, and as the poem unfolds, we see that 
the entire universe declares his name, especially the stars. Speech, star and weather signs, and 
written words are all part and parcel of Aratus’ cosmic semiotics. Thus, after reading the poem 
and undergoing its education in signs, we realize that the ability of humans to interpret and 
express ourselves in words is a key way through which we participate in the divine. Thus, it is 
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not only Zeus’ (= the divine’s) name that the universe speaks, it is also the human’s, insofar as 
the divine and the human are both sign-givers. Aratus adumbrates this connection between Zeus 
and himself as well as the broader categories of divine and the human by embedding his name in 
the second line of the poem. Aside from serving as a sort of sphragis, the pun also points to the 
parallel between Zeus and the poet: as we do not leave Zeus unmentioned, so also we do not 
leave Aratus “unmentioned” (ἄρρητον, Phaen. 2).   45
 Apparently, Aratus’ poetic signature at the beginning of the poem was admired by his 
contemporaries. Callimachus, the much-praised Alexandrian poet and the author of the Aetia (fl. 
268 BCE), wrote an epigram about Aratus’ poem, lauding its sweet verse (Callim. Epigr. 27 Pf. = 
56 GP): 
Ἡσιόδου τό ἂεισµα καὶ ὁ τρόπος⋅ οὐ τὸν ἀοιδῶν  
 ἒσχατον ἀλλ ̓ ὀκνέω µὴ τὸ µελιχρότατον 
τῶν ἐπέων ὁ Σολεὺς ἀπεµάξατο. χαίρετε λεπταί  
 ῥήσιες, Ἀρήτου σύµβολον ἀγρυπνίης.  
Hesiod’s is the song and Hesiod’s the style––not Hesiod’s verse to the last. But I don’t 
shrink from saying that the poet of Soli skimmed off the sweetest of his epic lines. Hail, 
slender words, sign of Aratus’ vigil. 
The epigram is both complimentary and imitative of Aratus’ poem. Callimachus offers his own 
learned allusion by picking up on the name pun in Phaenomena 2, for in the epigram’s Ἀρήτου 
we hear an echo of ἄρρητον,  which is suggested by the spelling of Aratus’ name with an eta 46
instead of an alpha, as well as the assonance between the adjacent words ῥήσιες and Ἀρήτου. 
These careful literary games show the attentive reader that Callimachus has spotted Aratus’ pun, 
 Bing (1990) is the first modern scholar to notice the pun. See also Bing (1993). Hanses (2014) 609 n. 1 draws 45
attention to other potential plays on Aratus’ name in salient passages, such as the first astronomers’ division of the 
stars into constellations (ἐναρηρότες, Phaen. 383) and Athena’s fashioning of the universe as an armillary sphere 
(συναρηρότα, Phaen. 532). See Katz (2008) on Vergil’s Aratean pun at the opening of the Georgics.
 Bing (1993) 105.46
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which he signals by employing an Aratean technique of sweetness even as he praises that very 
technique. 
 Leonidas of Tarentum (fl. 3rd c. BCE) also writes an epigram in response to Aratus and 
like Callimachus, picks up on Aratus’ name pun (Leon. 101, 1 GP): 
Γράµµα τόδ᾽ Ἀρήτοιο δαήµονος, ὃς ποτε λεπτῇ  
 Φροντίδι δηναιοὺς ἀστέρας ἐφράσατο, 
Ἀπλανέας τ᾽ ἄµφω καὶ ἀλήµονας, οἶσιν ἐναργὴς 
 Ἰλλόµενος κύκλοις οὐρανὸς ἐνδέδεται. 
Αἰνείσθω δὲ καµὼν ἔργον µέγα, καὶ Διὸς εἶναι 
 Δεύτερος, ὅστις ἔθηκ᾽ ἄστρα φαεινότερα.  
This is the writing of the experienced Aratus, who with subtle attention declared the 
everlasting stars, both the non-wanderers and the rovers, in which the bright turning 
firmament is set. Let us praise him for the great task at which he toiled, second to Zeus, 
who rendered the stars more brilliant. 
Leonidas uses the alternate spelling of Aratus’ name (Ἀρήτοιο), thereby signaling that he (like 
Callimachus) has picked up on the pun on Aratus’ name in Phaenomena 2.  Furthermore, 47
Leonidas emphasizes the link between Zeus and Aratus, whom he calls second to Zeus (Διὸς 
εἶναι/Δεύτερος). The epigram blurs the distinction between Zeus and Aratus with ὅστις, which 
could refer grammatically either to Zeus or to Aratus and therefore simultaneously points to both, 
positing a connection between Zeus, the creator of the cosmos, and Aratus, the creator of the 
poem.   48
 Bing (1993) 106.47
 “With the statement that Aratus comes next after Zeus, Leonidas spells out what is implicit in the placement of the 48
pun on that poet’s name at Phainomena 2” (Bing (1993) 107). On Leonidas’ epigrams, see also Dawson (1950), esp. 
276–7.
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Callimachus and Leonidas’ epigrams both also include the word LEΠTOΣ, which alludes to 
Aratus’ famous acrostic in a passage that describes the moon and spells out LEΠTH (Phaen. 
783–7): 
λεπτὴ µὲν καθαρή τε περὶ τρίτον ἦµαρ ἐοῦσα 
εὔδιός κ᾿ εἴη· λεπτὴ δὲ καὶ εὖ µάλ᾿ ἐρευθὴς 
πνευµατίη· παχίων δὲ καὶ ἀµβλείῃσι κεραίαις 
τέτρατον ἐκ τριτάτοιο φόως ἀµενηνὸν ἔχουσα 
ἢ νότῳ ἄµβλυνται ἢ ὕδατος ἐγγὺς ἐόντος. 
If slender and clear about the third day, she will bode fair weather; if slender and very 
red, wind; if the crescent is thickish, with blunted horns, having a feeble fourth-day light 
after the third day, either it is blurred by a southerly or because rain is in the offing.  49
Here, LEΠTH creates a gamma-style acrostic, with the word beginning the initial line of the 
acrostic (783) and comprising the first letter of the first word of each of the next four lines, 
generating the word LEΠTH in a vertical column (see the bolded letters above).  Furthermore, 50
the acrostic runs diagonally, as Mathias Hanses (2014) has observed (as shown in the bolded 
underlined letters above).  Acrostics were one example of the Hellenistic predilection for word 51
games and patterns, which were especially appealing to the bookish culture of Alexandria since 
they are only possible in written form.   52
 Aratus’ LEΠTH acrostic was likely admired by Callimachus and Leonidas because it 
stylistically performs the very meaning of the word λεπτός which, thanks to Aratus, comes to 
 Trans. Kidd (1997).49
 Jacques (1960) was the first modern scholar to notice the LEPTH acrostic. For other possible acrostics, see 50
Levitan (1979) 55–68. For further discussion of the LEPTH acrostic and its reception, see Haslam (1992) 199–204 
and Bing (1993) 99–109. For other possible acrostics in Hellenistic literature, see Danielewicz (2005) 321–34.
 See also Danielewicz (2015), who argues for a hidden fifth λεπτή at Phaen. 783–4.51
 See Fantuzzi and Hunter (2004) 1–16.52
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define the refined aesthetics of Alexandrian poetry.  Callimachus and Leonidas both reference 53
the acrostic in their epigrams, deploying the word to compliment Aratus’ style. Callimachus 
praises the “slender verses of Aratus” (λεπταί/ ῥήσιες Ἀρήτου), remarkably alluding to both the 
name pun and the acrostic in the space of three mere words. Leonidas also cleverly refers to the 
LEΠTH acrostic by remarking on Aratus’ “subtle mind” (λεπτῇ/ Φροντίδι). Alluding to Aratus’ 
name pun and LEPTH acrostic thus became part of the epigram convention of praising the 
Phaenomena.  
 In this vein, complimenting Aratus with epigrams continues in the Latin tradition. The 
neoteric poet C. Helvius Cinna (?–44 BCE) pens an epigram for an unnamed addressee, sending 
it along with a copy of Aratus (fr. 11 Courtney, Blänsdorf = 13 Hollis): 
haec tibi Arateis multum vigilata lucernis  
 carmina, quis ignis novimus aerios, 
levis in aridulo malvae descripta libello  
 Prusiaca vexi munera navicula. 
These poems, much watched over by Aratean lights, by which we known the heavenly 
fires, I have conveyed as gifts on a Bithynian skiff, copied on a rather meager little book 
of smooth mallow. 
Like Callimachus and Leonidas, Cinna also alludes to the Phaenomena’s name pun and the 
LEPTH acrostic. Arateis points to arrheton, and one variant of the text substitutes e for a, which 
would nicely Latinize the name play in the Greek.  Cinna may also allude to the LEΠTH 54
acrostic with the word levis, one possible Latin translation of the Greek leptos. As leptos came to 
be a buzzword for Hellenistic aesthetics in the Greek, so also levis could represent the refined 
 I agree with Cameron (1995) 21–28 that λεπτός becomes a hallmark of refined style thanks to Aratus rather than 53
Callimachus, on which see Volk (2015) 262–5.
 See Volk (2015) 263 n. 28.54
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“smooth” Hellenistic style in the Latin. In any case, the proliferation of diminutives (aridulo, 
libello, navicula) point to the “subtlety” of the Hellenistic style. By using these allusive 
poeticisms, Cinna inserts himself into the Aratean tradition, which is both Hellenistic and 
astronomical, as well as the learned line of epigrammatists who praise Aratus.  Cinna thus 55
manages to be both Aratean and Callimachean. 
 Cinna is participating in the poetic topos of writing at night, known as ἀγρυπνίη in Greek 
and vigilare or lucubratio in Latin,  which ever since Callimachus’ epigram (if not before), “is 56
fixed with the new poetic significance” (Thomas (1979) 200). The “Aratean lamps” (Arateis ... 
lucernis) evoke the candlelight Aratus works by while writing his poetry at night, but a clear 
double entendre is present in this line: the Aratean lamps, of course, are also the stars. The 
mention of “heavenly fires” (ignis...aerios) is also fitting, given that these “fires” could refer to 
the flames of the lamp but also the twinklings of the night sky. Aratus, then, is present in the 
poet’s nighttime work as well as the night sky itself.  
 Cinna’s excellent epigram is another piece of evidence for the popularity of Aratus in 
first-century Rome.  As the Romans began to pick up “the discourse of (popular) astronomy, 57
they received it in its established Aratean format, that is, in the shape of the Phaenomena and its 
 Cf. Volk (2015) 263: “Cinna’s Aratus, then, is both a champion of the new poetics and an unquestioned authority 55
on the night sky.”
 The ἀγρυπνίη of Callimachus and the vigilata carmina of Cinna are both examples of lucubratio. Although 56
lucubratio can have sinister associations, “sleeplessness” pre-Augustus tends to be a positive activity. Thanks to 
Callimachus’ well-known epigram, the metaphor of writing poetry at night becomes associated with literary 
excellence, at least up until Vergil. Indeed, the night time “vigil” of burning the midnight oil is associated with 
writing poetry and/or pining for a lover. Ker thoroughly treats the tradition of lucubratio in the Imperial period 
(2004) 209–42. He does not, however, mention these epigrams and the tradition of “sleeplessness” as a metaphor for 
writing poetry (astronomical or otherwise) or being in love.
 See Hollis (2007) 42–3.57
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pedagogical paraphernalia” (Volk (2015) 264).  Cinna, who ran in the poetic circles shared by 58
Calvus and Catullus, was a contemporary of Cicero. Although we do not know the year in which 
this epigram was written, it seems probable that it was written after the publication of Cicero’s 
Aratea.  By virtue of writing in Latin about Aratus, Cinna participates in the Aratean tradition 59
that is brought into Rome by Cicero himself. Cinna emphasizes his own contribution to this 
poetic translation with the boat from Bithynia, birthplace of Hipparchus and Theodosius, two 
great astronomers. By writing this epigram, Cinna has “conveyed” (vehi) Aratus’ poem on an 
Alexandrian boat, a metapoetic description of his own contribution to the translation of Greece to 
Rome. At Cinna’s pen, Aratus becomes a hallmark of the emerging Latin aesthetics, just as he 
did of the Alexandrian aesthetic in the Greek. And whereas Cicero takes an entire poem to 
achieve this, Cinna manages it in the space of a single epigram, thus beating Cicero in a 
Hellenistic game. 
1.3 Translation as Creation 
In his 2016 monograph Beyond Greek, Denis Feeney points out that the birth of Latin literature is 
something of a unprecedented phenomenon in human history, in which Roman authors, although 
bilingual, translated and reworked Greek texts into Latin, the vernacular language of Rome. As 
Feeney puts it, “The Latin project of systematically translating literary texts is not a natural or 
inevitable thing to happen, and analogies for it in the ancient world turn out to be hard to find.”  60
 Aside from its literary merits, the Phaenomena was also a handbook of sorts on astronomy. The Phaenomena 58
generated a number of scholia and commentaries, including a commentary by the great astronomer Hipparchus (2nd 
c. BCE). On the scholia and commentaries, see Dickey (2007) 56–60.
 On the dating of the epigram, see Hollis (2007) 19. Cinna may have accompanied Memmius in Bithynia in 57–6 59
BCE, in which case it would be reasonable to assume that the epigram is dated to that general time.
 Feeney (2016) 16.60
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Latin literature as such was born as a translation in 240 BCE at the Ludi Romani with a Latin 
play rendered from the Greek. Translation itself, far from a rote exercise, is itself a creative act, 
as Feeney shows. But Feeney’s study overlooks a very significant cultural phenomenon: Aratus 
and his poetry. Feeney rightly observes that “what the Romans translate from Greek is precisely 
what we call ‘literature,’ and what they leave untranslated is precisely what we call ‘science,’ 
together with mathematics, divination, and music.”  Although Aratus is poetic, he is not 61
unscientific, and the boundaries of “science” and “literature” are not as neat as Feeney here 
suggests. Aratus’ poem embodies the scientific learning of its day through its literariness, and 
perhaps, is better able to achieve a scientific and poetic goals. Thus, Feeney’s light treatment of 
Aratus does not adequately portray the cultural impact of Aratus at Rome and Cicero’s Latin 
translation of it. 
 Despite its popularity, Aratus’ Phaenomena was not met with universal acclaim at Rome. 
Over a hundred years after Cicero’s Aratea, the great rhetorician and admirer of Cicero, Marcus 
Fabius Quintilianus (35–100 CE), gives a scathing critique of Aratus in his Institutio oratioria 
(10.1.55):  
Arati materia motu caret, ut in qua nulla varietas, nullus adfectus, nulla persona, nulla 
cuiusquam sit oratio; sufficit tamen operi cui se parem credidit. 
The material of Aratus lacks motion, being such that there is no variety, no emotion, no 
character, no speech; nevertheless he is sufficient for the task to which he believed 
himself suited. 
 Feeney (2016) 43.61
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A rather harsh judge of Aratus, Quintilian underappreciates the merits of his astronomical poem, 
especially its imaginative appeal and literary refinement.  But if there is any merit to his 62
complaint, it is rectified in Cicero’s translation of the poem; in the Latin Cicero breathes new life 
into the verse, animating it with characters and expanding and compressing the narrative as he 
sees fit. Cicero makes the sky come alive with a cosmic drama, creating a uniquely Roman, 
living cosmos.   63
A I O V E 
Let’s start at the beginning, which as Julie Andrews teaches us, is a very good place to start.  64
When you read you begin with ABC, and apparently Cicero thought the alphabet was a good 
way to start a poem:  
 A Iove Musarum primordia 
A translation of Aratus’,  
Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώµεσθα, τὸν οὐδέποτ᾿ ἄνδρες ἐῶµεν 
ἄρρητον· 
The full line of Cicero’s Latin has been lost, but we can see poetic genius in these four remaining 
words. As Joshua Katz has pointed out, Cicero’s opening consists of all of the vowels of the 
 Cf. Inst. 1.4.4, where Quintilian mentions the importance of understanding astronomy for reading poetry.62
 Green (2014) emphasizes Cicero’s predilection “to exploit the descriptive and anthropomorphic potential of the 63
subject matter to create a more ‘tactile’ and dramatic cosmos” (134). Volk (2015) also points out the heightened 
drama of Cicero’s Aratea and the subsequent Latin translators: “In the Latin Aratea, the constellations come alive, 
are endowed with character and emotions, and act out plots” (269).
 Katz (2009) 84 also compares Cicero and Julie Andrews in the Sound of Music. I believe that Katz and I came to 64
this comparison separately, but I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the possibility that I had read Katz’ 
chapter and forgotten it, surfacing his comparison from my subconscious when I sat down to write  my own 
thoughts on Cicero’s Aratea. 
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alphabet in the most compact and comprehensible makeup: A I O V E.  Although when voiced, 65
the I and the V are consonontal, when read, their vowel-ness is emphasized by virtue of their 
proximity to the A, O, and E. Later Latin translations do not follow Cicero, but eliminate the 
vowel effect by inserting a “b” after the “a,”  changing a to ab.   
For example, Vergil: ab Iove principium Musae: Iovis omnia plena; 
ille colit terras, illi mea carmina curae. (Ecl. 3) 
Or, Ovid: ab Iove, Musa parens, (cedunt Iovis omnia 
regno,) carmina nostra move! (Met. 10.148–9) 
Or Germanicus: Ab Iove principium magno deduxit Aratus, 
carminis at nobis, genitor, tu maximus auctor, 
te veneror, tibi sacra fero doctique laboris 
primitias. (German. Arat. 1–4). 
Cicero, the first translator of the Aratea, has chosen a while his successors chose ab, a decision 
that places all of the Latin vowels together at the very beginning of the poem. Why does this 
matter? Joshua Katz, in his article “Gods and Vowels” considers the sonority of the cosmos and 
the importance of vowels in particular for that sound. In many ancient traditions, song and 
speech are linked to the creation of the world. For example, in the Pentateuch, God creates the 
world by speaking it into being (Gen. LXX 1.3):  
καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός Γενηθήτω φῶς. καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς.  
And God said, Let there be light. And there was light.   
In the Jewish tradition, the creation of the universe is directly tied to God’s speech. Later, in the 
Christian tradition, the writer of the Gospel of John writes that Christ is the “word” (Λόγος, John 
 See Katz (2009) 82 and Katz (2013) 12.65
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1:1) that was present at the beginning (Ἐν ἀρχῇ, John 1:1). Vowels may not be something you 
think about much in your day-to-day life, but as the mom of a seven year old who is learning to 
spell, I think about them quite a lot. As I tell him, every syllable must have a vowel. In fact, it is 
impossible to articulate a word without a vowel.  They are the fundamental power of words that 66
are bounded and articulated by their consonantal brethren. As Katz explains, vowels “are in 
effect the free air that defines a language’s syllabic structure. They are primary, uttered with an 
open vocal tract, whereas consonants (Greek ἄφωνα, i.e. “un-sounds”) involve the full or partial 
constriction of the tract and are literally con-sonantes, things ‘sounding with’ other things, 
namely of course the primary, ‘phonated,’ syllable-building vowels.”  Vowels are the 67
fundamental matter of language. 
I use the word “matter” very deliberately, because there is an analogy between the building 
blocks of words and the building blocks of physical matter. In fact, Cicero’s poetic successor 
Lucretius makes the analogy between verbal and physical elementa explicit (Lucr. 2.688–99):  
Quin etiam passim nostris in versibus ipsis 
multa elementa vides multis communia verbis, 
cum tamen inter se versus ac verba necesse est 
confiteare alia ex aliis constare elementis; 
non quo multa parum communis littera currat 
aut nulla inter se duo sint ex omnibus isdem, 
sed quia non volgo paria omnibus omnia constant. 
sic aliis in rebus item, communia multa 
multarum rerum cum sint primordia, verum 
dissimili tamen inter se consistere summa 
possunt; ut merito ex aliis constare feratur 
 Granted, some languages do not have vowels, but even languages that lack vowels as such still require the 66
vocalization of vocalic sounds. 
 Katz (2013) 10.67
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humanum genus et fruges arbustaque laeta. 
Moreover, throughout my own verses you see different words contain the same 
elements. many elements common to many words, although you must confess that both 
verses and words are different and consist of different elements; I do not say that there 
are very few common letters running through all, or that no two words, if compared, are 
made up of elements all the same, but that commonly they are not all like all. So in other 
things also, although many first-beginnings are common to many things, yet taken one 
with another they can make up a whole quite unlike; so that different elements may 
rightly be held to compose the human race and corn and luxuriant trees.  68
The elementa of the alphabet are like the elementa that make up the nature of the universe, which 
Lucretius calls primordia (Lucr. 2.696),  the same word that Cicero uses at the beginning of his 69
Aratea (1). In the Aratea, too, we see some clever play between the fundamentals of the universe 
and the fundamentals of language. Some of this is speculative because of the fragmentary nature 
of the poem’s opening, but Lucretius may be drawing on Cicero at this point. After all, as Emma 
Gee has convincingly shown, Lucretius is engaged in a poetic polemic with Cicero’s Aratea 
throughout the entire poem.  Cicero and Lucretius imply that the poetic and physical analogy is 70
more than accidental, a fundamental aspect of the cosmic song, expressed in the creation of 
worlds and the crafting of words. The world was made by words, but the converse also holds: 
words make worlds.  
Cicero, in the first five letters of his poem, not only ingeniously draws attention to the 
connection between words and the cosmos, but I suggest, makes an even more daring poetic 
move. By pioneering the first Latin translation of Aratus, Cicero, assumes for himself a 
 Translation is Loeb. 68
 On Lucretius’ wordplay and his connection between verbal and material elements, see Snyder (1980), esp.  31–51.69
 See Gee (2013), esp. 66–109.70
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Demiurgic poetic role as the creator of the world of cosmic Latin literature. The poem, then, 
represents more than just a mere rote translation exercise from Greek to Latin, but itself is the 
poetic big bang of Latin star poetry. Cicero’s poetic “Genesis” project elevates the Latin tongue 
itself to the speech of Zeus, God himself. Cicero’s Aratea, then, represents the creative power of 
the Latin language and Cicero’s role in making a new Roman world.  
  
Lepus Constellation 
Let us now turn to Aratus’ version of the Lepus constellation (Phaen. 338–40): 
ποσσὶν δ’  ̓Ωρίωνος ὑπ’ ἀµφοτέροισι Λαγωός  
ἐµµενὲς ἤµατα πάντα διώκεται· αὐτὰρ ὅ γ’ αἰεί  
Σείριος ἐξόπιθεν φέρεται µετιόντι ἐοικώς. 
Under both feet of Orion the Hare is always being pursued through all days; for Sirius is 
always carried along behind it, like a pursuer  
Aratus’ description of these constellations is rather straight forward, accurately explaining the 
patterns of the constellations and the apparent pursuit of Sirius on the heels of the Hare. Whereas 
Aratus suppresses the dynamism of a dog (i.e. Sirius the Dog Star) chasing a rabbit (i.e. the 
Hare), Cicero paints a vivid picture of the hunt in the reader’s mind (Cic. Arat. 33.120–4): 
Hunc propter supterque pedes quos diximus ante  
Orioni’ iacet levipes Lepus. Hic fugit, ictus  
horrificos metuens rostri tremebundus acuti:  
nam Canis infesto sequitur vestigia cursu,  
praecipitantem agitans. 
Next to it (i.e. the Dog) and under the feet of Orion, which I mentioned before, lies the 
light-footed Hare. Filled with terror, it flees, fearing the horrifying bites of its sharp 
snout; for the Dog follows its tracks with its hostile course, hunting it as it runs headlong 
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Cicero expands the passage by two hexameters, affording him the space to create a more 
dramatic scene. The Hare, instead of just being the object of pursuit, in the Latin becomes “light-
footed” (levipes, Arat. 121), a word first attested here which in context picks up on the 
“feet” (pedes, Arat. 120) of Orion in the line above as well as the swiftness of the Hare itself. In 
levipes may be some clever verbal play; pes most immediately refers to the Hare’s fleet foot, but 
it could also allude to the “light” (levis) “foot” (pes) of the hexameter line, playfully enacting the 
“lightness” and “pleasantness” of its poetic charm. This reading may be confirmed by the 
juxtaposition of levipes and Lepus (Arat. 121). Lepus is a translation of the Greek Λαγώς (cf. 
Λαγωός, Phaen. 338) but according to Varro citing Aelius Stilo’s etymology, lepus is derived 
from levipes.  By placing the two words side by side, Cicero signals that he knows this learned 71
etymology. After all, Cicero also studied with Stilo. Furthermore, we may detect a pun on lepus, 
a homonym with lepos, pointing to lepidus: “pleasant” and “witty.” Thus, Cicero cleverly shows 
off the merits of the Latin language and his learned verse in a simple hare. 
 While Aratus is largely concerned with the perpetuity of the chase (ἐµµενὲς, Phaen. 339; 
ἤµατα πάντα, 339; αἰεί, 339), Cicero, by contrast, highlights the heightened emotion of the 
scene: the fierce maw (rostri…acuti, Arat. 122) frightens the hare, “full of terror” (tremibundus, 
Arat. 122) because of the dog’s “hostile course” (infesto…cursu, Arat. 123) and “horrible 
bites” (ictus…horrificos, Arat. 121–2). Furthermore, whereas in Aratus the Dog is only “like a 
pursuer” (µετιόντι ἐοικώς, Phaen. 340 ), in Cicero the chase is made real. Thus, the 
 Cf. Varro Rust. 3.12: L. Aelius putabat ab eo dictum leporem a celeritudine, quod levipes esset. Ego arbitror a 71
Graeco vocabulo antico, quod eum Aeolis λέποριν appellabant. See also Varro Ling. 5.101: Lepus, quod Siculi, ut 
Aeolis quidam Graeci, dicunt λέποριν: a Roma quod orti Siculi, ut annales veteres nostri dicunt, fortasse hinc illuc 
tulerunt et hic reliquerunt id nomen.
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“movement” (motus, Inst. 10.1.55) and “emotion” (adfectus, Inst. 10.1.55) that Quintilian had 
criticized Aratus for lacking is rectified in Cicero’s version.  72
 Reading the passage with an attentive eye is invited by the motif of hunting, which can 
have metapoetic associations. Cicero, I suggest, beckons us readers to trace the literary path 
(vestigia, Arat. 123), keeping a sharp eye out for literary traces and sharpening our senses to pick 
up on examples of poetic play.  
  
Orion episode 
We encounter another example of the vividness of Cicero’s Aratea with his story of Orion the 
Hunter. According to mythological sources, Orion was very similar to Herakles, and like his 
mythological counterpart, is both civilizer and maniac.  Let us turn to the passage in both Aratus 73
and Cicero.  
 The tale of the aetiology of the Orion and Scorpio constellation is in the section on the 
simultaneous rising and settings of the constellations with the Zodiac. Scorpio forever rises as 
Orion sets, and the doctus poeta explains why (Arat. Phaen. 634–646): 
Καµπαὶ δ᾿ ἂν Ποταµοῖο καὶ αὐτίκ᾿ ἐπερχοµένοιο 
Σκορπίου ἐµπίπτοιεν ἐϋρρόου ὠκεανοῖο· 
ὃς καὶ ἐπερχόµενος φοβέει µέγαν Ὠρίωνα. 
Ἄρτεµις ἱλήκοι· προτέρων λόγος, οἵ µιν ἔφαντο 
ἑλκῆσαι πέπλοιο, Χίῳ ὅτε θηρία πάντα 
καρτερὸς Ὠρίων στιβαρῇ ἐπέκοπτε κορύνῃ, 
θήρης ἀρνύµενος κείνῳ χάριν Οἰνοπίωνι. 
ἡ δέ οἱ ἐξαυτῆς ἐπετείλατο θηρίον ἄλλο, 
νήσου ἀναρρήξασα µέσας ἑκάτερθε κολώνας, 
 On the heightened drama of this scene, see Volk (2015) 269–70.72
 On the Orion myth, see Kidd (1997) 396, who notes that the story may be Eastern in origin. For a sustained study 73
of the myth, see Fontenrose (1981).
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Σκορπίον, ὅς ῥά µιν οὖτα καὶ ἔκτανε πολλὸν ἐόντα 
πλειότερος προφανείς, ἐπεὶ Ἄρτεµιν ἤκαχεν αὐτήν. 
τούνεκα δὴ καί φασι περαιόθεν ἐρχοµένοιο 
Σκορπίου Ὠρίωνα περὶ χθονὸς ἔσχατα φεύγειν. 
The windings of the River will plunge into the fair stream of ocean as soon as the 
Scorpion arrives, which also puts great Orion to flight at its coming. May Artemis be 
gracious! It is a tale of the ancients, who said that stalwart Orion seized her by her robe, 
when in Chios he was smiting all the wild creatures with his stout club, striving to secure 
a hunting gift for Oenopion there. But she immediately summoned up against him 
another creature, breaking open the centre of the island’s hills to left and to right, a 
scorpion that stung and killed him for all his size, emerging even more massive, because 
he had outraged Artemis herself. That is why they say that when the Scorpion comes over 
the horizon, Orion flees round the earth’s boundary.  74
Let us compare the Greek with the corresponding Latin passage (Aratea 34.417–35): 
Cum uero uis est uehemens exorta Nepai, 
late fusa, volans per terras fama vagatur 
et Orion quondam manibus uiolasse Dianam 
dicitur, excelsis errans in collibus amens 
quos tenet Aegaeo defixa in gurgite Chius, 
Bacchica quam uiridi conuestit tegmine uitis. 
ille feras uaecors amenti corde necabat,  
Oenopionis auens epulas ornare nitentis. 
At uero pedibus subito percussa Dianae, 
insula discessit, disiectaque saxa reuellens   
perculit, et caecas lustrauit luce lacunas, 
e quibus ingenti existit cui corpori’ prae se 
scorpios infesta praeportans flebile acumen. 
hic ualido cupide uenantem perculit ictu, 
mortiferum in uenas fingens per uulnera uirus: 
ille graui moriens constrauit corpore terram. 
Quare cum magnis sese Nepa lucibus effert, 
Orion fugiens commendat corpora terris.   75
But when the mighty force of the Scorpion arose, spread widely, a rumor flies through the 
lands and is spread about that once Orion violated Diana with his hands while out of his 
mind, wandering in the high hills which Chios holds, fixed in the Aegean pool, which the 
 Text and trans. is Kidd (1997).74
 I have followed the text of Pellacani (2015).75
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Bacchic vine dresses with a green covering. Orion, insane, was harming the wild beasts 
with a wild heart, longing to decorate the glittering feasts of Oenopion. But suddenly 
struck by the feet of Diana, the island fell apart, and throwing up the rocks tore them 
apart and lit up the dark crevices with light. Out of these the Scorpion with its huge body 
stood out, carrying before itself its tear-inducing point. It struck the hunter eagerly with 
its strong force, pouring its death-bringing poison into the veins through the wounds: that 
one while dying covered the ground with his heavy body. For this reason, when Nepa (= 
the Scorpion) carries itself forth with great lights, Orion in flight entrusts his body to the 
earth. 
David Kubiak (1981) discusses the passage at length, pointing out its influence on later Latin 
literature (which we will turn to in due course). For the present purposes, I would like to draw 
attention to the way in which Cicero expands the original narrative in Aratus. Depending on 
where you consider the starting and ending points of the passage to be in the Greek and the 
Latin, the Latin is at least three lines longer than its Greek counterpart. Like in the Lepus 
passage, we see Cicero here infusing the narrative with more emotion and drama.  
 Orion’s emotional state is emphasized in the Latin, whereas in the Greek it is never 
mentioned. In Cicero’s version, we learn that he is a crazed: “out of his mind” (amens, Arat. 
34.421), “mad” (vecors, Arat. 34.424), and “with an insane heart” (amenti corde, Arat. 34.424).  76
We also get a glimpse into the emotional state of Orion who is “desirous” (avens, Arat. 34.425) 
as he hunts. Aratus’ version is for the most part a summary of the “old story” (προτέρων λόγος, 
Phaen. 637), but Cicero unfolds the drama before our eyes, fleshing out the details of Orion’s 
hunting, Diana’s escape, and the Scorpion’s attack. With Cicero, we hear the earth pounding 
beneath the footsteps of the goddess, which is captured in pedibus and percussae and the 
proliferation of labials (pedibus subito percussa, Arat. 34.426) and dentals (Dianae,/insula 
 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 1.9.18: aliis cor ipsum animus videtur: ex quo excordes, vaecordes concordesque dicuntur.76
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discessit, disiectaque, Arat. 34.426–7).  The breaking open of the ground is made more vivid, as 77
the island does not merely “crack” (discessit, Arat. 34.427) but actively plucks and throws rocks 
that have been dashed to pieces (disiectaque saxa reuellens, Arat. 34.427) and strikes (perculit, 
Arat. 34.428). Cicero also takes the opportunity to imbue the passage with some astronomical 
valences; in the context of the story, caecas lustrauit luce lacunas (Arat. 34.428) refers to the 
dark places of the earth breaking open to see the light of day, but given the astronomical nature 
of the poem, the passage is also charged with stellar meaning. Lustro is a word that Cicero 
elsewhere uses of heavenly bodies, and when juxtaposed with luce, alerts the reader to the astral 
significance this event is about to have.  It is almost as if the astronomical patterns are already 78
predestined in the events of the story. 
 One last point of difference between the Greek and the Latin: in Cicero’s version we may 
detect a more erotic undertone to the passage, which would be fitting given the poetic 
sensibilities of Hellenistic poetry in general and Latin poetry in particular. Aratus mentions Orion 
grabbing Diana by the cloak (ἑλκῆσαι πέπλοιο, Phaen. 638), but does not otherwise bring to the 
fore the chase as a sexual pursuit. Cicero, by contrast, makes the story an especially erotic one; 
the topos of wandering out of one’s mind is a poetic trope for being lovesick. Of course, such 
amorous desires should never be directed towards Diana, the virgin goddess. It is fitting then that 
the Scorpion she sends as punishment is depicted in sexual terms. The Scorpion hits Orion 
“desirously” (cupide, Arat. 34.431), a word which is charged with amatory associations, and by 
 On the poetry imitating the sound of the island’s shaking and cracking, see Pellacani (2015) 138 ad loc.77
 Cf. Arat. 34.332.78
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extension may give “strong thrust” (valido…ictu, Arat. 34.431) erotic shadings.  “Wound” can 79
also have sexual associations, and can refer to the deflowering of a virgin (Adams (1990) 152). 
The filling of veins with fluid can also be a sexual reference (Adams (1990) 35). The fluid which 
flows from the Scorpion’s tail is most obviously poison, but also has sexual associations. Not 
only is the tail itself a rather phallic appendage,  it also emits virus, a word which means 80
“secretion” and is later attested as semen (OLD s.v. 3a). The parallelism of love and death is also 
an established poetic trope, and “dying” can refer to death or metaphorically to physical 
exhaustion after intercourse.   81
 In the Lepus and Scorpion constellations,  Cicero creates a cosmos in Latin that is filled 
with movement and drama, and I have shown how he expands and elaborates upon his Greek 
model, showcasing his literary excellence and the capacity of Latin to capture the stars and 
perhaps even outstrip the Greek. Far from providing a stolid translation, Cicero turns Aratus’ 
poem into a living cosmos.    
Cicero's Zodiac 
In section 1.2, I discussed the influence of Aratus on the epigram tradition, especially with the 
LEPTH acrostic (Phaen. 783–7). Cicero also includes an acrostic, transforming it to suit his 
distinctly Latin project (Arat. 34.317–40):  
Zodiacum hunc Graeci vocitant, nostri Latini 
orbem signiferum perhibebunt nomine vero: 
 On ictus as a sexual word, see Adams (1982) 148–9, who notes that ictus is used by Lucretius to refer to 79
ejaculation (Lucr. 4.1245; 4.1273).
 On the association of penis with tail, see Adams (1982) 35–7.80
 See Adams (1982) 159.81
 41
nam gerit hic volens bis sex ardentia signa. 
Aestifer est pandens ferventia sidera Cancer; 
hunc subter fulgens cedit vis torva Leonis, 
quem rutilo sequitur conlucens corpore Virgo; 
exin proiectae claro cum lumine Chelae, 
ipsaque consequitur lucens vis magna Nepai; 
inde Sagittipotens dextra flexum tenet arcum;  
post hunc ore fero Capricornus vadere pergit; 
umidus unde loci conlucet Aquarius orbem; 
exim squamiferi serpentes ludere Pisces; 
quis comes est Aries, obscuro lumine labens, 
inflexoque genu, proiecto corpore, Taurus, 
et Gemini clarum iactantes lucibus ignem. 
Haec sol aeterno convestit lumine lustrans, 
annua conficiens vertentia tempora cursu.  
Hic quantus terris consectus pellitur orbis, 
Tantundem pandens supera mortalibus edit:  
sex omni semper cedunt labentia nocte, 
tot caelum rursus fugientia signa revisunt. 
Hoc spatium tranans caecis nox conficit umbris, 
quod supera terras prima unde nocte relictum est 
signifero ex orbi, sex signorum ordine fultum.  
The Greeks call it “Zodiac,” we Latins will call it the sign-bearing circle by its true name; 
for it is willing to carry the twelve flashing signs. There is heat-bearing Cancer, revealing 
the flaming stars; under it gleaming comes the fierce force of Leo, whom Virgo follows, 
shining brightly with her golden-red body; next come Scorpio’s claws (= Libra), jutting 
out with bright light, and the great shining force of itself follows, from there Sagittarius 
(the one powerful with his arrows) holds the flexed bow in his right hand, after this one 
Capricorn proceeds to go with a wild face, there wet Aquarius lights up the circle, after 
that the scaly serpentine Pisces play; Aries is their companion, gliding with a hidden 
light. On a bent knee, with his body leaning forward, is Taurus, and Gemini hurling bright 
fire with their stars. The sun in its movement dresses these with an eternal light, 
completing the space of a year with its turning course. As much of this circle of the 
Zodiac is cut off from the earth while it is driven on, by that same amount spreading itself 
on high shows itself to mortals. For six slipping signs recede always every night, and as 
many fleeing signs see the sky again. Night passing on with its blind shades completes 
the distance that remained of the Zodiac from above the earth at the beginning of the 
night, upheld by the order of the six signs.  
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Let us first establish that ZONA is indeed an intentional acrostic.  Cristiano Castelletti provides 82
useful criteria for determining the validity of an acrostic: “a) the relation between the acrostics 
and the context of the passage in which they appear; b) various signposting techniques devised 
by the author; and c) intertextual references that embed the acrostics within the literary 
tradition.”  Let us take each of Castelleti’s criteria in order. 83
A. The acrostic accords with the meaning of the passage, which is about the 
twelve constellations that form the Zodiac. Florian Hurka (2006) argues that the 
ZONA acrostic it is not a meaningless coincidence, pointing out its suitability to its 
immediate context. ZONA is a gloss on the first word Zodiacum, which in effect 
forms a type of gamma style acrostic. Zona refers to the imaginary bands that 
encircle the outer sphere of the two-sphere universe model, which fits nicely with the 
section on celestial circles (Arat. 34.237–340 = Phaen. 462–558). Furthermore, the 
end of the passage is marked by signifero (Arat. 34.340), a word which is also 
present in the second line of the zodiac passage (Arat. 34.318) and is itself a gloss on 
the word “Zodiac” (Zodiacum, Arat. 34.317).  
  
B. The passage surrounding the ZONA acrostic may signal the reader to look for 
signs of verbal play (Arat. 34.308–16): 
Quattuor hi motu cuncti voluuntur eodem; 
sed tantum supera terras semper tenet ille 
curriculum, oblique inflexus tribus orbibus unus, 
quanto est divisus Cancer spatio a Capricorno; 
 See Hurka (2006). Bishop (2016), and most recently, Rick (2019).82
 See Castelletti (2014) 49.83
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et subter terras spatium par esse necesse est. 
All these four circles turn in the same motion, but that one always holds as much of 
its course above the earth, obliquely embracing the three others (=equator and 
tropics), as Cancer is divided in space from Capricorn. And it is necessary for an 
equal measure of the band to pass under the earth. 
Here Cicero, following Aratus, describes the layout of the celestial bands, of which 
the Zodiac is one, but he may also subtly cue the reader to keep an eye out for signa. 
The four circles (quattuor hi motu cuncti, Arat. 34.308) could evoke the four letters 
forming the ZONA acrostic, which all turn on the same spot (voluuntur eodem, Arat. 
34.308), i.e. the Z that is the fulcrum of Γ shape that holds the three other letters/
bands. Furthermore, the Zodiac band intersects the others, embracing them obliquely 
(oblique inflexus tribus orbibus unus, Arat. 34.310), which could subtly allude to the 
single Z holding the three other letters of the acrostic which extend “askance” from 
the “single” (unus, Arat. 34.310) letter that holds it. Moreover, the acrostic lies at the 
center of the Zodiac passage (Arat. 34.317–20), with 20 lines above and 19 lines 
below it, thus visually mirroring in the text the Zodiac band “girdling” the other 
celestial circles. The Zodiac belt, which is a Zona, is circled by the middle, and in 
this way performs its very meaning by encircling the middle of the purple passage as 
the Zodiac itself does.  
C. The ZONA acrostic participates in the “acrostic conversation”  from Aratus’ 84
LEPTH acrostic which includes the epigrammatists discussed in 1.2 above. Although 
the ZONA acrostic does not replicate the LEPTH acrostic precisely, it serves a 
 A helpful term coined by Hejduk (2018).84
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similar purpose. Aratus crafts his poem to be a mirror of the natural world, and 
conversely, the patterns of the natural world are figured in the poem.  In this way, 85
word plays like the LEPTH acrostic serve as a textual analogy for the meaningful 
patterns we encounter in the heavens (i.e. constellations). In other words, the LEPTH 
acrostic is a “sign,” like the stars above. Cicero follows Aratus’ verbal signification 
by embedding an acrostic in a passage that particularly emphasizes the constellations 
of the Zodiac as star signs in particular. 
Although the ZONA acrostic does not precisely duplicate the LEPTH acrostic,  it elegantly 86
captures Aratus’ poetic spirit transformed into Roman form. As the LEPTH acrostic performs the 
poetic agenda that the cosmos is full of signs, so also Cicero’s ZONA attests to the inherent 
meaning of words and constellations and the fundamental connection between the two. Notably, 
Cicero locates this acrostic in a passage which emphasizes astral semiotics in particular. Cicero 
portrays the Zodiac as a “sign-bearing circle” (orbem signiferum, Arat. 34.318). 
 Cicero significantly expands his passage of the Zodiac. Aratus succinctly describes the 
Zodiac in a straightforward manner in order to show how it is an element of the design of the 
celestial circles. Consider how Aratus lays out the Zodiac (Phaen. 544–9):  
Ζωϊδίων δέ ἑ κύκλον ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσιν. 
Τῷ ἔνι Καρκίνος ἐστί, Λέων ἐπὶ τῷ, µετὰ δ’ αὐτὸν    
Παρθένος· αἱ δ’ ἐπί οἱ Χηλαὶ καὶ Σκορπίος αὐτὸς 
Τοξευτής τε καὶ Αἰγόκερως, ἐπὶ δ’ Αἰγοκερῆϊ  
Ὑδροχόος· δύο δ’ αὐτῷ ἔπ’ Ἰχθύες ἀστερόεντες,  
 Volk (2012) points out how Aratus’ poem is a microcosm of another heavenly text: the night sky.85
 Henkel (2011) 183 n. 9 passes over the ZONA acrostic, wondering if Cicero might have rendered Aratus’ LEPTH 86
with TENUI vel sim.
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τοὺς δὲ µέτα Κριός, Ταῦρος δ’ ἐπὶ τῷ Δίδυµοί τε. 
Men call it by name the circle of the Zodiac. On it is the Crab, and next the Lion, and 
under that the Maiden, after her the Claws and the Scorpion itself, the Archer and 
Capricorn, and after Capricorn the Water-pourer; after him the two Fishes are starred, 
after them the Ram, the Bull after that and the Twins.  87
Aratus calls the band Ζωϊδίων, the diminutive of ζῷον, animal or living creature. Aratus 
emphasizes the visual aspect of the Zodiac, choosing a nomenclature which draws attention to 
the Zodiac as a series of pictures of creatures that we see in the sky. Notably, Aratus does not use 
the word “sign” in his portrayal of the Zodiac at all. Instead, he succinctly informs the reader 
what the constellations of the Zodiac are.  
Cicero, by contrast, expands the passage and emphasizes how the Zodiac is made up, not 
of pictures of creatures, but of star signs. Cicero uses signum (or a compound of it) several times 
in his depiction of the Zodiac: twice in the opening lines of the ZONA acrostic (signiferum, Arat. 
34.318; signa, Arat. 34.319); once in the line preceding the acrostic (signa, Arat. 34.316); and 
three times in the closing lines of the section (signa, Arat. 34.337; signifero, Arat. 34.340; 
signorum, Arat. 34.340). The passage departs from its Greek model to make the point that the 
Zodiac is a system of signs.  
It is fitting, then, that Cicero takes the opportunity to correct the Greek (Arat. 34.317–9):  
Zodiacum hunc Graeci vocitant, nostri Latini 
orbem signiferum perhibebunt nomine vero: 
nam gerit hic volens bis sex ardentia signa.  
The Greeks call it “Zodiac,” we Latins shall call it by its true name, the signifying circle: 
for this turning wheel bears the two-times-six gleaming signs. 
 Text and trans. is Kidd (1997).87
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The Greeks call the Zodiac band according to its association with the Greek ζῷον, living 
creatures. But in Latin, it is the signifer orbis, a name which communicates that the Zodiac is a 
circle of star signs communicating to mankind, connecting the heavenly and the terrestrial 
realms. Signum not only means “sign” (OLD s.v. 3), but can also refer to language in particular 
(OLD s.v. 1a, 3d ). Like Aratus, Cicero also makes an analogy between the text (made up of 
words) and the heavens (made up of stars). Both, after all, are sign systems, albeit of different 
sorts. For this reason, Cicero declares that he is calling the Zodiac by its “true name” (nomine 
vero, Arat. 34.318), drawing attention to his coining of a new astronomical term as well as its 
semiotic accuracy. Cicero thus slyly showcases the equivalency—if not superiority—of the Latin 
tongue.  Even great Aratus, the marker of kindly Zeus’ natural signs, failed to notice that the 88
Zodiac is itself a sign system. By including his version of the LEPTH acrostic here, Cicero has 
his words poetically mirror the signs the Zodiac gives to humankind, offering his own sign at a 
point in the text that (re)defines the Zodiac as a circle of signs. Crucially, the semiotic nature of 
the Zodiac comes through in Cicero’s Latin more clearly than it does in the Greek.  
The semiotic importance of the ZONA acrostic is signaled by the immediately preceding 
passage on the craftsman simile, which draws a parallel between a work of art and the universe, 
highlighting the artistry of god as well as the divinity of the artist. This, of course, has huge 
implications for the poet at hand: Cicero. Like the maker of the armillary spheres, he too is 
creating an ordered work of art with the poem (Arat. 34.311–6): 
ut nemo, cui sancta manu doctissima Pallas 
sollertem ipsa dedit fabricae rationibus artem, 
tam tornare cate contortos possiet orbis 
quam sunt in caelo diuino numine flexi, 
 Cf. Bishop (2016) 157–8.88
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terram cingentes, ornantes lumine mundum,  
culmine transuerso retinentes sidera fulta. 
So that not even one to whom most learned sacred Pallas herself gave with her hand an 
art skilled in the ways of workmanship, could turn so cleverly the interlocked circles as 
they are flexed in the heavens by divine will, girding the earth, embellishing the world 
with light holding the stars fixed on a transverse column.   89
Emma Gee has pointed out that the layout of the celestial circles in Aratus serves as the crowning 
argument for intelligent design (2013b, 192). The acrostic also works as an indication of artistry 
on a smaller scale by replicating the divine craftsmanship of the cosmos. It is fitting, then, in a 
passage that showcases the divine order of the cosmos, to include an acrostic to make that point. 
The correspondence of universe/text works nicely, since words are made up of individual letters, 
much as stars make up individual constellations. Furthermore, Cicero elsewhere associates 
acrostics with careful handiwork and planning on the part of an intelligent mind (De div. 
2.112).   90
It is interesting to consider that Cicero might be importing the beginnings of an astrology 
here. The Zodiac obviously plays an extremely important role in astrology, which came to be 
more fully developed with Manilius in the Augustan generation of poets. But the fact that Cicero 
develops more of a robust astrological (potentially) dimension to the Zodiac is worthy of note.  91
The Zodiac is much more fleshed out than it is in Aratus, which essentially does no more than 
list the signs of the Zodiac in the space of a couple lines. Cicero, however, expands the section 
and emphasizes the way in which the Zodiac is sign-filled, having significance for mankind and 
 Trans. is Gee (2001) 529 with my modifications. 89
 Atque in Sibyllinis ex primo versu cuiusque sententiae primis litteris illius sententiae carmen omne praetexitur. 90
Hoc scriptoris est, non furentis, adhibentis diligentiam, non insani. See also Gore and Kersahw (2008) 394. 
 See Bishop (2019) 74–5, Green (2014) 134–8, and Siebengartner (2012) 104–6. 91
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bringing various states: such as “heat-bearing Cancer” (aestifer...Cancer, Arat. 34.320) and 
“watery Aquarius” (umidus...Aquarius, 34.326). It is worth considering this passage as evidence 
that astrology qua astrology (and not merely astronomy) was on the rise, and that Cicero helped 
make astrology more of a mainstay at Rome.  
The ZONA acrostic in many ways performs the role of the LEPTH acrostic but signals 
Cicero’s own priorities. In a passage that is concerned with the significance of the Zodiac and the 
ordering of the celestial spheres and bands—a manifestation of the supreme cosmic order—we 
encounter the acrostic that is also a sign of another intelligent mind, that of the poet. Cicero thus 
subtly shows the connection between the divine and the human artist. It is fitting then that the 
Zodiac, orbis signifer, sign-bearer, is a giver of signs, and so it is fitting that in that very passage 
he himself should give a sign. In this way, Cicero out-Aratuses Aratus and shows his merits not 
only as a translator, but as a poet in his own right.  
1.4 Lucretius and the Epicurean Aratea  
In February of 54 BCE Cicero writes a letter to his brother Quintus (Q. fr. 2.10.3): 
Lucreti poemata, ut scribis, ita sunt, multis luminibus ingeni, multae tamen artis. Sed cum 
veneris. Virum te putabo si Sallusti Empedoclea legeris, hominem non putabo. 
The verses of Lucretius are just as you write: with many flashes of genius (ingenium) and yet 
of much craft (ars). But more when you come. I will think you are a man if you have read 
Sallustius’ Empedoclea, but I won’t think you are human! 
Cicero’s mention of Lucretius’ poem is the only contemporary assessment we have of the De 
rerum natura (DRN). The quip has gained much attention in scholarship and much could be said 
about it, but for the present I would like to consider the letter as a piece of evidence attesting to 
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the fact that Cicero read Lucretius’ poem and gave it a positive appraisal.  This letter shows that 92
Cicero was reading and thinking about Lucretius in the mid-fifties, the same period when he was 
writing the De re publica, which has been seen as a response to Lucretius’ DRN.   93
 Admittedly, Cicero’s statement is not easy to interpret; ingenium and ars are loaded 
descriptors.  Ingenium can mean inborn talent or genius. Ars is a technical term that refers to 94
rhetorical excellence but also more generally careful craftsmanship (τέχνη). The combination of 
ingenium and ars is high praise; the DRN has many flashes of ingenuity, but at the same time, it 
is written with skill, that is, with the technique suitable to Roman poetry.  
In this section, I show how Cicero’s poetry, specifically the Aratea and De consulatu suo, 
influenced Lucretius’ DRN, initiating a literary polemic between Cicero and Lucretius. Recently, 
Emma Gee (2013) has demonstrated how Lucretius used Cicero’s Aratea for his own Epicurean 
ends, drawing upon his very language to show that the universe is not the product of an 
intelligent mind, but rather configurations of atoms and void. As she points out, “Lucretius 
recomposes Cicero’s poem in opposition to itself, and in so doing places himself within a 
philosophical debate in which the Aratea plays an essential part” (2013, 67).  I would add that 
the De consulatu suo is also ammunition for Lucretius, who uses Cicero’s poems to get the point 
across that the universe does not operate by divine laws and principles. If the stars are the 
 For discussion of this letter, see Zetzel (1998) 230, Sedley (1998) 1–2, and Donohue (1993) 2–18. I have followed 92
the punctuation of SB.
 For Cicero’s Dream of Scipio as a response to Lucretius’ Epicurean worldview, see Zetzel (1998) 230–47 and 93
more recently Gatzemeir (2013) 32–42. I provide my own analysis of the astral and cosmic dimension of the De re 
publica in Chapter 2.
 See Gatzemeier (2013) 27–32 for a detailed discussion of the meaning of ingenium and ars in Cicero’s appraisal 94
of Lucretius.
 50
clearest sign of transcendent order, it is fitting that Lucretius tackles astronomy in particular.  In 95
effect, by putting Cicero’s verse in service of his Epicurean arguments, Lucretius overturns 
Cicero poetically and philosophically in one fell swoop, thus earning the title of Rome’s leading 
poet, a title which Cicero, despite his best efforts, never quite recovers.  96
 I differ from Emma Gee (2013) in one important respect. I would point out that while a 
sort of rational order is part of Stoic thought, it is not exclusively the purview of Stoicism. 
Whereas Gee sees the poetic exchange as a battle between Stoicism and Epicureanism, I would 
prefer to see the debate as centered on the question of “cosmic semiotics” and intelligent design 
(or the lack thereof). By “cosmic semiotics,” I mean that natura ipsa is charged with significance 
and interpretability that reveals its divine and eternal nature. Both Cicero and Lucretius view the 
universe as an intelligible system that dispels fear of death, but where Lucretius sees atoms, void, 
and a wondrous absence of divine craftsmanship, Cicero upholds the cosmos as the finest work 
of art, the handiwork of a divina mens that animates not only the cosmos, from the stars to the 
plants to the beasts, but also the very souls of human beings, which participate in the cosmic 
divine nature. While Gee sees the Aratea as a Stoic poem, I view it as a poem about cosmic 
significance which subtends from the stars to the very words of the poet’s pen. The world is full 
of signs, and thus connection between the divine and human is possible. For Lucretius, such 
communication is absurd. I offer three examples which showcase Lucretius’ engagement with 
Ciceronian verse: the concept of lucubration, the Zodiac, and the planets. 
 Cf. Gee (2013) 71: “Astronomy was the node of the debate, the area in which, according to your philosophical 95
position, you either believed divine intervention was demonstrable, or that it was not.”
 Plut. Cic. 2.4–5.96
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Lucubratio 
It is interesting to compare Cicero’s compliment to Lucretius with Cinna’s epigram praising 
Aratus, which also combines light imagery and admiration. As we saw earlier in this chapter, the 
epigram tradition of praising Aratus linked star poetry and nighttime labor. Cicero’s letter also 
subtly plays into this tradition. We get a hint with the word that Cicero chooses to praise 
Lucretius’ poetry: luminibus.  Much like Cinna’s epigram, Cicero’s praise is centered on light 97
and hints at the stars. Furthermore, veneris may itself be a pun on Venus, the goddess whom 
Lucretius praises at the beginning of his poem.  Such a pun nods to Aratus (Phaen. 2) and fits 98
nicely with the verbal play that characterizes the Aratean epigram tradition and Hellenistic poetry 
more generally. The mention of Sallustius’ Empedoclea may also adumbrate Cicero’s Aratea, 
since both are translations (or adaptations, as the case may be) of Greek sources,  which would 99
further strengthen the Aratean theme in the end of the letter. 
Luminibus is also reminiscent of the light imagery in the De Rerum Natura.  Lucretius 100
often employs the light/dark dichotomy to contrast philosophy with religion, such as when he 
praises Epicurus: “From such shadows, you first were able to lift up such a bright light, shedding 
light on the profits of life” (o tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen/ qui primus potuisti 
inlustrans commoda uitae, Lucr. 3. 1–2). As Epicurus’ bright doctrine “sheds light” on the life of 
men, Lucretius scatters the oppressive darkness of religion with his “bright 
 On the concept of lumen in Cicero’s De oratore, see Fantham (1972) 169–70.97
 Thanks goes to Gareth Williams for pointing out this pun to me. On the importance of puns in Lucretius, see 98
Snyder (1980); see esp. 63–6 on Cicero’s use of paronomasia. 
 See Sedley (1998) 1–2. Sallustius’ Empedoclea was presumably a philosophical didactic poem written in Latin. 99
See also Cowan (2013) 764–71.  
 On light as a metaphor in Lucretius’ poetry to express philosophical clarity, see Marković (2008) 87–90. 100
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poetry” (lucida...carmina, Lucr. 1.933–4). Furthermore, Lucretius’ poetry is bright because it 
explicates atoms, which are by their invisible nature obscurus, occultus, and caecus.  Cicero’s 101
choice of luminibus could refer to this motif, but it could also allude to celestial lumen: the stars. 
Cinna’s epigram also employs light imagery to praise Aratus (Arateis…lucernis; ignis...aerios), 
collapsing the distinction between the light of the Aratus’ genius, the light of the lamp, and the 
light of the stars themselves. 
 Lucretius also picks up on the epigram tradition in a famous passage that connects light 
imagery, poetics, night labor, and Aratus (Lucr. 1.140–6): 
sed tua me virtus tamen et sperata voluptas  
suavis amicitiae quemvis efferre laborem 
suadet et inducit noctes vigilare serenas  
quaerentem dictis quibus et quo carmine demum  
clara tuae possim praepandere lumina menti, 
res quibus occultas penitus convisere possis. 
But nevertheless your virtue and the hoped for pleasure of sweet friendship urge me to 
endure any labor and to suffer to stay awake through the calm nights, seeking with what 
words and by what song at last I can kindle lights for your mind so that with them you are 
able to see deeply into hidden things. 
As David West says of this passage, the idea of sleepless night is suggestive of  “a man who 
enjoyed the solitude and serenity of working at night, and who couldn’t keep away from the 
window” ((1969) 81).  The resonances between this passage of the De Rerum Natura and the 102
epigrams of Cinna, Callimachus, and Leonidas are marked.  Robert D. Brown points out that 103
 On these terms, see Volk (2002) 64–6.101
 Cf. Bailey (1947) 624 ad loc.: “Serenas is a picturesque epithet, which suggests the calm uninterrupted nights of 102
study.”
 See Henkel (2011) 179–83.103
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“as a didactic poet following in the tradition of Aratus, Lucretius may have felt a particular 
affinity to [Callimachus’] epigram; one may even sense a hint of Aratus’ star-studded sky in the 
epithet serenas, apart from its important psychological significance” (2007, 338). The word 
lumina (Lucr. 1.145) is also reminiscent of the luminibus in Cicero’s letter and the lucernis in 
Cinna’s epigram.  This passage of Lucretius is also an example of lucubratio: the combination 104
of “hoped for pleasure of sweet friendship” (sperata voluptas/ suavis amicitiae, Lucr. 1.140–1) 
and “staying awake through the quiet nights” (noctes vigilare serenas, Lucr. 1.143) places this 
passage in the tradition of Callimachus Epigr. 27 and Leonidas, but with a particularly Epicurean 
flair of pleasurable friendship.  To stay awake through the late nights contemplating the 105
universe is the activity of Aratus writing the Phaenomena, but when done in Latin, of Cicero’s 
Aratea.  
 It is significant, then, that the passage contains allusions to Cicero’s Aratea. Lucretius’ 
noctes vigilare serenas (Lucr. 1.143) alludes to the constellation Orion appearing in the night sky 
(Arat. 34.102–5): 
    Exinde Orion obliquo corpore nitens 
inferiora tenet truculenti corpora Tauri. 
quem qui suspiciens in caelum nocte serena 
late dispersum non viderit, haud ita vero 
cetera se speret cognoscere signa potesse.  
From there Orion, gleaming with his slanted body, holds the body of truculent Taurus 
below. If someone looking into the sky on a serene night did not see him spread out 
widely, scarcely should he hope that he would be able to recognize other signs.  
 Henkel (2011) 181 sees this passage as an expression of “Lucretius’ motivation to write didactic in terms drawn 104
not only from Callimachus, but more generally from the critical reception of Aratus, Lucretius’ most eminent 
Hellenistic predecessor.” 
 On the Epicurean shadings of voluptas in this passage, see Gale (1994) 212. See also Gale (2000) 153 n. 30.105
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Aratus’ version is as follows (Phaen. 322–5): 
λοξὸς µὲν Ταύροιο τοµῇ ὑποκέκλιται αὐτὸς 
᾽Ωρίων. µὴ κεῖνον ὅτις καθαρῇ ἐνὶ νυκτὶ 
ὑψοῦ πεπτηῶτα παρέρχεται ἄλλα πεποίθοι 
οὐρανὸν εἰσανιδὼν προφερέστερα θηήσασθαι.  
Crosswise from the cut off [foreleg] of the Bull lies Orion himself. Whoever on a clear 
night passes it by unnoticed as it is positioned on high can be sure that he will never gaze 
upon anything superior when looking up at the sky.  
Orion appears on a “serene night” (nocte serena, Arat. 34.104), which is refracted in Lucretius’ 
noctes vigilare serenas (Lucr. 142).  Why does Lucretius allude to the Orion passage in 106
particular, and why does he use this phrase? To answer that question, let us first consider how 
Cicero’s departs from Aratus in this passage by making the constellation Orion more active and 
vivid. Orion does not “lie” beneath Taurus (ὑποκέκλιται, Phaen. 322), but rather “holds” him 
(tenet, Arat. 34.103). Cicero also brings out his brilliance, characterizing him as 
“shining” (nitens, Arat. 34.102), a word which is absent in Aratus’ version. The greatest 
difference between the Greek and Latin is the final line, which explains how a stargazer who 
could not make out Orion would not be able to see other “signs” (signa, Arat. 34.105). Aratus, by 
contrast, does not use the word “sign” here at all, but rather emphasizes the pre-eminence of 
Orion (προφερέστερα, Phaen. 325), which I take to refer both to the constellation’s brilliance and 
beauty.  Cicero chooses to emphasize that Orion is an especially visible sign (signa, Arat. 107
34.105); someone looking up into the night sky could hardly miss it. For Cicero, Orion is the 
 Gee (2013) 64–5 notes the verbal overlap but does not pursue it.  The phrase is Ennian (Ann. 396), but given the 106
proliferation of Aratean imagery in this passage, I take Lucretius’ deployment of noctes serenas as an allusion to 
Cicero. Cicero uses a similar locution in the De consulatu suo (luce serenanti, 2.24).
 Kidd (1997) 305 ad loc. sees προφερέστερα to refer to Orion’s brightness, but προφερής can denote general 107
excellence (LSJ s.v. 1). Cf. Pi. Ol. 1.7.
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paradigmatic star sign, which in the world of the Aratea represents the connection between 
human and the divine. Orion is a constellation that for Cicero exemplifies cosmic semiotics.  
 The DRN explodes the connection between the divine and human. It is fitting, then, that 
he uses Cicero’s own language in service of this point. Unlike the stargazer of the Aratea who 
sees the handiwork of the divine in bright Orion, Lucretius instead spends the night under the 
stars to craft his poem that will bring the reader to Epicurean enlightenment. Whereas Cicero’s 
nox serena represents Zeus’ providential care and desire to communicate with humans, Lucretius’ 
noctes serenas bring Epicurean revelation and ataraxia. Serenus is often used as an epithet of 
Jupiter, evoking his joyous and propitious nature.  Here, the word becomes Epicurean, turning 108
divine providence inside out. The brightness is Epicurean revelation, not divine care. This point 
is also adumbrated in the convisere possis, which resonates with Cicero’s cognoscere signa 
potesse.  Lucretius does not look to uncover Zeus’ signs, but rather seeks to shed light on 109
hidden things (res occultas, Lucr. 1.146), using Ciceronian language to downplay cosmic 
semiotics. 
 Lucretius’ polemical engagement with Cicero’s poetry and the worldview it represents is 
also signaled by the passage that immediately precedes the lucubratio. Before embarking on his 
task of explicating the natural order, Lucretius laments the poverty of the Latin tongue for such a 
task (Lucr. 1.136–9): 
Nec me animi fallit Graiorum obscura reperta 
difficile inlustrare Latinis versibus esse, 
 On the associations of Jupiter with serenus, see Hejduk (2009) passim. Serenus may also have Stoic undertones, 108
on which see Simone (forth.) n. 31.
 This passage is replete with Ciceronian language. Convisere is an Aratean word (Cic. Arat. 352), and 109
praepandere echoes Cic. Arat. 440. See Bailey (1947) ad loc.
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multa novis verbis praesertim cum sit agendum 
propter egestatem linguae et rerum novitatem 
Nor does it elude me that it is difficult to shed light on the dark discoveries of the Greeks 
with Latin verse, especially since it must be done with new words on account of the 
poverty of the tongue and the novelty of things 
Lucretius sets up an opposition between Greek and Latin philosophy, language, and poetry.  110
Lucretius’ reflection on translating Greek knowledge into Latin is polemical, I suggest, as it 
undermines the philosophical work Cicero has already done in conveying a divinely designed 
universe in the Aratea and De consulatu suo. Cicero has already pioneered technical 
astronomical Latin, but here Lucretius rues the inadequacy of the Latin tongue, which is a thinly-
veiled critique of Cicero’s own efforts. Cyril Bailey deems Lucretius’ complaint to be “well 
justified; in his day there was in Latin no technical philosophical or scientific phraseology. 
Cicero had similarly to work it out for himself (cf. De Fin. iii. 1.3 nobis, quibus etiam verba 
parienda sunt imponendaque nova rebus novis nomina)” (1947, 622–3); however, Bailey does 
not recognize the extent to which Cicero had already developed a vocabulary for astronomy.  In 111
fact, inlustrare (Lucr. 1.137) is itself a word that evokes Cicero’s Aratea and De consulatu suo; 
Cicero repeatedly uses forms of lustro to describe heavenly bodies.  Lucretius here deploys a 112
Ciceronian astral coinage at the very point he criticizes the Latin tongue. Lucretius’ critique of 
 On Lucretius’ Latinizing of Greek philosophy and technical language, see Sedley (1998) 35–61. 110
 Cicero, unlike Lucretius, holds that the Latin language is a suitable, even superior, vehicle for philosophy (Cic. 111
Fin. 1.1–12), on which see Baraz (2012) 113–127.
 In his later writings, Cicero describes his own act of translation with inlustrare (Acad. 1.3 and Tusc. 1.5), which 112
may be Cicero’s rebuttal to Lucretius critique here. On the use of inlustrare in Lucretius and Cicero, see Tatum 
(2007) 136–8.
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Latin and of Latin poetry in particular (Latinis versibus, Lucr. 137) alludes to Cicero’s astral 
poems. 
 Furthermore, Lucretius’ turn to lucubratio is focused on the act of translation; Lucretius 
spends the night agonizing over which words to use in order to illuminate Memmius’ mind; 
dictis quibus et quo carmine (Lucr. 1.143) is a gloss on Latinis versibus (Lucr. 1.137).  113
Although Cicero has already developed a Latin song about the stars, Lucretius spends his nights 
dissecting Cicero’s verse to rearrange it in service of his new poem on the natural world. 
Tellingly, Lucretius uses Ciceronian language to express his concern about the inadequacy of 
Latin, thus acknowledging Cicero as the pioneer of astronomical Latin and outstripping his 
predecessor in one fell swoop.  
Zodiac 
Lucretius continues to use Ciceronian language in the service of his Epicurean polemics. One of 
the most striking verbal borrowings is signifer orbis, a phrase that Cicero coined for the Zodiac. 
Lucretius likewise uses Cicero’s new word to describe the Zodiac and the celestial circles (Lucr. 
5.680–95): 
Crescere itemque dies licet et tabescere noctes,  
et minui luces, cum sumant augmina noctes,  
aut quia sol idem sub terras atque superne 
imparibus currens anfractibus aetheris oras  
partit e in partis non aequas dividit orbem, 
et quod ab alterutra detraxit parte, reponit  
eius in adversa tanto plus parte relatus,  
donec ad id signum caeli pervenit, ubi anni  
 Bailey (1947) 624.113
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nodus nocturnas exaequat lucibus umbras.  
nam medio cursu flatus aquilonis et austri  
distinet aequato caelum discrimine metas  
propter signiferi posituram totius orbis, 
annua sol in quo concludit tempora serpens,  
obliquo terras et caelum lumine lustrans, 
ut ratio declarat eorum qui loca caeli  
omnia dispositis signis ornata notarunt. 
It is permitted for the days to grow longer and for the nights to likewise grow short, 
and the daylight decreases when the nights accept increase, either because the same sun, 
running under the earth and above it, divides the shores of heaven into unequal arcs, and 
what it has taken from one part, it gives back that much more to the other side when it 
comes back around, until it reaches that constellation of heaven where the knot of the 
year makes the darkness of night equal to day. For at the midpoint of its course, halfway 
between the gusts of the north and the south, the sky holds its turning-points at equal 
distances, on account of the position of the whole constellation bearing ambit, within 
which the sun confines its annual course as it slides, as the reason declares of those who 
marked out all the regions of the sky decorated with defined constellations. 
To describe the varying lengths of days and nights, Lucretius paints an Aratean picture of the 
celestial circles with Cicero’s language. Lumine lustrans (Lucr. 5.693) is a distinctive Ciceronian 
phrase,  and ornata (Lucr. 5.695) picks up on the Aratean notion of the universe as a divine 114
artifact.  Cicero uses serpens to describe the motions of the stars.  Most importantly, 115 116
Lucretius uses the Ciceronian coinage signifer orbis to describe the Zodiac, instead of zona or 
zodiacus. As we saw above in section 1.2, Cicero develops the idea of the Zodiac as a circle of 
 Cicero uses lumine in the fifth foot 47 times in the Aratea (see Ewbank (1997) 109). See Arat. 34.332 (haec sol 114
aeterno convestit lumine lustrans). Cf. Arat. 34.237 (quattuor, aeterno lustrantes lumine mundum).
 Cicero uses the word ornatus to describe the cosmos, and later attributes the word to the celestial spheres (Rep. 115
1.22). On the significance of ornatus for an intelligently designed cosmos, see Gee (2001) 527–36.
 Arat. fr. 15, 34.15, 34.48, 34.95, 34.126; 34.215; 34.248; 34.328.116
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signs, the hallmark of the Aratean universe. Cicero out-Aratuses Aratus by making his cosmos 
especially sign filled and interactive. Thanks to Cicero’s coinage, Latin becomes a superior 
vehicle for conveying Aratean cosmic semiotics, and Cicero flags the superiority of the Latin 
term.  
 Lucretius deliberately uses Cicero’s coinage signifer orbis to emphasize that this celestial 
model is one of cosmic significance and divine order. The celestial bands and the shifting course 
of the sun under the designated sign at the designated time of year resemble a divine dance. But 
for Lucretius, this is a universe that cannot be. He undermines this Aratean explanation of solar 
motion by overturning it with alternative explanations for the variation of the lengths of days, 
suggesting that these seemingly ordered patterns could be due to the thickness of the air (Lucr. 
5.696–700) or due to slower or quicker confluence of fires (Lucr. 5.701–4). The two alternative 
explanations show that the celestial bands are not the only way of explaining the length of the 
days. For Lucretius, it is nonsense to think “that there can be a single limiting explanation for the 
sun’s motion.”   117
 Lucretius demonstrates that he can portray an Aratean cosmos in verse, only to show its 
inadequacy with alternative rational explanations. Lucretius also reveals the inadequacy of 
Cicero’s own astral language to describe the randomness of the universe; quite possibly, the sun 
does not weave itself along the signifer orbis, but follows no pattern at all. Its apparent motions 
may be due to airs and fires, nothing more. Cicero, Aratus, and all those “who mark out all the 
ordered places of the sky with certain signs” (eorum qui loca caeli/ omnia dispositis signis 
ornata notarunt, Lucr. 5.694–5) read cosmic significance into a universe that has none. The 
 Gee (2013a) 77.117
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constellations have not been “distributed” (dispositis signis) by divine hand, but are the 
imaginings of those who believe the universe to be a divine artifact. By undermining this Aratean 
model, Lucretius also overturns Cicero’s philosophical poetry, and he uses his own words to do 
it. 
Planetary Polemics  
As Cicero corrects the Greek term for the Zodiac with signifer orbis, so also he shows the 
superiority of Latin in describing the planets at the opening of De consulatu suo Book 2: 
Principio aetherio flammatus Iuppiter igni 
vertitur et totum conlustrat lumine mundum 
menteque divina caelum terrasque petessit, 
quae penitus sensus hominum vitasque retentat 
aetheris aeterni saepta atque inclusa cavernis 
Et si stellarum motus cursusque vagantis 
Nosse velis quae sint signorum in sede locatae 
Quae verbo et falsis Graiorum vocibus errant, 
Re vera certo lapsu spatioque feruntur, 
Omnia iam cernes divina mente notata 
In the beginning Jupiter burning with the aetherial fire turns and illuminates the whole 
cosmos with his light, and seeks out the sky and the earth with a divine mind, which 
sustains the thoughts and lives of humans to their innermost being, enveloped and 
embraced by the vaults of immortal aether. And if you wish to know the motions and 
vagrant courses of the planets, which are located in the seat of the constellations, which 
wander in name and in the false names of the Greeks though in truth are carried by a 
determined movement and distance, you will perceive that all things are marked out by a 
divine mind.  
The heavenly Muse Urania establishes that Jove fills the universe; the cosmos is not random, but 
as its name suggests, a beautiful, intelligible arrangement of stars, planets, and humans. Hence, 
Urania-cum-Cicero points out the Greeks’ error in calling planets “planets”—they are not 
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wanderers but heavenly bodies that follow determined and rational routes (even if those routes 
are unknown to us mortals, for the problem of the motion of the planets which seem to go into a 
retrograde motion inexplicably was a perennial problem up to Galileo’s day)—and this rational 
nature of the universe derives from the very mind of Jove itself, which is wisdom.  
 In the Aratea, however, Cicero follows Aratus in passing over the planets (Arat. fr. 
34.229–36):  
Sic malunt errare vagae per nubila caeli 
atque suos vario motu metirier orbes. 
Hae faciunt magnos longinqui temporis annos,  
cum redeunt ad idem caeli sub tegmine signum;  
quarum ego nunc nequeo tortos evolvere cursus:  
verum haec, quae semper certo evoluuntur in orbe  
fixa, simul magnos edemus gentibus orbes.  
Thus they prefer to wander footloose through the clouds of heaven and to measure out 
their orbits with a variable motion. These bring about the Great Years of long duration, 
when they return to the same star-sign under the canopy of heaven. I am not now able to 
unroll their sinuous courses; but I shall proclaim at large the great orbits of those fixed 
stars which roll round in a predictable course.   118
Cicero describes the fixed stars as following a “legitimate course” (legitimo...cursu, Arat. 
34.224), evoking the idea that they follow laws set by divine providence. The “eternal 
motion” (aeternum...motum, Arat. 34.225) of the universe is also regular, predictable, and 
ordered, as befits an Aratean cosmos. The fixed stars are contrasted with the planets, which slip 
through the Zodiac signs, for it is not possible for them to be marked out by the same rational 
movement. But as Daniele Pellacani (2015, 124 ad loc.) in his commentary on this passage 
observes, that Cicero’s planets do not randomly wander, but wander because of their preference 
(malunt, Arat. 34.229): the planets have a personality.  
 Trans. is Gee (2013b) with my modifications. 118
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 Cicero thus subtly departs from Aratus in his depiction of the planets. Although the 
planets follow a different path than the fixed stars and the Zodiac belt, they are not without 
reason: they have their own path that they prefer to take. Cicero adapts Aratus, showing that the 
planets are not completely erratic, but simply make their own way in the night sky. Nevertheless, 
Cicero does not attempt to explicate their paths, preferring to explain the fixed stars at length. 
But unlike Aratus, whose courage falters to explain them, Cicero says he is not able to explain 
their courses “now” (nunc, Arat. 34.234), leaving open the possibility of returning to them later 
(which he does in the De consuatu suo and in the Dream of Scipio, as we will see in the next 
chapter).  
 Nevertheless, the planets can still be exploited as a weak spot in an otherwise orderly 
universe. Despite Cicero’s efforts in the Aratea and De consuatu suo to show that they are not 
planets per se but rather idiosyncratic wanderers that follow their own paths, Lucretius exploits 
the weakness. Emma Gee points out how Lucretius uses the planets to promote his philosophy 
(2013a, 105):  
Cicero’s planets are extremely useful to Lucretius as an analogy for matter. In his polemic 
against intelligent design, including the argument against the roundness of the earth at 
1.1061, Lucretius makes use of the most irrational thing in the universe of the Aratea: the 
planets. The one inexplicable thing in their system is picked up by Lucretius and made to 
do all the work in his polemics. Matter and the word in general—is a random creation: 
everything in the Epicurean universe is “planetary” in this sense. 
If the stars are the visible manifestation of the inner-workings of the divine cosmic mind, then if 
they wander, this poses a real problem for the Cicero’s cosmos of signs.  
 Lucretius objects to the tenet that a divina mens et ratio moves the celestial bodies. Near 
the beginning of book 5, he promises to expose the purely natural origin of stellar motion, “lest 
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by chance we think that they light up their eternal courses between heaven and earth freely of 
their own will” (ne forte haec inter caelum terramque reamur/ libera sponte sua cursus lustrare 
perennis, Lucr. 5.77–8) or “are turned by some purpose of the gods” (neve aliqua divom volvi 
ratione putemus, Lucr. 5.81). Lustrare, cursus, and volvi are Ciceronian words used to describe 
the motions of heavenly bodies.93 Furthermore, the “plan of the divine” (divom...ratione, Lucr. 
5.81) echoes the divina mens at the beginning of Urania’s speech (DCS 2.3, 2.10). Lucretius uses 
Cicero’s language to show that all of the universe is driven by the same sort of chaotic element 
that the planets introduce. The only law that runs Lucretius’ universe are atoms and void. 
Planetary motion for Cicero represents the ordered movement of a divine mind, that subtends 
from the heavenly orbits to every stratum of the natural world. But for Lucretius, the movements 
of the planets represent a sort of wondrous randomness.  
Cosmic Poetics 
Lucretius not only uses Cicero’s poetic language, he also uses his same networks of thought in 
structuring the universe. He uses the same methodology—the analogue between universe, state, 
and soul—but to a completely different end. Book 5 concerns the birth of the cosmos as well as 
the birth of society, implicitly positing a connection between the cosmic and political, which is a 
connection that Cicero himself makes, not only in the De consulatu suo, but also in the De re 
publica, as we will see in the next chapter. For Lucretius, this parallel demonstrates the 
spontaneous generation of the natural world, both on an ecological and a societal level. Thus, in 
effect, Lucretius deploys the notion of cosmic connection (what the Stoics would call sympathy) 
to show that there is no divine plan or cosmic semiotics, only atoms and void. 
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 By writing about these matters in Latin, Lucretius is encouraging a debate that Cicero has 
set by deploying his language and structures of thought (i.e. the parallel between state, cosmos, 
soul). We also have a clue by Cicero’s response in the De re publica to reassert the idea of a 
divine mind and a divine plan. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE STARS AND THE STATESMAN  
namque erit ille mihi semper deus 
For that one will always be a god to me 
Verg. Ecl. 1.7 
2.1 Introduction 
The sixth and final book of Cicero’s On the Commonwealth (De re publica, henceforth DRP) 
famously ends with P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus (henceforth Scipio) relating an 
incredible dream in which his adoptive grandfather, the elder Scipio Africanus (henceforth 
Africanus) takes him on a dazzling astral tour. Africanus shows Scipio the order of the planets, 
the music of these spheres, the relative smallness of the earth, and the heavenly abode in the 
Milky Way reserved for good statesmen, musicians, and scholars.  Scipio’s Dream is the 119
culmination of three days of conversation about the best form of government amongst nine 
Roman statesmen away from the harried life of Rome at his countryside villa.   120
 This idyllic setting, however, does not make them forget the turbulence caused by the 
Gracchan reforms. Scipio’s nephew Q. Aelius Tubero begins the conversation by asking about 
the appearance of two suns in the sky—a topic which Scipio engages, albeit with some 
hesitation, since answers to such questions cannot be attained with any real certainty, unlike 
 For a general introduction to the Dream, see Powell (1990) 119–133, which includes an English translation and 119
commentary. The most comprehensive study of the Dream remains Boyancé (1987), but it mostly considers the 
Dream apart from the rest of the dialogue. For a helpful yet brief analysis integrating the Dream with the rest of the 
DRP, see Coleman (1964).
 The elder interlocutors are L. Furius Philus, G. Laelius Sapiens, M’ Manilius, Sp. Mummius; the younger are Q. 120
Aelius Tubero, P. Rutilius Rufus, Q. Mucius Q.f. Scaevola, C. Fannius M.f. See Zetzel (1995) 11–13 and Zetzel 
(2017) xiv–xv for a helpful introduction to the dialogue’s members. The conversation takes place in early 129 BCE 
during the Feriae Latinae, though the exact date is not clear since the Feriae Latinae were not fixed and the day of 
Scipio’s death is unknown. See Zetzel (1995) 8 n. 20.
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more pressing political affairs (Rep. 1.15).  The arrival of Scipio’s two most intimate friends, L. 121
Furius Philus and G. Laelius Sapiens, renews the debate about the topic of conversation: 
astronomy or politics (Rep. 1.17–8). Philus is eager to continue the astronomical conversation 
(Rep. 1.19). Laelius originally cedes to Philus, who tells a story about Archimedes’ two celestial 
spheres (Rep. 1.23–4). After this astronomical excursus, Laelius asks Scipio to ground the 
conversation in a more relevant, political topic (Rep. 1.33). After all, as he explains to Tubero, 
there is no room for idle talk about double suns when the Senate itself is all but split in two (Rep. 
1.31). In comparing the two suns to the division in the senate, Laelius redirects the conversation 
to politics, which remains the topic of conversation (in one form or another) until Scipio’s Dream 
(Rep. 1.33). 
 Because of the fragmentary nature of the dialogue, we are not privy to every stage of their 
discussion. Fortunately, the surviving fragments of Books I, II, III, and VI of the DRP are 
substantial; for the other books we have quotations and (partial) summaries, thanks to Lactantius 
and Saint Augustine. The fragments’ distribution—albeit uneven—across the six books allows us 
to trace the trajectory of the dialogue: it begins and ends with astronomy, but the majority of it 
concerns politics.  After indulging Philus’ astronomical talk for a while, Laelius brings the 122
conversation back down to earth by asking Scipio to talk about the state. Scipio happily 
acquiesces and begins a discursive speech about the ideal commonwealth, which, unlike Plato’s 
imaginary Kallipolis, actually exists: Rome. We might think that astronomy has been abandoned 
 Parhelia are commonly known as sun dogs. See Pease (1920) ad Cic. De div. 1.97. For meteorological 121
phenomena in antiquity, see also Stothers (2009), who writes with the expertise of a present-day meteorologist.
 I do not mean to trivialize the difficulties and complexities in analyzing the DRP in its fragmentary state, a 122
pursuit which is simultaneously “both easier and more difficult…more difficult, in that more effort is needed to 
recover even the basic outline of the argument; easier, in that the interpreter is relatively unhampered by 
evidence” (Zetzel (2001)). For a similar sentiment, see Powell (2012) 14.
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altogether; however, the stars come back full force in Book 6 in the magnificent Dream. When 
Scipio awakes, the book (as we have it) ends, leaving the reader to puzzle over its meaning. 
 What is the point of framing the political discussion with astronomy? Is the beauty of the 
Dream a Lucretian honeyed cup to sweeten a tiresome discussion of political exigencies? By 
including stars and cosmic harmony in his DRP, could Cicero simply be following Plato, whose 
Republic also famously ends in a cosmic tale, the Myth of Er? Or perhaps Cicero, licking his 
wounds after his return from exile in 57 BCE, includes the cosmic vision as a sort of consolation 
after his fall from political influence but does not take his own cosmic escapism too seriously. 
After all, on one level the DRP suggests that philosophy (including astronomy) and politics have 
little to say to one another. The dialogue dramatizes the debate between philosophy and politics 
through the stargazing Philus and practical Laelius. In the opening preface to the DRP, most 
likely addressed to his brother Quintus, Cicero himself voices disdain for philosophers who 
devote themselves to the pleasures of academic leisure instead of entering the roiled waters of 
political service. Moreover, the majority of the dialogue focuses on the cycles of political 
systems, not the movements of the heavens. It might seem, then, that the DRP’s astronomy is 
subsidiary to its politics. 
 Certainly, the DRP has often been read in this way. While acknowledging that the Dream 
picks up on the initial conversation of the double suns, scholars usually either focus on the 
dialogue’s political theory or the Dream itself, but rarely make an attempt to read the two 
together in a systematic way.  This tendency to treat the Dream separately has largely been 123
conditioned by the accidents of textual transmission. For well over a thousand years, Scipio’s 
 Atkins (2013) is a notable exception; cf. Ruch (1948), Gallagher (2001), and Coleman (1964).123
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Dream lived on apart from the lost DRP dialogue, thanks to Macrobius’ detailed commentary on 
it, and as an independent text had a huge impact on the Western scientific and literary 
imagination (including Dante). Two centuries ago, more of the DRP was found in a palimpsest 
on Saint Augustine’s Commentary on the Psalms by Angelo Mai, a discovery which vastly 
improved our knowledge of the text . Even so, the tradition of reading the Dream separately 124
was already well established; even today Latin students usually encounter the Dream apart from 
the rest of the DRP and thus miss its literary and philosophical context.  125
 Although the DRP seems to jettison astronomical topics in favor of political ones, I argue 
that the apparent shift in conversation is not straightforward. As critics have noted, Scipio’s 
discursive account of political constitutions is indebted to the opening astronomical conversation 
about Archimedes’ two spheres. Moreover, when we consider the Dream’s dramatic position in 
the dialogue, its powerful cosmic vision, I suggest, outshines the preceding conversation, which 
in retrospect asks to be reconsidered in light of the Dream’s astral grandeur. In the course of this 
chapter, I examine the major astronomical elements in the DRP: the portent of the double suns; 
Philus’ account of Archimedes’ two celestial spheres; Scipio’s invocation of Aratus; and Scipio’s 
Dream itself. As a dialogue concerned with the Republic’s wellbeing, the DRP explores the ideal 
commonwealth, which, unsurprisingly, Scipio locates in Rome. But as the dialogue unfolds, the 
best political system is bound up with scientific language and astronomical metaphors, 
 The DRP was well known until at least the 5
th
 c. CE, after which it was lost. Zetzel (2017) xvi–xx has a helpful 124
discussion of the textual transmission of the DRP. For more on Mai’s discovery and its impact on Italy, see Zetzel 
(2012) 19–44.
 The available Anglophone commentaries are Powell (1990) and Zetzel (1995). Powell’s commentary contains the 125
Dream and no other part of the DRP; Zetzel’s commentary includes the Dream and most of the fragments but 
excludes some of the initial astronomical conversation, which makes the dialogue’s astronomical frame less 
noticeable to students.
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suggesting that the parallelism between the microcosm of the state and the macrocosm of the 
heavens is not merely an analogy but itself a natural phenomenon, as it were, one that likewise 
requires interpretation. A polyphonous dialogue, in which no voice has the ultimate authority, the 
DRP requires the reader to attend carefully to the conversation to discern its meaning, which in 
turn implicates her in the ongoing activity of the dialogue in its pursuit of truth, which extends 
from Scipio and his friends, to Cicero and his brother, to us readers.  
 This quasi-narrative form is especially well suited to Cicero’s own philosophical position 
as an Academic Skeptic. In the world of the dialogue, Cicero is able to dramatically play out one 
perspective against another while entertaining multiple possibilities of truth, including a starry 
afterlife, which must have been attractive to him given the political turmoil of the 50s. But for 
Cicero, the dialogue remains open. Scipio’s Dream is not the final word. I think that Cicero is 
cautiously hopeful that the order of the stars implies some undergirding rational order, as the 
Stoics say it does. But Cicero sua voce does not forward such a view, for to do so would reify the 
truth into a single object, which from his perspective as a Skeptic must always remain a matter of 
probabile. Thus, the dialogue itself operates in a dual register—with two suns, two philosophical 
modes, even two Scipios—figuratively communicating the impossibility of pinpointing a 
definitive answer in one philosophical viewpoint. But whatever the relationship between stars, 
states, and human souls, Cicero’s dialogue, I believe, asks us to at least entertain the possibility 
that the cosmic order is relevant for human political life.  
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2.2 The Horizontal and the Vertical: The Old Quarrel Between the Active and 
Contemplative Life 
Before turning to the four particular instances of astronomy mentioned above, I first consider 
how the DRP navigates the long-standing debate between the active and contemplative life, a 
tension that Cicero raises in the preface and returns to in the unfolding of the dialogue.  These 126
two modes are relevant to my argument about the dialogue’s fundamental relationship between 
states and stars since political engagement and stargazing are the consummate examples of the 
active and contemplative life, respectively. Furthermore, the dialogue itself invites such a 
comparison in juxtaposing the preface’s discussion of the active/contemplative life with the 
opening conversation about politics/astronomy between Scipio and Tubero.   
 Cicero himself had to navigate his own relationship to political engagement and the 
contemplative life. As consul in 63, Cicero reached the pinnacle of the active life. After his 
subsequent exile and return (58–57 BCE), Cicero never again achieved the same degree of 
political influence; it is surely no coincidence that Cicero then began his first period of writing 
philosophical dialogues with the De oratore (55 BCE) and the DRP shortly thereafter (54–51 
BCE). His philosophical writing, the labor of otium, serves as a substitute for political 
engagement. Hence, Cicero, choosing philosophical topics that focus on theories of human 
conduct and action, crafts his philosophy as fundamentally connected to the vita activa.  
 Cicero brings up the tension between the active and contemplative life in letters to Atticus: Att. 1.17.5,  2.12.4, 126
2.16.3, 7.3.1, 14.20.5, on which see McConnell (2014) 115-60. For Cicero’s conception of this quarrel as a 
Peripatetic debate, see also Zetzel (1995) 96–9. Baraz (2012) 22–45 explores the tension between work and leisure 
in Cicero and Latin literature of the first c. BCE more broadly. Brown (2009) establishes the general Roman 
attitudes against leisure and its activities. On Cicero’s treatment of the topic, see also André (1966) 279–334, Görler 
(1990), and Lévy (2012).
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 Even so, philosophy itself needs an apology. As Yelena Baraz points out, “philosophy was 
not an easy sell” in first-century Rome (2012: 3) . Philosophy was readily accepted in certain 127
spheres—a wealthy family might keep a house philosopher as a sign of prestige; a young man 
would often study philosophy as part of his early education—but overindulgence was viewed 
with a certain degree of wariness.  Philosophy, after all, requires time and space to think. If 128
Rome’s best and brightest were to keep their heads in the clouds, who would steer the state? 
Philosophy most naturally attaches to the vita contemplativa since it requires the space of leisure 
for thinking, writing, and reading. Philosophy in and of itself is commonly viewed as useless—
acceptable if relegated to limited periods of otium, but not to be pursued for its own sake.  129
Cicero is well aware that philosophy and writing dialogues are naturally in tension with public 
pursuits, as we see him wrestling with his own philosophical output in the dialogue’s preface: 
How much philosophy is appropriate? And, what kind of philosophy is best?  
 Cicero was not the first to raise these tensions, which are questions that occupied the 
Greeks as well. The relationship between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa goes back at 
least to Aristotle, as Cicero himself recognizes (De Fin. 2.19). In the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle makes the distinction between theoria and praktike (1.9). Later, the Peripatetic 
Dicaearchus advocated the active life, whereas Theophrastus championed theoria.  The 130
different philosophical schools of Cicero’s time advocated different degrees of public 
 Baraz (2012) portrays first-century Rome as generally suspicious and even contemptuous of philosophy (12–3). 127
In her analysis, Romans appropriated Greek culture in ways that could immediately benefit them (12). Zetzel (2015) 
points out that Cicero was able to draw on great philosophical cultural cachet that reveals the prevalence of 
philosophy in elite circles, showing that philosophy was in the drinking water, so to speak.
 See Tusc. 2.1 and Cat. 3 and Baraz’ discussion of them (2012) 22–31.128
 See Baraz (2012) 22–3.129
 For the Peripatetic nature of the debate between the active and contemplative life with regards to this passage, see 130
Zetzel (1995) 98–99.
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engagement. Stoicism, for example, encouraged political activity; Epicureanism, by contrast, 
urged a quiet retreat from public life; Platonism and Aristotelianism, in between the two, extolled 
the vita contemplativa (albeit with some considerable reservations). Yet to some extent, 
philosophy itself is a contemplative activity that, even in its most politically engaged forms, is 
attached to the theoretical, not the practical. Thus, a tension arises between the otium philosophy 
demands and the negotium of political engagement. On this view, of the three branches of 
philosophy—ethics, logic, and physics—the last might strike one of Cicero’s Roman 
contemporaries as the most superfluous of an already gratuitous mode of inquiry. What, then, 
does the DRP—a dialogue ostensibly focused on the commonwealth—have to do with 
philosophy, much less natural philosophy?  
 Whatever the implications of philosophy for public life, the Epicureans pursuing leisure for 
its own sake are surely wrong from Cicero’s viewpoint, as the opening of the extant preface 
indicates. After about seventeen missing folios, the text enters this old quarrel with Cicero’s 
praise of the Elder Cato, who abandoned his life of leisure in old age in order to serve the 
Republic (Rep. 1.1): 
M. vero Catoni homini ignoto et novo, quo omnes qui isdem rebus studemus quasi 
exemplari ad industriam virtutemque ducimur, certe licuit Tusculi se in otio delectare, 
salubri et propinquo loco. Sed homo demens, ut isti putant, cum cogeret eum necessitas 
nulla, in his undis et tempestatibus ad summam senectutem maluit iactari quam in illa 
tranquillitate atque otio iucundissime vivere.  
But M. Cato, an unknown and “new man,” whom we who are eager for the same things 
all follow as an example for industry and virtue, certainly could have enjoyed himself in 
leisure at Tusculum, a salubrious and nearby spot. But Cato was a lunatic, as those men 
suppose, since when no necessity drove him to do so, he preferred to be buffeted in these 
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waves and storms––up to the highest age––rather than to live most pleasantly in that 
tranquility and leisure.  
Cato is upheld as an exemplum to Roman readers for putting the Republic above all else, 
including the otium of a deserved retirement. By extolling Cato for entering the undis et 
tempestatibus (1.1) of political life instead of succumbing to pleasant leisure, Cicero implicitly 
critiques the Epicurean school, which posits the injunction “live unnoticed” (λάθε βιώσας) and 
advocates the pursuit of pleasure.  Cicero repudiates “those men” (isti, 1.1) who pooh-pooh 131
Cato for entering political waters, an image which recalls the famous opening of Book 2 of the 
DRN where Lucretius remarks how pleasant it is to stand apart from life’s turbulences (Lucr. 
2.1–4):  
Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis 
e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem;  
non quia vexari quemquamst iucunda voluptas, 
sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suave est.  
It is sweet to watch from the land the great effort of another when the winds stir up the 
level fields of water on the great sea, not because it is a joyous pleasure that anyone be 
tormented, but because it is sweet to perceive that you are free from those dire situations 
yourself. 
The man being tossed by billows refers not only to the risks of seafaring but also evokes the 
ship-of-state metaphor.  The Epicurean does not enter such roiled political waters, but rather 132
stands aside, increasing his pleasure by the contrast between his happy state and the buffeted 
 For a discussion of Cicero’s disdain for Lucretius and Epicureanism on both a literary and philosophical level, 131
see Zetzel (1998) contra Maslowski (1974). On Epicureanism in Cicero more broadly, see Gilbert (2015) and Volk 
(forthcoming) 31–44. For an introduction to the Epicurean idea of λάθε βιώσας, see Roskam (2007) 1–28.
 Cf. Rep. 1.6, where Cicero makes the ship-of-state metaphor explicit. See also Rep. 1.34.132
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man’s. But, if by employing the hedonistic calculus (Epist. ad Men. 130), the Epicurean ever 
should discover that his avoiding political life will ultimately cause him more pain than engaging 
it, he may enter the public eye—for example, if the state is in crisis.   133
 Cicero finds this particularly objectionable. State leadership requires political expertise 
acquired over time, a point he levels against the Epicurean proposition that the sage may enter 
politics in a crisis without prior experience (Rep. 1.10–11). Cicero spares no words to denigrate 
the Epicureans for their political withdrawal (although it is interesting that he never names them 
explicitly), but he does not stop with them. Indeed, Cicero rebukes all philosophers for retreating 
into their corners (Rep. 1.2). Even the distinguished philosopher Xenocrates says that philosophy 
only succeeds in making a few virtuous men, whereas the law compels many to live well, 
indicating that public service effects greater good and is therefore superior to philosophy (Rep. 
1.3).  
 But it is far too simplistic to interpret Cicero championing politics above and beyond 
philosophy without qualification. After all, the lawmakers are able to develop their good laws 
because of the underlying order of nature that spurs people to create political communities in the 
first place (Rep. 1.3). But who is it who studies this underlying natural order and translates it to 
the practical “real” world, if not the philosophers? This suggests that philosophers have a certain 
sort of precedence over lawmakers, or perhaps, that the lawmakers are themselves philosophers 
of a sort. The Seven Sages, for example, are upheld as a model of philosopher-politician-
lawmakers, even though, as Cicero notes, not all of them directly participated in public life (Rep. 
 On the political engagement of Epicureans, see Fish (2011).133
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1.12), most famously Thales, who studied natural phenomena.  Nevertheless, for Cicero, they 134
are exemplary in their pursuit of an active philosophy. 
 Let us now turn to the opening dialogue between Scipio and Tubero, which renews the 
preface’s tension between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa and adds a new but related 
topic: the relationship of astronomy and politics. After Tubero arrives at his uncle’s villa, Scipio 
expresses some surprise that his nephew has abandoned the leisure of his studies (Rep. 1.14–15): 
Tum ille: Mihi vero omne tempus est ad meos libros vacuum; numquam enim sunt illi 
occupati; te autem permagnum est nancisci otiosum, hoc praesertim motu rei publicae. 
Tum Scipio: Atqui nactus es, sed mehercule otiosiorem opera quam animo. Et ille: At 
vero animum quoque relaxes oportet; sumus enim multi, ut constituimus, parati, si tuo 
commodo fieri potest, abuti tecum hoc otio. {SC.} Libente me vero, ut aliquid aliquando 
de doctrinae studiis admoneamur. Tum ille: Visne igitur, quoniam et me quodam modo 
invitas et tui spem das, hoc primum, Africane, videamus, ante quam veniunt alii, quidnam 
sit, de isto altero sole quod nuntiatum est in senatum? 
Then Tubero said: “I have all the time in the world for my books, as they’re never busy. 
You, however––it’s no small thing to find you at leisure, especially given this turmoil of 
our commonwealth.” 
Scipio replied: “And indeed, you have found me more at leisure in activity than mind.”  
Tubero: “But truly, it’s fitting that you relax your mind as well, for several of us are ready 
to spend this period of leisure with you, as we decided––if it is agreeable to you.” 
Scipio: “Yes, with pleasure. That way we can at last be reminded of something 
worthwhile concerning our endeavors of study.” 
Tubero then said: “Well then, since you all but invite me and give me hope for your 
interest, shall we consider this first, Africanus—before the others come—what should 
one make of that second sun that’s been reported in the senate?” 
 Thales famously fell into a well while studying the stars (Pl. Tht. 174a3–b1). The anecdote supposedly illustrates 134
the irrelevancy of astronomy (and Thales’ stargazing making him disconnected from reality), but for the argument 
that Thales went into the well intentionally in order to better observe the sky, see Buddensiek (2014) 1–32.
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Tubero says that his books are never busy (numquam enim sunt illi occupati, 1.14), since they 
naturally are read during periods of otium. Scipio, however, is almost always occupatus, unlike 
Tubero’s books, which have endless leisure (omne tempus…vacuum, 1.14) . Yet even the 135
suggestion that the books could be occupati (even though they are not) opens up the imagination 
to think that books could be part of something other than pure leisure. The fact that Scipio is 
otiosum (1.14) when the Republic is in turmoil (motu rei publicae, 1.14) draws attention to the 
specter of political obligation that is always pressing upon the circumscribed space of otium. 
Obligation looms over leisure even in the best of political circumstances, but especially during 
hard political times (which is not only the case for the dramatic setting of the dialogue—the 
Gracchan reforms—but also for the time when Cicero was writing—the rise of Caesar). Scipio’s 
response also draws attention to the distinction between political engagement and otium even as 
it blurs that distinction. Scipio is otiosus with respect to opera, but not in animo. The life of the 
mind, which naturally attaches to otium, is occupied with public negotium, whereas Scipio’s 
leisure is defined in terms of (the lack of) opera. Yet by describing Scipio’s leisure in the terms 
of a lack of deeds—the purview of negotium—Cicero brings to the fore the contrast between the 
active life of political engagement and the philosophical conversation of otium. 
 In proposing an astronomical topic of conversation, Tubero not only foreshadows the starry 
ending of the Dream but also invites the readers to ask themselves what sort of studia it is 
acceptable to pursue during otium. Will Scipio allow astronomical talk when political life at 
Rome is going so poorly? Scipio begins to engage Tubero with his question of parhelia, which 
suggests some degree of openness to talking about natural phenomena. But Scipio quickly brings 
 Occupatus is a word that evokes the vita activa; cf. Baraz (2012) 21.135
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up Panaetius, who he wishes were present among their coterie, since he is “accustomed to 
inquire most eagerly both about these celestial matters and other topics of interest” (qui cum 
cetera, tum haec caelestia vel studiosissime solet quaerere, Rep. 1.15). Scipio, however, 
immediately proceeds to criticize their Stoic friend for his over-confidence in his opinions about 
astral matters (and presumably other philosophical topics as well), because he “affirms those 
things which we are scarcely able to make conjectures about, so that it seems as if he perceives 
these things with his eyes or handles them openly with his own hand” (qui, quae vix coniectura 
qualia sint possumus suspicari, sic adfirmat, ut oculis ea cernere videatur aut tractare plane 
manu, Rep. 1.15).  Panaetius merits critique for his excessive confidence in things which 136
cannot be known for certain.   
 As a foil to Panaetius, Scipio turns to Socrates, who did not make assumptions about 
abstract topics which cannot be affirmed, like astronomy (Rep. 1.15–16): 
quo etiam sapientiorem Socratem soleo iudicare, qui omnem eius modi curam deposuerit 
eaque, quae de natura quaererentur, aut maiora, quam hominum ratio consequi posset, aut 
nihil omnino ad vitam hominum adtinere dixerit.  
Wherefore I deem Socrates even wiser, who set aside all concern for this mode of inquiry 
and said that those things which are asked about nature either are more than human 
reason can follow or in no way pertain to the life of mankind.  
Scipio suggests that Panaetius and Socrates pursue opposing philosophical modes: Panaetius is 
excessively devoted to theoretical investigations, whereas Socrates is concerned with matters 
closer to Earth. Hence, Scipio relates that Socrates rejects the study of natural philosophy (quae 
 Panaetius of Rhodes (185–109 BCE) was an orthodox Stoic, although he challenged the idea of eternal 136
recurrence and the relevancy of astrology. For more on Panaetius and Cicero, see Gärtner (1974).
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de natura quaererentur, Rep. 1.15) in favor of ethical philosophy, which has something definitive 
to say about real-world human life (ad vitam hominum adtinere, Rep. 1.15–16). The implication 
is that Scipio and Tubero should also direct their conversation to more practical matters. 
 But what counts as politically relevant and hence practical is precisely what is in question. 
Tubero does not ask about parhelia out of the blue; the double suns have been brought up in the 
Senate, presumably because it must be determined whether or not the phenomenon is a portent 
that needs interpretation. The phenomenon, after all, could have political import (and indeed, 
Scipio’s imminent death suggests that it does) . Tubero is not interested in parhelia only qua 137
astronomical phenomenon; it is already bound up with a political context. So the question 
remains: are astronomical questions actually politically relevant? 
 Tubero continues to combine the theoretical and practical by pointing out that Socrates 
himself combined the two modes, and he therefore objects to his uncle’s portrayal of Socrates 
(Rep. 1.16): 
Nescio, Africane, cur ita memoriae proditum sit, Socratem omnem istam disputationem 
reiecisse et tantum de vita et de moribus solitum esse quaerere.  
I do not understand, Scipio, why it has been handed down to memory in this way—that 
Socrates rejected wholesale this sort of inquiry and was accustomed only to ask about 
human life and ethics. 
Tubero draws attention to competing accounts of the sort of philosopher Socrates was, which 
may remind us of various representations of Socrates in the Greek sources. For example, 
 This interpretation is supported by a later comparison linking the death of Scipio with the portentous appearance 137
of two suns: “Then the sun doubled, which I had heard had happened when Tuditanus and Aquilius were consuls, in 
which year indeed Publius Africanus, that second sun, was extinquished” (tum sole geminato, quod ut e patre audivi 
Tuditano et Aquilio consulibus evenerat, quo quidem anno P. Africanus sol exxtinctus est, Nat. D. 2.14).
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Aristophanes maligns Socrates for wasting his time staring at the sky and walking about in the 
clouds (Pl. Ap., Ar. Nub.), whereas Xenophon claims that Socrates jettisoned astronomical 
learning altogether (Mem. 1). Perhaps the most definitive source on Socrates (certainly in 
Tubero’s view, at any rate), Plato paints a Socrates who was interested not only in ethical matters 
but also physical ones. Tubero reminds his uncle of this Platonic Socrates (Rep. 1.16): 
quem enim auctorem de illo locupletiorem Platone laudare possumus? cuius in libris 
multis locis ita loquitur Socrates, ut etiam, cum de moribus, de virtutibus, denique de re 
publica disputet, numeros tamen et geometriam et harmoniam studeat Pythagorae more 
coniungere.  
For what authority can we praise that is more substantial than that Plato? In his books in 
many places Socrates speaks in such a way that even when he argues about ways of 
living, excellence of character, and ultimately the state, he nevertheless is eager to 
connect them with mathematics, geometry, and harmony in the Pythagorean mode.  
For this Socrates, the practical habits of human life—including political ones—are part and 
parcel of more theoretical inquiries, like mathematics. Tubero’s/Plato’s Socrates is a far cry from 
Scipio’s. It seems, then, that we have two different Socrates: one devoted solely to ethics and one 
also interested in theoretical inquiries.  
 Scipio does not deny that Plato portrays Socrates in such a way. Rather, he explains Plato’s 
Socrates’ interest in lofty subjects with Plato’s desire to attribute as much as possible to his great 
teacher (Rep. 1.16):  
Sunt ista ut dicis; sed audisse te credo, Tubero, Platonem Socrate mortuo primum in 
Aegyptum discendi causa, post in Italiam et in Siciliam contendisse ut Pythagorae 
inventa perdisceret, eumque et cum Archyta Tarentino et cum Timaeo Locro multum 
fuisse, et Philolai commentaries esse nanctum, cumque eo tempore in his locis 
Pythagorae nomen vigeret, illum se et hominibus Pythagoreis et studiis illis dedisse. 
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Itaque cum Socratem unice dilexisset, eique omnia tribuere voluisset, leporem 
Socraticum subtilitatemque sermonis cum obscuritate Pythagorae et cum illa plurimarum 
artium gravitate contexuit.  
What you say is true: but I believe that you have heard, Tubero, that after Socrates died, 
Plato first made his way to Egypt for the sake of learning, and afterwards to Italy and 
Sicily, so that he might thoroughly learn the discoveries of Pythagoras; and that he spent 
much time with Archytas of Tarentum and Timaeus of Locri, and that he got a hold of 
Philolaus’ commentaries; and that since at this time and in these places the name of 
Pythagoras flourished, he dedicated himself to the Pythagoreans and their studies. 
Therefore since he loved Socrates uniquely, he wanted to attribute to him all things, and 
he wove Socratic charm and subtlety of speech together with the obscurity of Pythagoras 
and with that gravity of his numerous forms of knowledge. 
Scipio refers to the tradition that Plato went to Egypt and beyond, where he acquired 
Pythagorean knowledge which he was in turn eager to attribute to Socrates. But this Socrates is 
merely Plato’s version. The difference in the perception of the two Socrates depends on the 
tradition that has been “handed down to memory” (proditum memoriae, Rep. 1.16.2). This detail 
is important, because memory determines the present perception of past knowledge and people, 
such as Socrates, Plato, and even Cicero himself . 138
 Cicero invites us readers to think carefully about how the Socratic question applies to 
Cicero’s own construction of his dialogue. Tubero and Scipio’s debate draws our attention to the 
discrepancy between Plato’s Socrates and Socrates the historical man. Although it is common 
both in antiquity and today to view Socrates as Plato’s mouthpiece, Cicero foregrounds the 
discrepancy between the author of the dialogue and his interlocutors. By the same token, 
Cicero’s voice cannot be localized in Scipio or any other single character. Rather, it is the task of 
. For the idea of writing as a means of preserving memory and therefore even superior to action, see Baraz (2012) 138
27–8 on Sallust’s prefaces.
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the reader to wrestle through the interlocutors’ various arguments to get at the truth, a process 
which suits Cicero’s Academic mode.  While one might think that Scipio is a stand-in for 139
Cicero, the text is not so straightforward. Cicero uses the genre of the dialogue to bring diverse 
ideas into competition and emphasizes this by reminding his readers that the Socrates 
encountered in the Platonic dialogues is not the “true” Socrates but only a particular version of 
him. 
 Plato was an extremely important figure for Cicero.  Not only did he translate the famous 140
philosopher, he also gave him the highest praise, elevating him to a nearly divine status (ille deus 
noster, Att. 4.16.3). Pliny the Elder reports that in the preface to the DRP Cicero declared himself 
to be Plato’s companion (NH praef. 22). Certainly, Cicero seems to be following Plato in his 
writing of the DRP,  which formally mimics the Republic insofar as it is a philosophical 141
dialogue concerned with politics that ends with a cosmic myth. But Cicero’s text is a Roman 
version of Plato’s Republic, or rather, “Plato’s turned inside out.”  Plato’s Republic only 142
imagines what the ideal city would be while Cicero upholds Rome as a real-world example of 
that ideal (Rep. 2.52): 
 For a similar point, see Atkins (2013) 33–42. On the suitability of the dialogue for Cicero’s philosophical 139
allegiance to Academic Skepticism, see Woolf (2015) with a discussion of the Republic and Laws as Cicero’s first 
philosophical dialogues (93–124). Thanks to a letter to his brother Quintus (Q. fr. 3.5.1–2), we know that Cicero 
considered inserting himself into the dialogue. Ultimately, he decided against it; in part, I propose, because it would 
have undermined the philosophical benefits of his Skeptical stance. Long (1995) 41–3 points out Cicero’s imitation 
of Plato’s dialogue style and its suitability to his Skepticism.
 For a general introduction to Cicero as a Plato figure, see Long (1995) 37–61; Bishop (2019) 85–128; and 140
Boyancé (1970). On Plato being particularly suited to Cicero as a Skeptic, see Fox (2007) 57–68; Schofield (2008); 
and Brittain (2001). Zetzel (2003) considers Cicero’s use of Plato and Greek culture, arguing that Cicero is 
“genuinely distrustful” of it and “believed that there were strict limitation to the proper role of Greek culture in 
Rome” (120–121). For a catalogue of Cicero’s uses of Plato, see Degraff (1940). See also Quint. Inst. 10.1.123, who 
famously praises Cicero, calling him Plato’s equal in his philosophical endeavor (Platonis aemulus), on which see 
Douglas (1962).
 Long (1995) 44–5.141
 Sharples (1986) 30; see also Zetzel (1995) 13–7.142
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Ego autem, si [quo] modo consequi potuero, rationibus eisdem, quas ille vidit, non in 
umbra et imagine civitatis, sed in amplissima re publica enitar, ut cuiusque et boni publici 
et mali causam tamquam virgula videar attingere.  
But I, if I am somehow able to follow suit with those same principles of reason that 
[Plato] saw, I shall try—not in the shadow and likeness of the commonwealth—but in the 
most fleshed-out, Republic—to appear to touch the cause of each public good and ill with 
a pointer, as it were.  
This passage’s context has been lost, but the speaker (presumably Scipio) recognizes the 
similarity of approach between himself and Plato while also highlighting the difference between 
the theoretical and the actual: Plato’s Republic is about a hypothetical city, while Cicero writes 
about a political regime that has actually been implemented—Rome.   143
 Cicero’s DRP, however, is not as practically and politically oriented as this juxtaposition 
might seem to suggest. For one thing, Cicero sets the DRP in the past, which already puts it at a 
remove from Cicero’s Rome of the 50s BCE.  This authorial decision is especially salient since 144
we know that Cicero considered setting the dialogue in contemporary times, although Cicero 
says that in the end he chose not to in order to avoid offense.  Yet projecting the dialogue into 145
the past grants it an imaginary, even mythic, quality. Furthermore, Cicero’s Rome is itself a 
fiction. For example, Scipio’s historical narrative in Book 2 is highly edited: Romulus is praised 
 Schofield (2008) sees the DRP as an “assertion of Rome against Greece” (77). He argues that in the DRP Cicero 143
has Scipio articulate his ideal commonwealth as a polemic against Plato: “In De Republica, for example, despite the 
respect for Plato that Cicero expresses here as elsewhere (in this work by the very writing of a dialogue with that 
title and with the main themes it pursues), a key claim is that the theory of the optimus status rei publicae he puts in 
the mouth of Scipio is superior to Plato’s (Rep. 2.21–2), because it is not utopian and because it reflects the historical 
experience of the Romans as they worked out their own compromise between monarchy, aristocracy and popular 
rule” (78).
 Cf. De or., which is set in 91 BCE at the brink of the Social War, when Cicero was a youth. Putting a dialogue in 144
the past is a technique of Plato's (e.g. Ti., Symp.).
 Q. fr. 3.5.2.145
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while Remus does not even appear, a choice that allows Cicero to suppress the fratricide and 
uphold Romulus alone as Rome’s admirable king and founder. Such a narrative is itself a kind of 
myth-making . 146
 We begin to see, then, that the division between theory and reality, contemplation and 
action, philosophy and politics, stargazing and statecraft, is not as stark as the dialogue initially 
seems to suggest. The text’s organizational structure pits intangible ideals (such stars and 
theoretical philosophy) against real-world concerns (such as political constitutions and 
statesmanship), only to show how interconnected these binaries really are. On the one hand, the 
interlocutors are statesmen dedicated to the vita activa whose primary concern is practical: the 
best political model and its implementation at Rome. On the other hand, the dialogue itself is a 
philosophical treatise set in the country during a period of leisure, and the interlocutors—
whatever their roles of negotium in city life—are men with well-known intellectual interests and 
philosophical inclinations musing about ideal governments and the relevance of astral 
phenomena, which in and of itself is a theoretical enterprise. To put it plainly, the DRP is not a 
how-to manual on running governments or a straight-forward historical account but a highly 
literary piece of political (and perhaps natural) philosophy. Moreover, the DRP ends with the 
magnificent Dream, an astral myth, which seems to challenge political philosophy as such. These 
respective divisions initially appear divergent in their orientations, like horizontal and vertical 
axes. Yet we see the text drawing our attention to the intersection of these axes, not their 
divergence farther afield. 
 See Cornell (2001) 41–56 for Scipio’s selective historical narrative.146
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 Below, I chart the apparent structuralist dualities operative in the dialogue (table 1). On the 
one hand, we have the Horizontal category, which Cicero seems to advocate in the preface and 
Scipio moves toward in the opening dialogue. This is the world of practical action. On the other, 
we have the Vertical category, which Tubero gestures towards in his questioning into astronomy 
and his portraiture of a Platonic Socrates. This is the world of contemplation.  
Table 1 
I set forth this schema as a tool that is useful to think with in approaching the DRP, but I do not 
mean to suggest that it is absolute. For example, the appearance of an item in one category does 
not necessarily imply the presence of all of the others: if a character seems to advocate for star 
study, he may not at the same time gesture towards leisure or myth. I argue that Cicero plays 
these dualities against one another in order to show their fundamental connection since the 
dialogue blurs the opposites even as it posits them: otium is bound up with the political life; 
Tubero’s astronomical question is politically contextualized.  
HORIZONTAL                                         VERTICAL








 As Book 1 progresses, the debate between the Horizontal and Vertical passes from Scipio 
and Tubero to Laelius and Philus. Unlike Tubero and Scipio, who are separated by age and rank, 
Laelius and Philus are equals, experienced statesmen who belong to the older generation of the 
dialogue’s interlocutors. As readers, we may be more inclined to heed Scipio’s points over 
Tubero’s because of his august status. With Laelius and Philus, however, it is not obvious that 
one should be considered more authoritative than the other. Granted, Laelius is named Sapiens, 
but both are held in high esteem by Scipio. On the one hand, Scipio seems quite close to Laelius 
in his opinions on the stars since he challenges his nephew’s interest in star study at the 
beginning of the dialogue. The dialogue thus seems to set up Laelius and Scipio as pendants of 
one another (Rep. 1.18). Sometimes Laelius upholds Scipio as the superior, but sometimes Scipio 
puts Laelius in the preeminent position, granting him as it were parental authority (in loco 
parentis, Rep. 1.18).   147
 On the other hand, the text also suggests that Philus could be Scipio’s doublet. Like 
Laelius, Philus is a man of influence and Scipio’s intimate friend. Philus’ story about Galus’ 
sphere prompts Scipio to wax loftily about the cosmic viewpoint and the value of philosophy 
(Rep. 1.27–9), though Laelius immediately grounds him in political discussion again. To borrow 
Atkins’ terminology, Scipio demonstrates a “dual allegiance” to philosophy and politics and 
oscillates between the philosophical positions that Philus and Laelius uphold.  148
 We should note that in the De Amicitia Cicero portrays Laelius as Scipio’s most intimate friend, a role that 147
arguably plays in the DRP as well. I simply wish to point out that he and Philus both belong to the “older 
generation” of interlocutors and that Scipio, ambivalent, at some points seems more persuaded by one, at other times 
by the other.
 Atkins (2013) 54 points out Scipio’s ambivalent stance: “While the other characters so far have appeared to be 148
devoted more completely either to politics or scientific inquiry, Scipio has demonstrated a dual allegiance.”
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 Laelius and Philus voice opposing views: Laelius is the most consistent and vociferous 
defender of the Horizontal, Philus of the Vertical. The stature of both men asks the reader to 
consider both their viewpoints seriously. Furthermore, in the course of their conversation, it 
seems that Philus and Laelius themselves shift in their positions as they adopt the opposing 
viewpoint in the re-enactment of the Carneadean debate in Book 3. Even though their adjustment 
in positions is contrived by the parameters of the conversation, the fact that they are able to 
change their philosophical viewpoints invites the reader in her engagement with the dialogue to 
likewise try on different philosophical viewpoints. In short, the dialogue asks the reader to 
engage various characters’ arguments and does not univocally advocate for one position over the 
others.     
 Let us look more closely at Laelius and Philus’ exchange in Book 1. Shortly upon his 
arrival at Scipio’s villa, Laelius inquires about the day’s topic of conversation. When Philus first 
informs him of their debate about the parhelia, Laelius marvels that they would indulge in such 
conversation when the commonwealth is at stake (Rep. 1.19). Laelius’ indignation is expressive 
of his deep commitment to the Republic. His particular allegiances preclude him from bothering 
about physics, not because he is not curious about parhelia per se, but because their nature is 
undiscoverable and (on his view) merely idle speculation (Rep. 1.32):  
aut enim nullus esse potest, aut sit sane, ut visus est, modo ne sit molestus, aut scire 
istarum rerum nihil aut, etiamsi maxime sciemus, nec meliores ob eam scientiam nec 
beatiores esse possumus 
For either such a thing [as double suns] cannot exist, or to be sure, let it exist, as long as it 
doesn’t cause trouble—we either can’t know anything about these matters, or, even if we 
know them well, we are not able to be better or happier on account of such knowledge.  
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This objection to studying astral matters recalls Scipio’s critique of Panaetius, who likewise 
investigated things that cannot be known for certain. Political knowledge, on the other hand, 
accords with real-world experience and can therefore be known and benefit mankind (Rep. 1.32).  
 Yet, despite his rejection of further inquiry into parhelia, Laelius is the one who posits a 
parallel between the astral phenomenon of the two suns and the political situation. Earlier in 
Book 1, Laelius tells Philus that he is happy to continue their conversation of the two suns, 
“unless by chance Manilius thinks that some interdict should be issued for the two suns, that they 
should possess the heavens in the same way in which they both possessed it before” (nisi forte 
Manilius interdictum aliquod inter duos soles putat esse componendum, ut ita caelum 
possideant, ut uterque possederit, Rep. 1.20). Laelius’ legal joke about the suns posits a 
connection between the laws of the land and the laws of stars. Of course, this parallel is made in 
jest, but Laelius is the first to suggest a direct connection between the two. Later, Laelius even 
more explicitly connects the parhelia to the political phenomenon of two Senates (Rep. 1.31): 
Quid enim mihi L. Pauli nepos, hoc avunculo, nobilissima in familia atque in hac tam 
clara re publica natus, quaerit, quo modo duo soles visi sint, non quaerit, cur in una re 
publica duo senatus et duo paene iam populi sint.  
Why, I ask, does the grandson of L. Paulus, nephew of this uncle, born in the most noble 
family and in this renowned republic, ask why two suns have been seen in the sky, and 
not ask why in one republic there are two senates and almost already two peoples?  
The happenings of the sky reflect the political realities, suggesting some sort of sympathy 
between the two: the two suns mirror the two peoples. In his rejection of astral matters, Laelius 
seems to highlight their political relevance; the very fact that Laelius entertains the possibility 
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that the double suns could be an omen suggests that there is a connection between the Horizontal 
and the Vertical. 
 Laelius’ unwitting connection of the astronomical and political picks up on the logic of 
Philus’ earlier point that the astral and political are inextricably linked. To convince Laelius that 
their astronomical investigation is worthwhile, Philus appeals to Laelius’ domestic inclinations 
by eliding the difference between the city and the universe, pointing out that they are one and the 
same (Rep. 1.19):  
An tu ad domos nostras non censes pertinere, scire quid agatur et quid fiat domi—quae 
non ea est quam parietes nostri cingunt, sed mundus hic totus, quod domicilium quamque 
patriam di nobis communem secum dederunt—cum praesertim, si haec ignoremus, multa 
nobis et magna ignoranda sint?  
“But do you not think that it concerns our homes to know what is being done and 
accomplished at home—which is not the one which our walls enclose but this whole 
universe, which the gods gave to us as a domicile and as a fatherland to have in common 
with them. Especially since, if we are ignorant of these matters, we must remain ignorant 
of many important things?”  
Philus makes a very Stoic point by expanding the borders of “home” to the cosmos itself, thereby 
making the parhelia a local affair of domestic importance. On this view, we are citizens of Rome, 
but we are first and foremost members of the cosmic city, the cosmopolis.  Therefore, the 149
astronomical happenings are inherently public and relevant to human life.  




 c. BCE, coined the appellation “citizen of the 149
universe” (κοσµοπολίτης), which influenced the Stoic concept of Cosmopolitanism; see Schofield (1999) 64. See 
Schofield (1999) for more on early Stoic political thought and its relation to Zeno’s Republic; Zeno’s was later 
abandoned in favor of Chrysippus’ idea of the cosmic city, inhabited by gods and men alike and undergirded by 
λόγος. Vogt (2008) argues that the early Stoic conception of the cosmic city is a genuine contribution to political 
philosophy.
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2.3 Archimedes’ Celestial Spheres 
Philus proceeds to tell the interlocutors about two celestial spheres—one mechanical, one solid
—both designed by the great Sicilian scientist Archimedes.  The spheres were spoils from the 150
Second Punic War: Marcus Claudius Marcellus (268–208 BCE), comrade of Africanus at 
Carthage, brought them back to Rome after sacking the Greek city Syracuse in 212/211 BCE. 
The solid sphere—which was very beautiful—Marcellus placed in the Temple of Virtue for all to 
see; the mechanical orrery—which was not much to look at—he brought home for his own 
private use.  Philus recounts how he was at the house of the younger Marcellus (M. Marcellus’ 151
grandson) when Marcellus’ co-consul C. Sulpicius Galus used the orrery to explain planetary 
motion.  152
 What is the point of this story? Philus’ vignette is followed by a lacuna, but the text 
resumes with Scipio recollecting how Galus—like Pericles and Thales before him—explained an 
eclipse to frightened troops, demonstrating how technical astronomical knowledge can have 
tactical and political benefits. Furthermore, as Martin Gallagher has shown, the language Philus 
uses to describe the motions of the mechanical sphere is echoed by Scipio in his description of 
the revolutions of political cycles, suggesting that politics and astronomy are deeply 
interconnected, or at least share a common language.   153
 Let us now turn to Philus’ story, which I quote in full (Rep. 1.21–22): 
 For the impact of Archimedes on Roman literature and culture, see Jaeger (2008) 48–68, who has a thoughtful 150
discussion of Archimedes’ celestial spheres.
 For a brief history of planetaria, see Pease (1955) ad Cic. Nat D. 2.88.151
 Galus and Marcellus were consuls together in 166 BCE.152
 See Gallagher (2001).153
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Tum Philus: Nihil novi vobis adferam, neque quod a me sit cogitatum aut inventum; nam 
memoria teneo C. Sulpicium Galum, doctissimum, ut scitis, hominem, cum idem hoc 
visum diceretur et esset casu apud M. Marcellum, qui cum eo consul fuerat, sphaeram, 
quam M. Marcelli avus captis Syracusis ex urbe locupletissima atque ornatissima 
sustulisset, cum aliud nihil ex tanta praeda domum suam deportavisset, iussisse proferri; 
cuius ego sphaerae cum persaepe propter Archimedi gloriam nomen audissem, speciem 
ipsam non sum tanto opere admiratus; erat enim illa venustior et nobilior in volgus, quam 
ab eodem Archimede factam posuerat in templo Virtutis Marcellus idem. sed posteaquam 
coepit rationem huius operis scientissime Galus exponere, plus in illo Siculo ingenii, 
quam videretur natura humana ferre potuisse, iudicavi fuisse. dicebat enim Galus 
sphaerae illius alterius solidae atque plenae vetus esse inventum, et eam a Thalete Milesio 
primum esse tornatam, post autem ab Eudoxo Cnidio, discipulo, ut ferebat, Platonis, 
eandem illam astris stellisque, quae caelo inhaererent, esse descriptam; cuius omnem 
ornatum et descriptionem sumptam ab Eudoxo multis annis post non astrologiae scientia, 
sed poëtica quadam facultate versibus Aratum extulisse. hoc autem sphaerae genus, in quo 
solis et lunae motus inessent et earum quinque stellarum, quae errantes et quasi vagae 
nominarentur, in illa sphaera solida non potuisse finiri, atque in eo admirandum esse 
inventum Archimedi, quod excogitasset, quem ad modum in dissimillimis motibus 
inaequabiles et varios cursus servaret una conversio. hanc sphaeram Galus cum moveret, 
fiebat, ut soli luna totidem conversionibus in aere illo, quot diebus in ipso caelo, succederet, 
ex quo et in sphaera—solis fieret eadem illa defectio et incideret luna tum in eam metam, 
quae esset umbra terrae, cum sol e regione . . . 
Then Philus said, “I will present nothing new to you, nothing which has been thought of 
or discovered by me; for I remember that C. Sulpicius Galus, a most educated man, as 
you know, when this same phenomenon was reported to have been seen, he was by 
chance at the house of M. Marcellus, who was consul with him, and he ordered for the 
orrery to be brought out, which M. Marcellus’ grandfather had taken from the richest and 
most adorned city Syracuse when it was captured, although he carried off nothing else 
from such great booty to his home. Although I had often heard talk of this sphere on 
account of Archimedes’ fame, I did not really admire its appearance. For there was a 
handsomer and more elegant sphere than it in common view—made by the same 
Archimedes—that the same Marcellus had placed in the Temple of Virtue. But after 
Galus most scientifically began to give an account of this work, I decided that there was 
more genius in that Sicilian than it seemed possible that human nature could possess. For 
Galus said that Marcellus’ other sphere was solid and without hollow space, an old 
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invention, and that it was first fashioned by Thales of Miletus. Later, however, this same 
solid sphere was described by Eudoxus of Cnidus—a disciple of Plato, allegedly—with 
stars and constellations, the ones that cling to the outer sphere of the sky. This whole 
order and description was taken from Eudoxus by Aratus many years afterwards. Aratus 
set it forth in verse, not with any astronomical knowledge, but with a certain poetic skill. 
This type of spherical model, however, in which were contained the motions of the sun 
and moon and those five stars which are called wanderers or as it were vagrants, showed 
what could not be depicted on that solid sphere, and the invention of Archimedes 
deserved admiration because he had devised a way to portray the asymmetrical and 
various paths in their dissimilar motions with a single turn of the device. When Galus 
moved this sphere, it happened that the moon followed the sun with as many turns on that 
bronze as it does by days in the sky itself. Therefore, that same eclipse of the sun would 
happen on the sphere and the moon would come into that same boundary where the shade 
of the earth was, when the sun from the opposite… 
In this story, Philus recalls a time from his youth when double suns appeared—“the same 
phenomenon was reported to have been seen” (cum idem hoc visum diceretur, Rep. 1.21)—
which connects the past of the vignette to the present of the dialogue. The settings share many 
common features: in both past and present, political men are gathered at a home (Marcellus’; 
Scipio’s) enjoying conversation (with some degree of leisure) and considering the appearance of 
a parhelia phenomenon. Philus’ story evokes a double-vision in the reader; the doubling of the 
suns is reflected in the overlap of the settings of past and present, suggesting a deep connection 
between the two events. Furthermore, in telling this story, Philus evokes the past as a model, an 
exemplum, for the present, which accords with Roman sensibilities about authority and tradition: 
what men of old (Galus; Marcellus) did in turn shapes the men of today (Laelius; Scipio; et al.). 
We should, therefore, pay the story heed.  
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 Galus himself is also an exemplum: he is a man who unites political expertise with 
astronomical learning. As consul Galus not only had achieved the highest political office of the 
land, but was also extremely learned, a homo doctissimus (Rep. 1.21). According to Pliny, Galus 
even published his own astronomical treatise and was the first Roman to write about both solar 
and lunar eclipses (NH 2.9) . In the story at hand, Galus’ knowledge of the mechanical orrery’s 154
w o r k i n g s a n d t h e a c c o m p a n y i n g e x p l a n a t i o n w h i c h h e d e l i v e r s “ m o s t 
scientifically” (scientissime, Rep. 1.21) bespeak his remarkable astronomical and technical 
knowledge. Galus is an accomplished politician and scientist; thus, in telling this story, Philus 
might be understood as implying that Scipio, Laelius, et al. should imitate Galus’ dual allegiance 
to politics and astronomy, the Horizontal and the Vertical.  
 Furthermore, Philus' tale demonstrates that astronomical learning can actually be 
practical and effect change on the ground. The mechanical orrery turns out to be of great use. 
While the older, solid sphere is visually attractive, it has no moving parts.  The orrery, by 155
contrast, is a remarkable new invention that can mimic in miniature the motions of the planets 
with a single turn, thereby allowing the handler to predict specific astronomical occurrences, 
including eclipses.  Philus is just about to tell us how Galus explained how the device could 156
model an eclipse when the text breaks off. It resumes with Scipio telling his own story about how 
 “And Sulpicius Galus—who was consul with M. Marcellus but who at the time was military tribune—was the 154
first Roman to publish an account of both types of eclipses” (Et rationem quidem defectus utriusque primus Romani 
generis in vulgum extulit Sulpicius Galus qui consul cum M. Marcello fuit, sed tum tribunus militum, NH. 2.19). 
Pliny does not say whether Galus wrote his treatise in Latin or Greek, although presumably the latter given the 
subject matter and time frame. Cicero makes no mention of Galus’ treatise in the extant DRP text, although it is 
possible that he consulted it. Cicero praises him for his learning: “of all the elite men, he devoted himself to Greek 
studies the most” (maxime omnium nobilium Graecis litteris studuit, Brut. 78). See also Sen. 49–50.
 See Büchner (1984) 103–4 ad loc.155
 On the astronomical precision of this passage, see Haury (1964).156
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he remembers Galus explaining an eclipse at the Battle of Pydna (June 21, 168 BCE). When 
Scipio was a youth, he went with his biological father Paullus (who was consul at the time) on a 
campaign in Macedonia. By chance on the eve of battle, “a clear night, suddenly the moon—full 
and bright—fell into darkness” (serena nocte subito candens et plena luna defecisset, Rep. 1.23). 
The troops were terrified by the phenomenon, racked by “superstition and fear” (religione et 
metu, Rep. 1.23). Eclipses were believed to portend disaster, and such an event on the eve of 
battle would have been an ill omen indeed. Yet thanks to his astronomical expertise, Galus was 
able to explain to the troops that the eclipse was nothing to fear, but a rationally explicable 
natural event (Rep. 1.23): 
haud dubitavit postridie palam in castris docere nullum esse prodigium, idque et tum 
factum esse et certis temporibus esse semper futurum, cum sol ita locatus fuisset, ut 
lunam suo lumine non posset attingere 
on the next day without hesitation [Galus] explained openly among the troops that [the 
eclipse] was not a prodigy, and that it had happened at that time and would always 
happen again at certain times, when the sun was positioned so that it was not able to 
reach the moon with its own light. 
The troops, thanks to Galus’ lecture, set aside their fear and went on to win the battle, which 
ultimately resulted in the defeat of King Perseus. Such a victory might never have been secured 
if it had not been for Galus’ scientific explanation. Scipio’s story shows how useful astronomical 
knowledge can be.  
 The use of scientific knowledge to effect military success has a long tradition. Thales, 
traditionally considered the first scientist and father of astronomy, is said to have predicted an 
eclipse in 585 BCE. Although today it is doubted that Thales had the astronomical knowledge to 
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actually predict eclipses consistently and accurately,  in antiquity he was credited with being 157
the first to make such a discovery (Thaletem Milesium primum vidisse dicunt, Rep. 1.25).  In 158
Herodotus’ account, Thales’ scientific knowledge is not merely theoretical, but employed for 
military benefit. The Lydians and the Medes, upon viewing the solar eclipse which Thales 
predicted for the Ionians, set down their arms and made a truce (Hdt. 1.74). Herodotus also 
records that Thales diverted a river for Croesus’ army (Hdt. 1.75), a narrative detail which 
cleverly unites Thales’ famous philosophical theory that water is the archē of all things with 
practical military strategy.  
 After Scipio recounts his memory of Galus explaining a lunar eclipse, the text has a 
lacuna of two leaves, after which Scipio is speaking about Pericles (Rep. 1.25). During a solar 
eclipse that occurred in the Peloponnesian War, Pericles, like Thales before him and Galus after 
him, also taught his troops that the solar eclipse was nothing to fear, but a normal event that 
“happens at a certain and necessary time” (certo illud tempore fieri et necessario, Rep. 1.25). 
Scipio highlights Pericles’ exceptional qualities: “the leader of his state in terms of authority, 
eloquence, and judgment” (et auctoritate et eloquentia et consilio princeps civitatis suae, Rep. 
1.25). But Pericles’ excellence is not only political; he also has astronomical expertise and 
training in natural philosophy. He was, after all, Anaxagoras’ student: “he is said to have taught 
his fellow citizens that which he himself had heard from Anaxagoras, whose listener he had 
been” (docuisse civis suos dicitur, id quod ipse ab Anaxagora cuius auditor fuerat acceperat, 
Rep. 1.25). Thanks to his training in natural philosophy, then, Pericles was able to draw upon 
 On the state of astronomical knowledge of eclipses around the time of Thales, see O’Brien (1968) and 157
Mosshammer (1981); cf. Div. 1.112.
 Cf. Pliny, who says that Thales was the “first of all” (primus omnium, NH. 2.53) who investigated eclipses.158
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both his political prowess and his philosophical training to allay the Athenian troops’ irrational 
fears about celestial phenomena. Pericles is another example of a political leader—a princeps 
(Rep. 1.25)—who brings together astronomical and practical expertise for a real-world military 
advantage.  
 Lurking behind these figures is the great Sicilian scientist who also used astronomical 
knowledge for tactical advantage. In the Second Punic War Archimedes carefully positioned 
mirrors to burn the Roman fleet. Although Cicero does not mention this well-known story (at 
least not in the text that survives), he certainly had great admiration for Archimedes.  In fact, 159
during his stint as quaestor in Sicily, he uncovered Archimedes’ tomb, which had been grown 
over with foliage and forgotten by the locals (Tusc. 5.64). He recognized the sphere and the 
cylinder on the column of the tomb because of reading “some lines” (quosdam senariolos, Tusc. 
5.64) about Archimedes’ proof of the sphere and the cylinder,  and so he was able to identify 160
the small column protruding out of the bushes and find the forgotten tomb (Tusc. 5.65). From 
Thales to Pericles, from Archimedes to Galus, we have exempla of great men of the past—
maiores—who brought together the Horizontal and the Vertical by using their astronomical and 
scientific/philosophical expertise for the benefit of the state.  
 Philus’ point about the value of astronomy is well taken by Scipio. After his discussion of 
eclipses and military strategy, Scipio delivers an effusive speech about the smallness of man, the 
grandness of the cosmos, and the importance of mathematics for distinguishing humans from 
other forms of animal life (Rep. 1.26–9). In many ways, this lofty speech anticipates the themes 
 As Haury (1964) 198 observes, “Cicéron paraît avoir éprouvé pour Archimède une admiration qui touchait au 159
culte.”
 On the mathematical significance of placing a sphere inside a cylinder, see Netz (2004) 19.160
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of the Dream in Book 6.  Scipio advocates for a cosmic viewpoint that recalibrates our human 161
perspective; in contrast to the view from the heavens, Rome seems small (Rep. 1.26):  
Quid porro aut praeclarum putet in rebus humanis, qui haec deorum regna perspexerit, 
aut diuturnum, qui cognoverit quid sit aeternum, aut gloriosum, qui viderit quam parva sit 
terra, primum universa, deinde ea pars eius, quam homines incolant, quamque nos in 
exigua eius parte adfixi plurimis ignotissimi gentibus speremus tamen nostrum nomen 
volitare et vagari latissime?  
The man who has gazed upon these kingdoms of the gods, what could he any longer 
consider outstanding in human affairs, or everlasting, who knows what eternity is, or 
glorious, who has seen how small the earth is—first the whole earth, then that part of it, 
which humans inhabit—and on how tiny a part of it we dwell, completely unknown to 
most races of men, and nevertheless hope that our name will fly far and wide?  
After peering down from the cosmic realm, even the greatest affairs of man seem small. Scipio 
deemphasizes Horizontal matters in favor of Vertical contemplation since it is by carefully 
watching the heavens (haec deorum regna, Rep. 1.26) that the sage is able to gain a sense of 
perspective and come to see man’s—and even Rome’s—relative insignificance (plurimis 
ignotissimi gentibus, Rep. 1.26). Therefore, Scipio next emphasizes the value of leisure (Rep. 
1.27–8):  
Qui denique, ut Africanum auum meum scribit Cato solitum esse dicere, possit idem de 
se praedicare, numquam se plus agere quam nihil cum ageret, numquam minus solum 
esse quam cum solus esset 
He at last would be able to say the say the same thing about himself that Cato writes that 
my grandfather Africanus was accustomed to say: that he never did more than when he 
was doing nothing, and that he was never less alone than when he was alone.  
 Cf. Rep. 6.16, 20–5.161
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Africanus’ adage confounds the idea that otium is useless and negotium is useful: “doing 
nothing” (nihil cum ageret, Rep. 1.27) is when he does the most (numquam se plus agere, Rep. 
1.27). Leisure affords the sage time to consider the regna deorum (Rep. 1.26) and in turn to do 
more for the regna hominum, a point which Scipio highlights by contrasting the Syracusan tyrant 
Dionysius with the Sicilian scientist Archimedes (Rep. 1.28):  
Quis enim putare vere potest plus egisse Dionysium tum, cum omnia moliendo eripuerit 
civibus suis libertatem, quam eius civem Archimedem, cum istam ipsam sphaeram, nihil 
cum agere videretur, effecerit? 
For who would be able to really think that Dionysius had done more at the time when, by 
doing everything he could, he deprived citizens of their freedom, than his citizen 
Archimedes, when he made that sphere itself, at a time when he seemed to be doing 
nothing? 
Dionysius is a ruler, Archimedes a mere citizen. Dionysius is in a state of hectic activity (omnia 
moliendo, Rep. 1.28) whereas Archimedes seems to do nothing (nihil cum agere videretur, Rep. 
1.28). Dionysius is a real-world man; Archimedes “idly” spends his time making seemingly 
useless globes and watching the stars. Yet Scipio’s point is that Archimedes makes a much 
greater contribution to human society than the Syracusan tyrant.  Scipio’s speech extols 162
astronomy and natural philosophy: the Vertical. At the same time, Scipio also confounds the 
categories of Horizontal and Vertical: stargazing is useful and politically relevant. After all, 
Archimedes, in crafting his spheres, was doing more for Syracuse than the Horizontally-gazing 
Dionysius. 
 Cicero makes a similar comparison of Dionysius and Archimedes at Tusc. 5.57–67.162
 98
 After Scipio’s grand speech, Philus would seem to have won his case on astronomy’s 
behalf quite decidedly. Laelius, however, begins to draw Scipio back down to earth by adducing 
another notable exemplum: Aelius Sextus, a sagacious and supremely prudent person (egregie 
cordatus homo, catus Aelius Sextus, Rep. 1.30)—as Ennius himself said—who did not waste his 
time with those things that could not be discovered but rather occupied himself with matters that 
could be worked out with “care and work” (et cura et negotio, Rep. 1.30), a point which echoes 
Scipio’s earlier critique of Panaetius (Rep. 1.15). In response to his friend Galus, Sextus 
(according to Laelius) always had on his lips the words of Achilles from Ennius’ now-lost 
Iphigenia (Rep. 1.30): 
Astrologum signa in caelo quid sit observationis? 
Cum Capra aut Nepa aut exoritur nomen aliquod belvarum 
Quod est ante pedes nemo spectat, caeli scrutantur plagas 
Why do astrologers have to look for the signs in the sky? When the Goat or the Scorpion 
or some other animal rises, no one looks at what is before his feet; they look at the 
expanse of the sky.  163
By quoting the lines Sextus used to draw down his friend Galus back to the ground from his 
astronomical revelries, Laelius aims to do the same in the present with Scipio. Laelius’ case is 
made all the more persuasive by the inclusion of Ennius, Rome’s greatest poet. Ennius’ high 
opinion of Sextus and his anti-stargazing lines carry great weight. Laelius does not reject Greek 
learning altogether; he simply wants to pursue learning “which we are able to apply to the use of 
real life or even to the commonwealth itself” (quae vel ad usum vitae vel etiam ad ipsam rem 
publicam conferre possumus, Rep. 1.30). Laelius’ exemplum Sextus follows Ennius’ 
 The translation is Zetzel (1995) 121. This is the first attested usage of the word astrologi.163
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Neoptolemus, who said “he wants to practice philosophy, but just a little; for it does not 
altogether please to do so completely” (philosophari velle, sed paucis; nam omnino haud 
placere, Rep. 1.30).  After Laelius’ rejection of astronomy and natural philosophy, Scipio 164
promptly descends from his peaks of contemplation in order to talk about what he knows best: 
the state. The remainder of the Book 1—and indeed, the rest of the DRP dialogue—focuses on 
politics until astronomy returns full force in the Dream.  
2.4 Planetary Motion and Political Cycles 
Does Scipio’s quick return to the Horizontal mean that Laelius wins the debate about the 
relevance of astronomy? Not necessarily. For one thing, I have argued that Scipio is not simply 
Cicero’s mouthpiece (sec. 2.2), so his turn to politics does not necessarily require that we readers 
should take his trajectory as our own. But more importantly, it is not clear that Scipio abandons 
astronomy in favor of politics after all. Let us take a closer look at Scipio’s constitutional 
discourse. After discussing the three simple forms of government—democracy (civitas 
popularis), aristocracy (optimates), and monarchy (rex) (Rep. 1.42)—Scipio explains that each of 
these simple forms can easily devolve into a debased version of itself (Rep. 1.45): 
…taeterrimus, et ex hac vel optimatium vel factionis, tyrannica illa vel regia vel etiam 
persaepe popularis, itemque ex ea genus aliquod efflorescere ex illis quae ante dixi solet, 
mirique sunt orbes et quasi circumitus in rebus publicis commutationum et 
vicissitudinum.  
…the worst, and from it [arises a regime] either of aristocracy or faction, or monarchy or 
even very often mob rule, and similarly from it some type is accustomed to develop from 
 Cf. De or. 2.156 and Tusc. 2.1. See also Baraz (2012) 23–7 on Cicero’s use of Ennius as a mouthpiece for 164
Romans’ deeply-held anxiety about excessive philosophy.
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those which I spoke of before, and there are marvelous cycles and, as it were, revolutions, 
of changes and alterations in public affairs . 165
Democracy turns to mob rule; aristocracy to oligarchic faction; and kingship to tyranny. Scipio 
describes these changes as “cycles” (orbes, Rep. 1.45) and “revolutions” (circumitus, Rep. 1.45), 
expressions Cicero uses elsewhere as astronomical terms.  In the Dream, Cicero describes how 166
the planets complete their circular paths as they traverse their regular “cycles” or orbits (orbes, 
Rep. 6.15).  Cicero also uses circuitus in the Dream: Africanus tells Scipio that when he has 167
lived through seven times eight revolutions of the sun, he will reach the fated point of his life by 
the “natural revolution” (circuitu naturali, Rep. 6.12).  In the De natura deorum, Cicero uses 168
circumitus and orbes together to describe the motion of the sun.   169
 The connection between the planetary and political cycles becomes more pronounced with 
the mention of the wise man who foresees the revolutions of regimes (Rep. 1.45): 
quos cum cognosse sapientis est, tum vero prospicere impendentes, in gubernanda re 
publica moderantem cursum atque in sua potestate retinentem, magni cuiusdam civis et 
divini paene est viri. itaque quartum quoddam genus rei publicae maxime probandum 
esse sentio, quod est ex his quae prima dixi moderatum et permixtum tribus. 
It is the part of the wise man to know these [revolutions and cycles], and to foresee them 
before they occur; moderating a course in governing the state and keeping her in his own 
power, is the part of a certain great citizen and almost divine man. Therefore I believe 
 See Zetzel (1995) 134–5 for the reconstruction of the passage. I follow Zetzel’s text and have adapted his 165
translation.
 See Gallagher (2001).166
 Sidera circulos suos orbesque conficiunt (Rep. 6.15).167
 Nam cum aetas tua septenos octiens solis anfractus reditusque converterit, duoque ii numeri, quorum uterque 168
plenus alter altera de causa habetur circuitu naturali summam tibi fatalem confecerint (Rep. 6.12).
 Circumitus enim solis orbium quinque et sexaginta et trecentorum quarta fere diei parte addita conversionem 169
conficiunt annuam (Nat. D. 2.49).
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that a certain fourth type of commonwealth should be approved of the most, which is a 
balance and mixture from these three regimes which I first spoke of. 
The sapiens is responsible for forecasting the state’s “course” (cursum, Rep. 1.45), which is the 
same word Philus uses of planetary motion in recounting Galus’ explanation of Archimedes’ 
orrery (varios cursus servaret una conversio, Rep. 1.22). In the Dream, cursus is used of 
planetary orbits (Rep. 6.17, 18).  In Book 2, Scipio again describes the cycles of political 170
constitutions in astronomical language (Rep. 2.45): 
Hic ille iam vertetur orbis, cuius naturalem motum atque circuitum a primo discite 
adgnoscere. id enim est caput civilis prudentiae, in qua omnis haec nostra versatur 
oratio, videre itinera flexusque rerum publicarum, ut, cum sciatis quo quaeque res 
inclinet, retinere aut ante possitis occurrere.  
Here that cycle will turn: learn to recognize from the beginning its natural motion and 
revolution. For this is the head of civil prudence, on which our whole discussion turns: 
to see the journeys and paths of states so that—since you know to where each state 
inclines—you are able to check or anticipate it. 
Romulus’ beneficent monarchic constitution devolves into Tarquinius Superbus’ tyranny, but this 
is a revolution which the sapiens should foresee, since he has studied the constitutions’ “natural 
motion” (naturalem motum, Rep. 2.45) and “revolution” (circuitum, Rep. 2.45). Here, the 
astronomical terms orbis and circuitus—which appeared in Rep. 1.45—are repeated. The rotation 
of the political cycle (vertetur orbis, Rep. 2.45) echoes the “turn” (conversio, Rep. 1.22) of 
Archimedes’ orrery. Convertitur is also used in the Dream to describe the revolution of heavenly 
 Hunc ut comites consequuntur Veneris alter, alter Mercurii cursus (Rep. 6.17). Quam ob causam summus ille 170
caeli stellifer cursus, cuius conversio est concitator, acuto et excitato movetur sono (Rep. 6.18).
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bodies (Rep. 6.17, 18, 19, 24).  The motus of the political cycles (motum, Rep. 2.45) recalls the 171
motus of the planets on the orrery (Rep. 1.22). In the De consulatu suo (henceforth DCS), Cicero 
also uses motus and cursus to describe the paths of the planets (fr. 2.6) . Scipio describes the 172
political constitutions in astronomical terms, which suggests that the “discourses on astronomy 
play a central role in the dialogue on the best constitution” (Gallagher 2001: 509).  
 Scipio, it turns out, does not leave behind astronomy for politics but rather demonstrates 
their fundamental connection. The constitutional cycles mirror the revolutions of the planets, and 
these cycles, as Scipio himself says, have been the point of their entire discourse (in qua omnis 
haec nostra versatur oratio, Rep. 2.45), which also may contain an astronomical pun. By 
studying constitutions, the sapiens can predict the rise and fall of political regimes, much as 
Galus and Pericles were able to foresee eclipses because of their astronomical learning. Just as 
there is no need to be alarmed when the sun becomes dark, we should also not be afraid when a 
tyrant appears; tyranny is a natural part of the cycle (naturalem motum, Rep. 2.45). When the 
orbis turns, another regime will rise, much as the sun returns after disappearing during an 
eclipse. Thus, Philus’ initial Stoic point still holds: everything that happens in the universe is 
pertinent to local life (Rep. 1.19). Political regimes are natural phenomena that we can study, like 
planets and stars. If the same type of motion that guides the planets also drives political cycles, 
then natural philosophy grants insight into political affairs and is not merely idle learning. In 
 In infimoque orbe Luna radiis Solis accensa convertitur (Rep. 6.17). Quam ob causam summus ille caeli stellifer 171
cursus, cuius conversio est concitator, acuto et excitato movetur sono (Rep. 6.18). Hic vero tantus est totius mundi 
incitatissima conversione sonitus, ut eum aures hominum capere non possint (Rep. 6.19). Cuius quidem anni 
nondum vicesimam partem scito esse conversam (Rep. 6. 24).
 Et si stellarum motus cursusque vagantis, fr. 2.6, on which see Kubiak (1994), who links Cicero’s political cursus 172
in the DCS with planetary motion: “The orator’s role in public life is to follow a path of virtue divinely ordained for 
him, just as we shall see in the Aratea and the De consulatu the physical path of the heavenly bodies is eternally 
decreed in the mind of Jupiter” (53–4).
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short, the mechanical orrery shows the intersection of the Horizontal and Vertical in two senses: 
(i) the orrery is helpful militarily and (ii) the orrery’s motions are fundamentally tied to the order 
of the state. Thus, the orrery serves as a demonstration of the political relevance of the stars in 
the DRP. 
2.5 The Static Sphere and the Beauty of the Cosmos 
So far, my discussion has focused on the mechanical orrery. But what of Archimedes’ second 
sphere? Since it is solid and static, it cannot be used to predict eclipses, nor does it convey the 
same sort of motions that drive constitutional cycles. What role, then, does it have? Perhaps 
Cicero simply includes the static sphere as a foil to its more useful and technologically advanced 
counterpart. Or Cicero could just be following history: Archimedes made two spheres which 
Marcellus brought to Rome, so Cicero includes both. Most scholars—if they pay the spheres any 
attention at all—have focused on the orrery.  I hope to show how both spheres are essential to 173
the dialogue, which will in turn bolster this chapter’s argument that the meeting of the Horizontal 
and Vertical is fundamental to the DRP.  
 The structure of Philus’ story invites a comparison of the two spheres. As Mary Jaeger 
points out, the “description alternates between them…This alternation, marked by various forms 
of the demonstratives hic and ille, turns readers’ attention from one sphere to the other, thus 
generating an image of the two side by side” (2008, 53). The narrative also emphasizes the 
contrast between Philus’ aural and visual experience of the two spheres. Philus seems rather 
 Jaeger (2008) 48–68 thinks the new orrery surpasses the older model of the static sphere, as does Gee (2000) 99. 173
Gallagher (2001) and Atkins (2013) both focus on the orrery. Kidd (1997) 17, by contrast, focuses on the solid 
sphere and excludes the orrery.
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disappointed in the orrery, but his opinion of it changes drastically when he hears an account 
(ratio) of how it works. Let us turn to Philus’ story of the two spheres again, but this time paying 
especial attention to the senses (Rep. 1.21):  
Nihil novi vobis adferam, neque quod a me sit cogitatum aut inventum; nam memoria 
teneo C. Sulpicium Gallum, doctissimum, ut scitis, hominem, cum idem hoc visum 
diceretur et esset casu apud M. Marcellum, qui cum eo consul fuerat, sphaeram, quam M. 
Marcelli avus captis Syracusis ex urbe locupletissima atque ornatissima sustulisset, cum 
aliud nihil ex tanta praeda domum suam deportavisset, iussisse proferri; cuius ego 
sphaerae cum persaepe propter Archimedi gloriam nomen audissem, speciem ipsam non 
sum tanto opere admiratus; erat enim illa venustior et nobilior in volgus, quam ab eodem 
Archimede factam posuerat in templo Virtutis Marcellus idem. sed posteaquam coepit 
rationem huius operis scientissime Galus exponere, plus in illo Siculo ingenii, quam 
videretur natura humana ferre potuisse, iudicavi fuisse.  
I will present nothing new to you, nothing which has been thought of or discovered by 
me; for I remember that C. Sulpicius Galus, a most educated man, as you know, when 
this same phenomenon was reported to have been seen, he was by chance at the house of 
M. Marcellus, who was consul with him, and he ordered for the orrery to be brought out, 
which Macus Marcellus’ grandfather had taken from the richest and most adorned city 
Syracuse when it was captured, although he carried off nothing else from such great 
booty to his home. Although I had often heard talk of this sphere on account of 
Archimedes’ fame, I did not really admire its appearance. For there was a handsomer and 
more elegant sphere than it in common view—made by the same Archimedes—that the 
same Marcellus had placed in the Temple of Virtue. But after Galus most scientifically 
began to give an account of this work, I decided that there was more genius in that 
Sicilian than it seemed possible that human nature could possess.  
Philus’ vignette draws our attention to his sensory experience of the two spheres—markedly 
different in terms of form—showcasing a functional and aesthetic contrast between the two (Rep. 
1.21). The orrery is surprisingly plain: Philus has often heard about the orrery (audissem), but 
when he first sees it with his own eyes (speciem ipsam), he is unimpressed and does not admire it 
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at all (non admiratus sum). He does not begin to appreciate the orrery until he hears Galus 
verbally explain its “logic” (ratio). Ratio is a loaded word: it most immediately pertains to Galus’ 
verbal explanation, but also evokes the ratio of the planets, which for Cicero are rational and 
predictable in their patterns of motion. We can imagine that the orrery Galus presents might be a 
flat circular disc with planetary models affixed to the surface, something like Freeth and Jones’ 
reconstruction of the Antikythera Mechanism (see Figure 2).  174
  
Figure 2  175
. I do not mean to say that the Antikythera mechanism is based on Archimedes’ orrery, but only that the orrery 174
might have looked something like Freeth and Jones’ reconstruction, especially in so far as it is a mechanical, flat, 
two-dimensional disc that can model planetary motion and eclipses. On the feasibility of such an orrery at this time, 
see Jones (2017) 151.
 Image from Freeth and Jones (2012).175
 106
The ordered (and predictable) movements of the planets are rational and intelligible, like the 
universe itself; after all, the planetary models of the orrery are just a miniature and simplified 
version of the heavenly bodies. And because Galus has ratio, he himself is able to give rational 
(verbal) account of the universe. The ratio of the planets becomes rational and hence 
comprehensible with a verbal explanation. The “beauty” of the orrery, as it turns out, is not for 
the eyes but the ears. The orrery is associated with the verbal, the logical—which has its own sort 
of beauty, but a beauty that is perceptible by the mind. This beauty is revealed by a learned 
teacher. No wonder, then, that the orrery is not publicly displayed for the masses but kept in 
Marcellus’ private collection (Rep. 1.21). It has only become accessible to a wider audience—
that is, us readers—through the medium of Cicero’s text. But in the dramatic setting of the 
dialogue, its beauty has been revealed only to a select few: the notable statesmen and 
intellectuals of Scipio’s party.  
 Visual beauty, by contrast, does not require specialized knowledge since the appeal is 
immediate. The stars, for example, are appreciated by astronomers and laypeople alike; you do 
not have to know much about the heavenly bodies to admire their beauty, although a more 
educated eye may appreciate more. The static sphere, we can imagine, is decorated with the 
celestial bands and constellations,  much like the globe atop Atlas’ back in the Farnese statue 176
(see Figure 3). 
 Figure 3 
 On ancient celestial globes and planetaria, see Künzl (2005), esp. 78–86 and Thiele (1898).176
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Like the night sky, the solid sphere is simply stunning whether you know about stars are not. 
Cicero's passage emphasizes the solid sphere’s charm and elegance (erat enim venustior et 
nobilior, Rep. 1.21), which in the common view (in volgus, Rep. 1.21) renders it superior to the 
orrery. Its popularity, we may presume, comes from its visual appeal. Installed in the Temple of 
Virtue, the static sphere is displayed for public consumption, unlike the orrery, whose beauty 
must be “unlocked” by a skilled teacher in a relatively private setting.  
 While the beauty of the static sphere may seem trivial, it is actually essential. The Greeks 
call the universe κόσµος, a word which can refer to both “order” and “adornment” (LSJ s.v.), 
“attesting to an inherent understanding that that which is orderly is also beautiful and decorative” 
(Volk 2009, 19). The beauty of the cosmos is not accidental but fundamental.  In this way, the 177
beautiful static sphere represents the universe well. Eudoxus’ description of the static sphere is 
called a “decoration” (ornatus, Rep. 1.22), a word which points both to its exquisite beauty and 
evokes the commonplace that the cosmos itself is a decorative work of art. The idea of the 
 See Volk (2009) 18–23 for a more detailed discussion of the Greco-Roman conception of cosmos.177
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universe as a work of art accords with the notion of god as a creator who, like an artist, makes a 
great work of art: the universe itself.  In fact, the Latin word for sky—caelum—can acquire 178
this metallurgic resonance, suggesting through (an albeit false) etymological connection (as if 
from caelare) that the sky is a detailed metal work with images.  Put simply, the cosmos is 179
something beautiful to be “looked at.” So also, the static sphere is a work of art that is meant to 
be seen.  180
 Aratus’ Phaenomena, mentioned by Philus as a versification of Eudoxus' description, is 
also closely associated with the visual register. Even the title, which Douglas Kidd translates as 
“Visible Signs,” points to the universe as something to be viewed.  The doctus poeta repeatedly 181
encourages his reader to “look” and “see” as he points out the constellations. This visual 
language requires the reader to paint the night sky in the mind’s eye.  With Aratus’ verbal 182
instruction, we are able to think of the stars and see them, as it were, by reading. The image of 
the stars and the orderliness of the constellations come into our view because of the text itself, 
which Aratus suggests is its own sort of cosmos. After all, the poem is also an ordered work of 
art, made up not of stars and constellations but signs of a different sort: letters and words.  In 183
 On the idea of Creationism in antiquity, see Sedley (2008), esp. 205–238.178
 See Varro, Sat. Men. 420.179
 As Volk puts it, “If a work of art created by a god’s skill and craft is thus presented, in our earliest text from 180
classical antiquity, as a replica of the entire world, the Greeks and Romans were accustomed to think, conversely, of 
the universe as resembling a supreme work of art” (Volk (2009) 18). The earliest conception of the universe that we 
have in the Greek tradition is the shield of Achilles, which depicts the universe as a work of art, on which see Hardie 
(1985) 11–31 and Volk (2009) 18–19.
 See Volk (2012), who convincingly argues that Aratus invites his readers to see the universe as a text. For similar 181
views (though less developed), see also Hunter (2008), Levitan (1979), and Gee (2001).
 Quintilian seems to have missed this visual vividness, as he critiques Aratus for lacking vibrancy and life (motu, 182
Inst. 10.1.55).
 Cf. Volk (2012) 209.183
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fact, as Katharina Volk has argued, Aratus’ poem is associated with the written word: just as 
individual stars make up the constellations, so also do the individual letters of words make up the 
text in the poem, which likewise requires a divine mind to put it into an intelligible—and legible
—order. Aratus adumbrates the connection between the universe and the text in his famous 
craftsman simile (Phaen. 529–33): 
οὔ κεν Ἀθηναίης χειρῶν δεδιδαγµένος ἀνὴρ 
ἄλλῃ κολλήσαιτο κυλινδόµενα τροχάλεια 
τοῖά τε καὶ τόσα πάντα περì σφαιρηδὸν ἑλίσσων, 
ὡς τά γ᾿ ἐναιθέρια πλαγίῳ συναρηρότα κύκλῳ 
ἐξ ἠοῦς ἐπὶ νύκτα διώκεται ἤµατα πάντα. 
In no other way would a man trained in the craftsmanship of Athene weld together 
revolving wheels in such a pattern and of such a size, rounding off the whole like a 
sphere, than the system of celestial circles, which, united by the oblique circle, speed 
from dawn to nightfall all the time.   184
Aratus compares the intersecting celestial circles (zodiac, equator, and tropics) to an armillary 
sphere. The man who has been taught in Athena’s craft is put into the same position as the god—
Zeus—who has created such an orderly cosmos. Likewise, the δεδιδαγµένος ἀνὴρ recalls the 
doctus poeta himself: Aratus.  Thus, we see a parallel between the god, the craftsman, and the 185
poet, as well as between their relative creations: the cosmos, the sphere, and the poem, which 
suggests that “the universe is itself a kind of artifact, one specifically designed by benevolent 
Zeus for the purpose of communicating with human beings by sending them signs” (Volk 2009, 
 Translation is Kidd (1997).184
 Cf. Volk (2012) 210–11 and Volk (2013) 108.185
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108). Thanks to Aratus’ widespread popularity,  the notion of the universe as a work of visual 186
art becomes all but synonymous with his poetry. 
 But the beauty and artistry of the static sphere is not merely suggestive of Aratus: the 
DRP makes the link between the two explicit by recounting the origin of the static sphere (Rep. 
1.22):  
dicebat enim Galus sphaerae illius alterius solidae atque plenae vetus esse inventum, et 
eam a Thalete Milesio primum esse tornatam, post autem ab Eudoxo Cnidio, discipulo, ut 
ferebat, Platonis, eandem illam astris stellisque, quae caelo inhaererent, esse descriptam; 
cuius omnem ornatum et descriptionem sumptam ab Eudoxo multis annis post non 
astrologiae scientia, sed poëtica quadam facultate versibus Aratum extulisse.    
For Galus said that Marcellus’ other sphere was solid and without hollow space, an old 
invention, and that it was first fashioned by Thales of Miletus. Later, however, this same 
solid sphere was described by Eudoxus of Cnidus—a disciple of Plato, allegedly—with 
stars and constellations, the ones that cling to the outer sphere of the sky. This whole 
order and description was taken from Eudoxus by Aratus many years afterwards. Aratus 
set it forth in verse, not with any astronomical knowledge, but with a certain poetic skill. 
The static sphere is traced back to Thales, Eudoxus, and most importantly for my argument, 
Aratus. It is striking how its tradition shifts from artifact to text, suggesting a sort of 
seamlessness between the sphere and the written word. The static sphere is the source for 
Eudoxus, and Eudoxus is the source for Aratus. If the static sphere points to Aratus, conversely, 
the presence of Aratus evokes the static sphere. On this view, the static sphere is relevant to the 
DRP’s invocation of Aratus at the beginning of Scipio’s discussion of political constitutions.  
2.6 The Invocation of Aratus 
 See Lewis (1992) 94–118.186
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Scipio opens his discursive speech on political constitutions with an invocation to Aratus. If 
readers find the invocation a bit perplexing, they are not alone: Laelius also wonders what Aratus 
has to do with their political conversation (Rep. 1.56):  
S. Imitemur ergo Aratum, qui magnis de rebus dicere exordiens a Iove incipiendum putat. 
L. Quo Iove? aut quid habet illius carminis simile haec oratio?   
“Scipio: “Let us therefore imitate Aratus who when setting out to speak about great 
subjects thought it necessary to begin from Jupiter.” 
Laelius: “What has Jupiter to do with it? What does our current discourse have in 
common with Aratus’ poem?”  
What can we make of this invocation? For one thing, the mention of Aratus promotes Cicero’s 
own Aratea carmina and likely is part of a polemic against Lucretius, who, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, coopts Cicero’s astral language as developed in the Aratea for his Epicurean 
purposes.  
 But beyond this, it is my contention that the invocation of Aratus communicates the 
fundamental idea that the universe is rational and intelligible because it itself is driven by a 
rational, divine mind: Jupiter, king of men and gods.  Let us return to the passage at hand to 187
consider how Scipio responds to Laelius’ incredulity about Aratus (Rep. 1.56): 
S. Tantum, inquit, ut rite ab eo dicendi principia capiamus, quem unum omnium deorum 
et hominum regem esse omnes docti indoctique [expoliri] pariter consentiunt. 
Scipio: “Only this: to fitttingly begin speaking from him whom all men—learned and 
unlearned—agree to be the single king of both gods and men.”  
 Volk (2015), for example, points out that the peculiar popularity of Aratus at Rome was shaped, in part, by the 187
Zeitgeist of the age, including a rise in the interest in Stoicism and the idea that a rational, benevolent Zeus stands 
behind the natural order.
 112
Scipio says that it is necessary when beginning to speak about “great things” (magnis de rebus, 
Rep. 1.56) to begin with Jupiter, after the model of Aratus who himself began with Zeus in his 
celebrated Phaenomena (1–18): 
Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώµεσθα, τὸν οὐδέποτ᾿ ἄνδρες ἐῶµεν 
ἄρρητον· µεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι µὲν ἀγυιαί, 
πᾶσαι δ᾿ ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, µεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα 
καὶ λιµένες· πάντη δὲ Διὸς κεχρήµεθα πάντες. 
τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος εἰµέν· ὁ δ᾿ ἤπιος ἀνθρώποισιν 
δεξιὰ σηµαίνει, λαοὺς δ᾿ ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει, 
µιµνῄσκων βιότοιο, λέγει δ᾿ ὅτε βῶλος ἀρίστη 
βουσί τε καὶ µακέλῃσι, λέγει δ᾿ ὅτε δεξιαὶ ὧραι 
καὶ φυτὰ γυρῶσαι καὶ σπέρµατα πάντα βαλέσθαι. 
αὐτὸς γὰρ τά γε σήµατ᾿ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξεν, 
ἄστρα διακρίνας, ἐσκέψατο δ᾿ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν 
ἀστέρας οἵ κε µάλιστα τετυγµένα σηµαίνοιεν 
ἀνδράσιν ὡράων, ὄφρ᾿ ἔµπεδα πάντα φύωνται. 
τῶ µιν ἀεὶ πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον ἱλάσκονται. 
χαῖρε, πάτερ, µέγα θαῦµα, µέγ᾿ ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειαρ, 
αὐτὸς καὶ προτέρη γενεή. χαίροιτε δὲ Μοῦσαι 
µειλίχιαι µάλα πᾶσαι· ἐµοί γε µὲν ἀστέρας εἰπεῖν 
ᾗ θέµις εὐχοµένῳ τεκµήρατε πᾶσαν ἀοιδήν. 
Let us begin with Zeus, whom we men never leave unspoken. Filled with Zeus are all 
highways and all meeting places of people, filled are the sea and the harbours; in all 
circumstances we are all dependent on Zeus. For we are also his children, and he 
benignly gives helpful signs to men, and rouses people to work, reminding them of their 
livliehood, tells when the soil is best for oxen and mattocks, and tells when the seasons 
are right both for planting trees and sowing every kind of seed. For it was Zeus himself 
who fixed the signs in the sky, making them into distinct constellations, and organised 
stars for the year to give the most clearly defined signs of the seasonal round to men, so 
that everything may grow without fail. That is why men always pay homage to him first 
and last. Hail, Father, great wonder, great boon to men, yourself and the earlier race! And 
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hail, Muses, all most gracious! In answer to my prayer to tell of the stars in so far as I 
may, guide all my singing.   188
Aratus’ poem presents the stars as the point of contact between the divine and the human. 
Because of his kindliness to human beings (ὁ δ᾿ ἤπιος ἀνθρώποισιν), Zeus has made the world a 
system of intelligible signs. Through the natural order—in particular the stars—Zeus 
communicates to us, allowing humans to look at the patterns of nature to guide their work and 
operations across every sphere of life, whether on land or at sea (Phaen. 2–4). Humans are able 
to do business in the marketplace, navigate, farm—even write—because the world in which we 
operate has meaning and a rational design. Thanks to Zeus and his star signs, we can actually 
know things about the world and respond accordingly. The universe is not random, but a cosmos 
in the true sense of the word: a beautiful, rational arrangement. And the reason it is intelligible is 
because it is the communication of an intelligent mind, that is, Zeus. 
 Zeus, of course, is the king. Although Aratus’ proem does not call him one, his 
prominence in the poem communicates his authoritative position (he looms so large, in fact, that 
the invocation of the Muses is delayed until the end of the proem, a poetic decision which 
troubled many commentators and a concern that Cicero responded to by including the Muses in 
the first line of his Aratea).  Scipio brings the kingship of Zeus—Jupiter in the Latin—to the 189
fore, calling him the “single king of all gods and men” (unum omnium deorum et hominum 
regem, Rep. 1.56). Jupiter rules the cosmos, a world that gods and men can comprehend and even 
 Translation is Kidd (1997).188
 Cicero cites his Aratea poem in De Legibus Book 2, in which Marcus and Quintus have a conversation that 189
recalls the exchange between Scipio and Laelius (respectively) at Rep. 1.56. Cicero quotes the first line of the Aratea 
as  “From Jupiter the beginnings of the Muses” (A love Musarum primordia, De leg. 2.7). On the influence of the 
scholia on Cicero’s translation and inclusion of the muses in the first line, see Pellicani (2015) 85.
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predict thanks to its intelligible patterns. By highlighting Jupiter’s kingship, which is only 
implicit in Aratus, Scipio posits a fundamental connection between the political and the heavenly 
realms. To answer Laelius’ question about which of the three simple regimes is best—kingship, 
aristocracy, or democracy—Scipio invokes Aratus, suggesting that the cosmic realm over which 
Jupiter presides and the human systems of government not only have something to say to one 
another but are seamlessly connected. By turning to an astronomical poem to answer a question 
about political life, Scipio, far from departing from the Vertical position, rather demonstrates 
Philus’ earlier point that the cosmos is fundamentally our home (Rep. 1.15). 
 But Jupiter is not only princeps, he is also the source of principia dicendi. The smooth 
transition from Aratus to the starting point of his speech invites us to consider the parallel 
between the cosmos and words, which, like the stars, are another system of signs. Jupiter, Scipio 
suggests, is the divine ratio behind the universe, driving the planets, political systems, and even 
our very speech.  In a similar vein, the Phaenomena posits a fundamental connection between 190
constellations and words. Seeing the stars provides the occasion for the poet to craft his own 
cosmos in response, not of stars and planets, but of text. Thus, the stars are analogized to another 
sign system: writing.  The sky is like a book, and the book is like the sky . This overlap is 191 192
supported by hidden signs in the Phaenomena, such as the pun on Aratus’ name in the second 
line of the poem and the famous ΛΕΠΤΗ acrostic.  Cicero may play a similar game of 193
 On the ratio of Cicero’s thought and its relationship to Aratus, see Gee (2001).190
 On which, see Volk (2012) and Volk (2013).191
 See Volk (2012) 109.192
 The ΛΕΠΤΗ acrostic was first spotted (in modern times) by Jacques (1960). See further Hanses (2014) 609 fn. 1 193
and Volk (2012) 226–7. See also p. 25–7 of this dissertation, sec. 1.2.
 
conflating text and sky in his Aratea, as the (intentional?) ZONA acrostic suggests.  In any 194
case, Aratus’ poem in particular is an example of how words can generate vivid images of the 
cosmos in the reader’s mind, and conversely, how the cosmos can be generated into words.  
 The creation of vivid images through words is essential for good oratory and good 
argument. In the De oratore, a text that was written in 55 BCE just before the DRP,  Cicero 195
says that metaphor in particular engages our senses—especially sight—through language, 
“which places as it were in the sight of the mind things which we are not able to perceive and 
see” (quae ponunt paene in conspectu animi quae cernere et videre non possumus, De or. 3.161). 
It also, he says, adds “brilliance” (lumen) to the style (De or. 1.39).  Metaphor translates one 196
register to another and in so doing it “best marks out the speech with—as it were—certain stars, 
and illuminates it” (maxime tanquam stellis quibusdam notat et illuminat orationem, De or. 
3.170). Cicero describes the benefits of metaphor with a metaphor, cleverly demonstrating its 
efficacy in his explanation of it. It is no accident, I think, that this metaphor is astral. I suspect 
that it is a nod to Aratus, whose Zeus “marks out” the stars to be signs for mankind (αὐτὸς γὰρ τά 
γε σήµατ᾿ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξεν/ ἄστρα διακρίνας, 10–11), much as the orator “marks 
out” (notat) his speech (its own sort of “cosmos”) with “stars” (tanquam stellis quibusdam). 
These sorts of metaphor make the speech more vivid in the mind’s eye. Light, whether 
metaphorical or physical, is necessary to “see” (=hear) well. Aratus, perhaps, is the quintessential 
 On the ZONA acrostic, see Hurka (2006) 87–91 and Rick (2019) 222–8. Cicero elsewhere introduces acrostics, 194
including the De divinatione, on which see Gore and Kershaw (2008). See Kubiak (1994) 52–66 and Knox (2011) 
for Cicero’s Hellenistic tendencies in his poetry. Katz (2009) 799–84 points out that Cicero’s translation of the poem 
A IOVE contains all of the vowels and may be part of a Hellenistic aesthetic. See also Volk (2012) 31–2. See p. 29–
35 of this dissertation, sec. 1.3.
 See Fantham (2004) 1–25.195
 Cf. Orat. 27.92.196
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example of a wordsmith making his readers see with words. With his excellent poetry, Aratus 
generates a sort of virtual reality where we can see the constellations of the night sky shine 
through the text on the page. This sort of synesthesia is the result of excellent “wordcraft,” and I 
suggest, is a trademark of Aratus.  Part of the reason that Scipio invokes Aratus is because he 197
too is bringing to life before our eyes the stars of the Roman past.   198
 Scipio emphasizes the role of the senses as he explains to Laelius why he brought up 
Aratus and Jupiter to start the political discussion. In response to Laelius’ question, Scipio says, 
“What do you think, except that which is before your eyes?” (Quid censes, nisi quod est ante 
oculos?, Rep. 1.56). Scipio answers as if the explanation were readily apparent (ante oculos), 
even thouogh their exchange is happening without the aid of any visual apparatus. Scipio rejects 
the Jupiter of traditional religion, saying that the sort of Zeus we encounter in Homer is either (i) 
a myth devised by the well-intentioned leaders of commonwealths who want to promote the 
model of kingship as the best or (ii) a fable that have been passed down to us “in error” (in 
errore).  But Scipio does not reject Jupiter altogether, nor does he reject learning about him 199
through words. Rather, he maintains that “we should listen to the universal (as it were) teachers 
of educated men, who have (as it were) seen with their eyes what we scarcely know by 
hearing” (audiamus communis quasi doctores eruditorum hominum, qui tamquam oculis illa 
viderunt, quae nos vix audiendo cognoscimus, Rep. 1.56). These teachers deserve our ear 
(audiamus) because they have “seen” these things (tamquam oculis illa viderunt) while we have 
 On how the ancients thought of the senses more broadly, see the collection of papers by Butler and Purves 197
(2013).
 Consider Knox (2011), who observes that Cicero’s interest in Aratus “more closely related to his interest in 198
polymathy as a credential for an orator than in its aesthetic qualities as a model for a poetic movement” (197). See 
also Courtney (1993) 149–50, n.7.
 Zetzel (1995) ad loc. observes that Scipio does not allow the possibility that Zeus actually exists.199
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barely even “heard” (vix audiendo) them. Scipio goes on to explain that these teachers are “those 
who have sensed by thoroughly investigating the nature of all things that this universe by a 
mind…” (Qui natura omnium rerum pervestiganda senserunt omnem hunc mundum mente, Rep. 
1.56).  
 Unfortunately, the text breaks off here, but the trajectory of Scipio’s point is clear enough 
in the context: Jupiter is the divine mind who animates the universe and makes it orderly, and 
this order is perceptible to those who study nature and the motions of the heavens. This Jupiter/
divine mind accords with the Jupiter of Aratus’ poem—not the capricious god of Hesiod and 
Homer, but the benevolent, intelligent force that orders the universe for the benefit of human life 
on the ground. We can perceive Jupiter firsthand with our own eyes by studying the patterns of 
nature. But we can also perceive him by listening to the words of teachers who use their words to 
allow us to “see.” 
 Scipio in his speech on political constitutions creates his own verbal “movie,” much like 
Aratus does in the Phaenomena, not of the constellations in the heavens, but of the great men of 
Roman history.  With his words, Scipio allows us to see the great men of the Roman past and 200
the constitutions they have created. Like Aratus, he creates a vivid image in our mind of the 
cycles of political constitutions. Yet Aratus is not without his limitations, and Cicero aims to 
surpass him.  Aratus’ model is static, like the solid sphere of Archimedes. But the cosmos itself 201
is both beautiful (like the static sphere) and in motion (like the orrery). While Aratus points out 
the simultaneous rising and settings of the constellations (as if his sphere rotates), he passes over 
 It is appealing to consider that the origins of the Roman state may stand in the place of a cosmogony, a point 200
which would solidify the connection between the cosmos and the state. On the substitution of the birth of Rome for 
the origin of the cosmos in Latin literature, see Bettini (2012) 69–72.
 Bishop (2016) argues that Cicero translated Aratus in order to appropriate his popularity to himself.201
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the planets, saying that it would be too great a task to tell of their motion: “When I come to them 
my daring fails, but mine be the power to tell of the orbits of the fixed stars and fixed signs in 
heaven” (οὐδ᾿ ἔτι θαρσαλέος κείνων ἐγώ· ἄρκιος εἴην/ ἀπλανέων τά τε κύκλα τά τ᾿ αἰθέρι 
σήµατ᾿ ἐνισπεῖν, Phaen. I60–1).  Cicero, however, makes a point in the DRP of discussing the 202
planetary motion and even corrects the Greek concept of “planets,” instead prefering to point out 
that they are moving stars that follow predictable and regular routes driven by ratio, as the orrery 
demonstrates.  Cicero does this by bringing together beauty and motion in the Dream. 203
2.7 The Dream of Scipio 
What is the Dream, and what should we make of it?  In light of the preceding discussion, it is 204
time to revisit my initial claim that the Dream is not an escapist fantasy but rather the 
consummation of the preceding dialogue. I have argued that the DRP shows the intersection of 
politics and astronomy, as we saw with the two celestial spheres and the invocation to Aratus. Let 
us begin by considering how the stars and the state come together in the Dream.  Africanus 205
 Omitting the planets is something of a literary topos, and Aratus may be following Plato’s Ti. 38, where the great 202
astronomer Timaeus jettisons an explanation of the planets since they are too complicated in their movements to 
describe in detail (Ti. 38). Timaeus begins to describe the orbits of the moon, the sun, Venus, and Mercury, but omits 
Saturn and Jupiter. He falters, unable to explain the planets’ relative positions and how they overtake and are 
overtaken by one another. The task is too great (ὁ λόγος πάρεργος ὢν πλέον ἂν ἔργον ὧν ἕνεκα λέγεται παράσχοι, 
38). See Fig. 1, pg. 2 of this dissertation. See also n. 4, above.
 Cicero highlights that planets are called “wanderers and vagrants” (errantes et quasi vagae, Rep. 1.21), picking 203
up on the Greek concept of planet qua wanderer, but then refutes this nomenclature by showing their rational 
courses on the orrery. On planetary motion and “saving the phenomena,” see Gee (2013) 8–10.
 Many scholars, doubting Cicero’s originality, have looked for sources for the Dream. Coleman (1964) points to 204
Pythagoreanism, and Luck posits some lost work of a Hellenistic philosopher (1956). Ruch (1948) sees the Dream 
as highly innovative, as does Boyancé (1987), who convincingly argues that the Dream is not merely adapted from 
Posidonius or some other Stoic source. On soul journeys in relation to Heraclides and his tale of Empedotimus, see 
Reiche (1993) 161–180
 Luck (1956) sees the “theoretical” and the “practical,” (what I call the Horizontal and the Vertical) come together 205
in the Dream. Ruch (1948) also sees a continuity in the dialogue, pointing to the Dream as the culmination of Philus’ 
comment at Rep. 1.19. Lèvi (2014) also sees the Dream as the culmination of the DRP. On the idea of the cosmic 
statesman, see McConnell (2017) 45–70.
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tells his adopted grandson that the god finds the human civitas the most pleasing of all earthly 
endeavors, and that he rewards those who cultivate it (Rep. 6.13): 
Nihil est enim illi principi deo, qui omnem mundum regit, quod quidem in terris fiat, 
acceptius, quam concilia coetusque hominum iure sociati, quae civitates appellantur: 
harum rectores et conservatores hinc profecti huc revertuntur.  
There is nothing that happens on earth more agreeable to that principal god who reigns 
over the entire universe than the gatherings and assemblies of people united by law which 
are called commonwealths: the rulers and preservers of these assemblies—who set forth 
from here—return here.  
It seems likely that the god is pleased with human political systems because they reflect his own 
character.  He is the princeps deus, the “king” god. His nature is inherently political: he rules 206
over the cosmos (omnem mundum regit), including the planets and heavenly bodies.  The 207
planets are portrayed in political terms, suggesting a fundamental connection between political 
and celestial systems (Rep. 6.17):  
novem tibi orbibus vel potius globis conexa sunt omnia, quorum unus est caelestis, 
extumus, qui reliquos omnes complectitur, summus ipse deus arcens et continens ceteros; 
in quo sunt infixi illi, qui volvuntur, stellarum cursus sempiterni; cui subiecti sunt septem, 
qui versantur retro contrario motu atque caelum 
Behold, all things are joined by these nine circles, or rather spheres, one of which is 
divine, the outermost sphere which contains all the rest, the supreme god enclosing and 
preserving the others; in it are fixed those everlasting courses of stars which rotate; 
subjected to it are the seven spheres which revolve in the opposite direction with a 
contrary motion to the sky   
 Cf. Woolf (2015) 110: “He tells Scipio that nothing on Earth is more pleasing to the god who rules the whole 206
universe than those gatherings of humans, bound by justice, known as states—doubtless because a well-run state 
follows the order of the universe.”
“The use of principi reinforces the analogy between cosmic and political organization which was applied to 207
natural and human law by Laelius in Book 3” (Zetzel (1995) 231).
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The god is associated with the outermost sphere and is portrayed as the supreme king. The 
political metaphor is adumbrated in “subjected” (subiecti), which simultaneously refers both to 
the spatial relationship of the spheres (i.e. they are below the outer sphere, OLD s.v. 1) and to 
their political inferiority (i.e. they are subordinate in rank to a monarch, OLD s.v. 5b). 
 The planets themselves are also portrayed in political language, as the sun is depicted in the 
same vocabulary as the rector of the state (Rep. 6.17): 
Deinde subter mediam fere regionem Sol obtinet, dux et princeps et moderator luminum 
reliquorum, mens mundi e temperatio, tanta magnitudine ut cuncta sua luce lustret et 
compleat.  
Then below the sun occupies the middle region, the leader and king and guide of the 
other lights, the mind of the cosmos and its moderator, of such great magnitude that it 
illuminates and fills all things with its light.  
The sun is both dux and princeps, suggesting a connection between the astronomical and 
political. The word moderator in particular recalls the language Scipio earlier ascribed to the 
ideal statesmen and his almost divine perspicacity to perceive the revolutions of political cycles 
(Rep. 1.45): 
Mirique sunt orbes et quasi circuitus in rebus publicis commutationum et vicissitudinum. 
Quos cum cognosse sapientis est, tum vero prospicere impedentes, in gubernanda re 
publica moderantem cursum atque in sua potestate retinentem, magni cuiusdam civis et 
divini paene est viri.  
And there are marvelous cycles and, as it were, revolutions, of changes and alterations in 
public affairs. It is the part of the wise man to know these [revolutions and cycles], and to 
foresee them before they occur; moderating a course in governing the state and keeping 
her in his own power, is the part of a certain great citizen and almost divine man.  
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This divine statesman, like the sun, moderates the orbes and circuitus, whether they be planetary 
or political. Furthermore, the light of the sun, which illuminates the universe, recalls the light of 
the statesman’s mind (lumen animi, Rep. 6.12), which like the sun’s rays, fills its realm—the 
state (=cosmos)—with his light (ostendas oportebit patriae, Rep. 6.12). In this way, the sun is 
given authority over the other planets, even as it is subjected to the outermost divine sphere. So 
also, the statesman guides and controls the state, perceiving its natural motions, in a way that 
imitates but does not fully encompass the deus’ cosmic rule. Thus, the terrestrial gatherings and 
assemblies mirror astral ones.   208
 Since it pleases the god to rule over the cosmos, it is fitting that his earthly ambassadors, 
the “rulers and preservers” (rectores et conservatores, Rep. 6.13) perform the same role on earth 
(on a much smaller scale) that he does in the heavens. In fact, Paullus tells his son that humans 
were created for this very reason: to watch over the earth (homines enim sunt hac lege generati 
qui tuerentur illum globum, Rep. 6.15). 
 According to the Dream, the parallel between human, planetary, and divine rulership points 
to a connection that is not mere metaphor but living. Humans’ original home is in the stars, 
which are themselves divine. Scipio learns that people originate in the stars (hinc profecti, Rep. 
6.13), where their souls are given to them from the eternal fires of the stars (eisque animus datus 
est ex illis sempiternis ignibus quae sidera et stellas vocatis, Rep. 6.15). The concept of 
humankind’s stellar origin can be traced to Plato’s Timaeus, in which the great astronomer and 
 Coleman (1964) 3 points out that King Masinissa’s address to the sun (Rep. 6.9) “skillfully prepares us for the 208
solar doctrine of the Somnium, in particular for the remarkable description of the Sun as dux princeps moderator 
luminum reliquorum” (Rep. 6.17), though Powell (2005) 19 disagrees.
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statesman Timaeus of Locri reveals that Zeus has assigned each soul to a star, to which it returns 
after completing a virtuous life (Ti. 41e): 
ξυστήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν διεῖλε ψυχὰς ἰσαρίθµους τοῖς ἄστροις ἔνειµέ θ’ ἑκάστην πρὸς 
ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐµβιβάσας ὡς ἐς ὄχηµα τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξε. 
After mixing together the whole, he divided the souls in equal numbers to the stars and 
assigned each one to a star. And he mounted it on a chariot, as it were, and showed it the 
nature of the universe. 
According to the Timaeus, Zeus has given mankind divine souls with an astral counterpart. In his 
own  Timaeus, Cicero translates the same passage (Cic. Tim. 43):  
Toto igitur omni constituto sideribus parem numerum distribuit animorum et singulos 
adiunxit ad singula atque ita quasi in currum universitatis imposuit commonstravitque 
leges fatales ac necessarias. 
Therefore, after he arranged the whole, he distributed an equal number of souls to the 
stars and ajoined the souls to the stars, one by one, and he placed them in a chariot, as it 
were, and carefully taught them the fated and necessary laws. 
The Timaeus offers an explanation of the correspondence of the human and the astral: Zeus gave 
each human to a star.  In the Dream, the stars’ swift motion points to their divinity, since they 209
are “animated by divine minds” (divinis animatate mentibus, Rep. 6.15). Human souls are also 
driven by this same divine motion and animated by divine fire. Indeed, Africanus makes the 
 On David Sedley’s view, Cicero’s Timaeus was composed between 45–43 BCE, likely after the Tusculan 209
Disputations and before De natura deorum, which of course would postdate the DRP and Dream by a decade or so 
((2013) 129). White (2015) agrees with Sedley’s dating, but a later translation date of course would not preclude 
Cicero from reading and being influenced by the Timaeus in his composition of the Dream. For my part, I am more 
inclined to think that Cicero worked on the Timaeus translation for many years, and I take the strong resonance 
between the Dream and Timaeus on the astral origin of the human soul to raise the possibility that Cicero was 
reading—and possibly translating—the Timaeus in the 50s.
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connection of the divine and human explicitly at the end of the Dream when he enjoins Scipio 
(Rep. 6.26), 
Deum te igitur scito esse, si quidem est deus qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui 
providet, qui tam regit et moderatur et movet id corpus cui praepositus est, quam hunc 
mundum ille princeps deus; et ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipse deus aeternus, 
sic fragile corpus animus sempiternus movet. Nam quod semper movetur aeternum est.  
Know therefore that you are a god, if indeed it is a god who lives, who feels, who 
remembers, who sees the future, who rules and governs and moves this body of which it 
has been put in charge, in the same way as that principal god rules and governs and 
moves this universe. And as that eternal god moves the universe, mortal in part, so also 
your eternal mind moves this fragile body. For that which is eternal is always in motion. 
Humans are not merely like the god; they are gods, in so far as their true essence is their souls. 
The principal god (ille princeps deus) is eternal and rules (regit), governs (moderatur), and 
moves (movet) the cosmos, which is mortal. So also, the divine part of us humans—the true part, 
according to Scipio—rules over the mortal body (fragile corpus). Hence, as the god rules over 
the cosmos, so also are we humans to govern political institutions and even our own bodies.   
 Yet by comparing the heavenly and the earthly, the divine and the human, Scipio comes to 
despise the terrestrial realm and longs to join his father and adoptive grandfather in the Milky 
Way. In comparison with astral greatness, mere earthly affairs seem insignificant. But if the 
Dream is meant to spur Scipio to greater care for the commonwealth, doesn’t this insight have 
the opposite of the desired effect? Instead of increasing Scipio’s desire to cultivate the 
commonwealth—the whole reason that the god created humans in the first place—Scipio is 
instead drawn to the stellar grandeur and begins to despise terrestrial life, which by comparison 
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seems like death, tempting him to commit suicide to hasten his stellar return (Rep. 6.15). As 
Scipio takes in the cosmic panorama, he says (Rep. 6.16), 
Ex quo omnia mihi contemplanti praeclara cetera et mirabilia videbantur. erant autem eae 
stellae, quas numquam ex hoc loco vidimus, et eae magnitudines omnium, quas esse 
numquam suspicati sumus, ex quibus erat ea minima, quae ultima a caelo, citima terris 
luce lucebat aliena. stellarum autem globi terrae magnitudinem facile vincebant. iam ipsa 
terra ita mihi parva visa est, ut me imperii nostri, quo quasi punctum eius attingimus, 
paeniteret. 
And from that point, as I looked at everything, all things seemed glorious and marvelous. 
There were those stars which I had never seen from this place, and their size, such as we 
never expeced, among them [= the planets] that one was the smallest circle, which 
furthest from the heavens, closest to the earth was shining with borrowed light [i.e., the 
moon]. However, the globes of the stars easily surpassed the size of the earth. Now the 
earth itself seemed to me so small, that I was ashamed of our empire, by which we touch 
only a point of it, as it were.  
Even the greatest city of Rome seems like nothing more than a mere point. Small amounts of the 
earth are inhabitable, and even if lasting fame is achieved, from the cosmic viewpoint a year is 
nothing in comparison to the scale of the Great Year, when all of the planets return to their 
original position.  
 Rather than being distressed by the smallness of man, the Dream suggests that Scipio (and 
we) can be spurred to greater action, knowing that life on the ground is both divinely appointed 
and ultimately a very small part of a larger cosmic picture. From the cosmic viewpoint, Scipio is 
able to see how fleeting human endeavors are. Instead of being driven by glory and fame, which 
thanks to the lesson of the Dream we now know is temporary, we can aim to cultivate our 
civilization, which is a microcosm of the divine interactions above and which, if we care for it 
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well, will hasten our return to our stellar homes. The Dream provides Scipio an opportunity to 
recalibrate his vision and hone the divine part of himself: the soul. By studying the stars, Scipio 
and we, his audience, tune our souls to align with their astral counterparts so that we can create 
human gatherings that most closely imitate the patterns of the heavens above. The connection 
between the stars and the human soul is not accidental, but fundamental.  210
 The Dream is, simply put, a stunning piece of literature: in the words of Wilamowitz, “eine 
schöne Dichtung.”  It is a very visual text, in so far as it encourages us to “see” with Scipio as 211
he goes on his astral tour. In this sense, the Dream accords with the static sphere, which is 
beautiful and appreciated visually. The Dream likewise is replete with visual cues that draw us 
into Scipio’s line of vision. “Do you see that city” (videsne illam urbem, Rep. 6.11); “But at that 
time I see, as it were, two paths of the fates” (sed eius temporis ancipitem video quasi fatorum 
viam, Rep. 6.12); “When I saw him, to be sure I poured forth a profusion of tears” (quem ut vidi, 
equidem vim lacrimarum profudi, Rep. 6.14); “There were however those stars which we have 
never seen from this place” (erant autem eae stellae quas numquam ex hoc loco vidimus, Rep. 
6.16); I marveling at these things nevertheless kept bringing back my eyes to the earth again and 
agan” (Haec ego admirans referebam tamen oculos ad terram identidem, Rep. 6.20);”therefore 
look aloft if you will” (igitur alte spectare si voles, Rep. 6.25). These verbal cues conjure a 
picture before our eyes—a sort of “vision” in the interlocutors’ (and reader’s) perception. We see 
the beauty of the cosmos, just as Scipio does.  
 For a different interpretation, see Woolf (2015) 111–3, who sees the call to action on the political level as in 210
tension with the Dream’s cosmic vision.
 Recorded by Harder (1929) 116 and quoted by Luck (1956) 209. For a recent appraisal of the Dream’s beauty, 211
see Wojaczek (2015), who says the Dream  “ist wohl das schönste Stück römischer Prosaliteratur” (123).
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 The immersive nature of the Dream recreates the experience of Scipio’s cosmic ascent, as 
if we were alongside him. The vividness of the experience is exemplified in the interlocutors’ 
strong reaction. When Scipio recounts Africanus’ prophecy that he may die at the hands of his 
impious relatives, Laelius and the rest of the company respond (Rep. 6.12):  
Hic cum exclamavisset Laelius, ingemuissentque vehementius ceteri, leniter arridens 
Scipio, St. Quaeso, inquit, ne me e somno excietis, et parumper audite cetera.  
At this point Laelius shouted out, and the others groaned deeply, but Scipio, laughing 
lightly, said, “Sh! Please, do not wake me from my sleep, and listen a bit to the rest.” 
Laelius and the others are so engrossed in Scipio’s tale that for a moment, they seem to forget 
that Africanus is not actually speaking before them. The text emphasizes their vehement reaction 
(exclamavisset, ingemuissentque, vehementius), signalling their strong emotional response. Story 
and reality, past and present blur, so that we almost cannot tell if the Dream is happening before 
our eyes or if it is just being recounted. Scipio’s response also suggests that temporal boundaries 
have collapsed: he tells them not to wake him from his dream (ne me e somno excietis), as if he 
were currently undergoing the dream and not merely retelling a memory of it. By recounting his 
dream, then, Scipio brings it from the past to the present, inspiring a sort of “virtual reality” 
where the images from the Dream are painted so vividly in the mind’s eye that it becomes 
consonant with present reality. In this sense, the Dream recalls Aratus’ Phaenomena (as well as 
the static sphere), since it is (i) beautiful and (ii) capable of creating a visual picture with words 
before our eyes.  
 But the Dream is not only beautiful and visually engaging, it also portrays the universe as a 
sonorous, moving mechanism. The planets and stars are both beautiful to look at and sweet to 
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hear, uniting the disparate representations of the two spheres into a true cosmos, which because 
of the inherent connection of ratio and beauty, must appeal to the ears and mind (like the orrery) 
and the eyes (like the static sphere). Like Archimedes’ orrery, the planets follow predictable 
routes. The Dream emphasizes their motion: “[the planets] complete their circles and paths with 
a miraculous speed” (circos suos orbesque conficiunt celeritate mirabili, Rep. 6.15); “they turn 
with a contrary motion” (versantur retro contrario motu, Rep. 6.17); “with an impulse and 
motion of their circuits [the music of the spheres] is created” (impulsu et motu ipsorum orbium 
efficitur, Rep. 6.18). Moreover, this motion is the source of their divinity, since the end of the 
Dream demonstrates with the translation of Plato’s Phaedrus that whatever has its own source of 
motion is divine. Hence, the planets are divine, like the self-moving human soul. Here, motion in 
particular is crucial, and in this respect the movements of the planets recall the orrery and its 
miniature planets. 
 This planetary motion also creates cosmic music. Scipio not only sees the universe, he 
hears it: “What is that great and sweet sound that fills my ears?” (quis est qui complet aures 
meas, tantus et tam dulcis sonus? Rep. 6.17). Scipio’s aural experience of the cosmos is 
emphasized (aures, sonus). Africanus goes on to explain that the regular intervals of the 
planetary spheres creates music (Rep. 6.18): 
“Hic est,” inquit, “ille qui intervallis coniunctus imparibus, sed tamen pro rata parte 
ratione distinctis, impulsu et motu ipsorum orbium efficitur, et acuta cum gravibus 
temperans varios aequabiliter concentus efficit. Nec enim silentio tanti motus incitari 
possunt, et natura fert ut extrema ex altera parte graviter, ex altera autem acute sonent.” 
He said, “This is the sound, which conjoined with unequal intervals which are 
nevertheless distinct proportionally by their ratio, and is being completed by the impulse 
and motion of their own circuits, and moderating the high with the low harmoniously 
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makes various sounds. For it is not possible for such motion to be incited in silence and 
its nature is such that these motions from the one extreme part sound deeply, and from the 
other sound at a higher pitch.  
The ratio of the concentric planetary orbits generates a harmonic scale. This cosmic ratio 
accords with the ratio of the orrery (ratio, 1.22), as well as the ratio of the statesman, who 
moderates the commonwealth by harmonizing the lower, middle, and upper classes, like a 
musician harmonizes a range of tones (ratione, 2.59). As James Zetzel puts it, “the universe is 
ordered by right reason, and the harmony of the spheres is a manifestation of that reason” (1995, 
240). So also, the same cosmic ratio that makes the planets sing also governs the ratio of the 
statesman moderating the civitas and the teacher explaining the ratio of the orrery. This ratio 
undergirds the fabric of the entire cosmos, which is made manifest on the level of individual 
(soul, mind), microcosm (commonwealth) and macrocosm (the universe). This ratio can take 
different forms (music, politics, speech), but its cosmic origin is the same.  
 Much as Philus has to learn about the ratio of the orrery, so also Scipio has to learn about 
the ratio of the planets. Africanus teaches Scipio about the music of the spheres, which he had 
never noticed before because, like people who live near a waterfall, he became inured to their 
rushing sound. Sometimes, the cosmos can be appreciated immediately because of its universal 
beauty (much like the static sphere), but sometimes the cosmos requires an explanation of its 
ratio (much like the orrery). The best way, it seems, to understand nature and the political 
systems that reflect it is to study nature itself. But the DRP also suggests that such study requires 
a more experienced guide. As Philus relies on Galus to understand the orrery, as Scipio needs 
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Africanus, so also we need an instructor who can help us to “see” and “hear” the ratio and 
ornatus of the universe. And for us readers, who is that guide but Cicero? 
 Perhaps, then, it is for this reason that writers and other artists earn a place in the stars. 
While on the one hand the beautiful order of the universe is self-evident, on the other, it is so 
complex and our own understanding is so dull that we cannot perceive the cosmos’ ratio without 
help. Artists of all sorts, whether writers, musicians, or philosophers, help us to “see” and “hear” 
what we might otherwise miss. In his role as author, Cicero takes off our blinders, so to speak, to 
reveal the cosmic reality that our human life is but a speck. But a paradox lies at the heart of the 
Dream: all human endeavors are temporary and contingent but also eternally relevant, since by 
pursuing them and creating things on the Horizontal plane—whether art or music or cities—
eternal bliss is secured. But this cannot be done without the proper perspective, and hence in the 
Dream we see Africanus repeatedly reminding Scipio to look up. Scipio’s inclination is to focus 
on the ground even while the stars dance and sing overhead. Africanus constant reminders to 
look and listen help Scipio enter a cosmic perspective, but then he realizes just how small Rome 
is—small, but not irrelevant. And so, when Scipio has the impulse towards suicide, he is stopped 
(Rep. 6.15): the life of the soul exercised in the body determines its stellar return.  
 The contingency of human civilizations and projects also bespeaks the tenuousness of the 
Republic itself, which could fall. In this sense, the Dream is not an escapist fantasy as some have 
argued but an ambiguous tale. This sort of ambiguity also ties into the sort of limited applications 
of the ideals of the dialogue that Jed Atkins points out.  The ideal super-lunar realm cannot be 212
implemented completely on the Horizontal plane, which can only approximate its Vertical 
 Atkins (2013) 47–79.212
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counterpart. So also, Scipio, although he advocates kingship, is satisfied for practical reasons 
with the blended constitution of Polybius, precisely because when it fails—and fail it will—it is 
not as grand and therefore does not fall as hard.  It seems to me that the Dream makes a similar 213
sort of move. Scipio may be dictator and preserver of the Republic, or he may die. Facing a two-
headed path, Scipio does not know if he will save the Republic as its dictator or die at traitorous 
hands. We readers, of course, know how the story ends: Scipio meets an untimely death, as 
signaled by the portent of the double suns. 
 Does this ominous undertone of the Dream imply that we should not take its lofty vision 
too seriously? Could it be a “noble lie” that incentivizes political greatness but is itself false? 
Perhaps, but I suggest that the Dream is a hopeful but realistic vision. Cicero, I contend, is 
cautiously optimistic that the ratio and beauty of the cosmos points to the intelligibility of nature 
and mankind’s divinity. He seems to me a hopeful Skeptic who would like to think that a 
beneficent god like Aratus’ creator Zeus adorns the natural world with beautiful phenomena that 
communicate to the deepest, most divine parts of the human experience. But as a realist, Cicero 
hedges his bets by tempering the mythic romanticism of the Dream:  he provides a rational 214
explanation for its occurrence (our waking hours impact our dreams) and he adumbrates the 
death of Scipio, Rome’s would-be savior. Rather than Socrates’ “noble lie,” it might be helpful to 
think of the Dream in terms of Pascal’s “wager.” Cicero makes a reasonable conjecture that a 
divinely guided cosmic order exists. If true, he encourages himself and other Romans to strive 
for immortality by doing good for the state in politics and the arts. But if such a god does not 
 On Cicero’s mixed constitution and its relationship to Polybius, see Asmis (2005) 377–416.213
 See Ruch (1948) 171, who thinks “La fiction de Cicero nous semble être à la fois plus naturelle et plus 214
ingénieuse.” For a similar view, see Coleman (1964) 2–3. For a different view on the mythology of the Dream, see 
Asmis (2014).
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exist, what has been lost? The state has still benefited. The eschatology of the Dream is not an 
escape from this world, but a call to action.  
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CHAPTER 3: SIGNS AND STARS, WORDS AND WORLDS 
Omne autem, quod gignitur, ex aliqua causa gigni necesse est; 
nullius enim rei causa remota reperiri origo potest. Quocirca si is, qui 
aliquod munus efficere molitur, eam speciem, quae semper eadem 
est, intuebitur atque id sibi proponet exemplar, praeclarum opus 
efficiat necesse est; sin autem eam, quae gignitur, numquam illam, 
quam expetet, pulchritudinem consequetur. 
However, all that which comes into existence must necessarily come 
into existence by some cause; for it is not possible to find an origin 
of anything when a cause is absent. Therefore, if he who strives to 
make some work gazes upon that image which always is, and places 
that model before himself, he will necessarily create a brilliant work; 
but if he looks at the image that is coming into existence, then he 




In 1485 CE, a tomb along the Appian Way was opened during archaeological excavations. A 
flickering lamp, marking the deceased’s spirit with its flame, suddenly went black. Within the 
marble tomb was a beautiful young woman who seemed to have died mere hours before. 
Covered with an aromatic paste of frankincense, myrrh, and aloe, the form was perfectly 
preserved. Luscious blonde hair was piled on her head and her flesh lightened at a fingertip’s 
touch, as if the capillaries beneath the surface of the skin were ready to refill with blood. This 
uncorrupted body allegedly belonged to Cicero’s beloved daughter, Tullia (or Tulliola, as he 
affectionately called her), who had tragically died shortly after childbirth in 45 BCE, over 1500 
years before this tomb was opened. A translation of a letter from Daniele da San Sebastiano, 
recorded by the great 19th c. Roman archaeologist Rodolfo Lanciani, reads, “I hasten to inform 
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you of this event, because I want you to understand how the ancients took care to prepare not 
only their souls but also their bodies for immortality.”  215
Cicero had indeed hoped for immortality for his daughter, who was his sole comfort as the 
Republic and his marriage waned. After Tullia’s untimely death, he resolved to build her a shrine, 
even against the counsel of his friends, who viewed his grief as excessive. In a letter to Atticus, 
dated May 3, 45 BCE, Cicero declares (Att. 12.36), 
fanum fieri volo, neque hoc mihi [dis]suaderi potest. sepulcri similitudinem effugere non 
tam propter poenam legis studeo quam ut maxime adsequar ἀποθέωσιν. 
I want a shrine to be made, and it is not possible to sway me from this. I am eager to 
avoid the appearance of a tomb, not so much because of legal penalty but in order to best 
achieve apotheosis.  
Cicero’s primary motivation for building a shrine was to achieve apotheosis for Tullia with a 
visible monument, a sign to the world of her immortality.  Despite the fancies of 15th c. 216
archaeologists, it seems that Tullia’s shrine was never built. Cicero, however, continued to 
ponder the immortality of the soul. After Tullia’s death in late January or early February of 45, 
Cicero penned many philosophical dialogues, exploring the nature of the gods, fate, and the soul. 
As Susan Treggiari nicely puts it, “Tullia's true memorial was the philosophical work which had 
 Lanciani (1896) 297. To the best of my knowledge, the original letter does not exist outside of Lanciani’s 215
recording.
 On Cicero’s contribution to the rise of deification at Rome, see Cole (2013), with a discussion of Tullia’s shrine 216
at 1–7.
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occupied Cicero's mind more constructively.”  Cicero did indeed make Tullia immortal, not 217
with marble but with words.  218
In a letter dated mid-April of 45, Cicero laments that he can find no reprieve in public or 
private life because his two greatest loves, Rome and Tullia, are dead (Fam. 4.6):  
itaque et domo absum et foro, quod nec eum dolorem quem e re publica capio domus iam 
consolari potest nec domesticum res publica. 
And so I am absent both from home and the forum, because my home is no longer able to 
console that grief which I have from the commonwealth, nor can the commonwealth 
console me in my familial grief.  
In these tragic circumstances, the questions surrounding the Dream must have taken on a new 
sense of urgency for Cicero. Is there a place secured in the stars for those who serve the state? 
Does the same immortal pattern that guides the stars also animate our souls? Do we humans have 
a divine mind? In the De re publica, Cicero was content to explore these questions through the 
drama of the dialogue. Indeed, the De re publica suggests that the order of the heavens subtends 
life on the ground, as I argued in Chapter Two, but Cicero crafts the dialogue in such a way that 
no voice gets final say, leaving the intersection of the Horizontal and the Vertical to be one of 
hopeful skepticism, not certitude. By contrast, in the De natura deorum and its sequel De 
divinatione, Cicero puts the cosmos to the test more directly. Is the cosmos filled with divine 
signs (which I shall refer to the Aratean view), or is it mute, the product of chance (the Epicurean 
view)?  
 Treggiari (1998) 16.217
 For a contrasting view, see Baraz (2012) 44–95, who downplays the connection between Tullia’s death and 218
Cicero’s crepuscular project. As she puts it, “Thus, if one thinks that the main reason behind the mass production of 
the more technically philosophical works of 45–44 was the need to take consolation in philosophy following the 
death in February 45 of Tullia, Cicero’s beloved daughter, then the author’s claims that the corpus was meant to be 
an important contribution to the future of the republic are bound to be taken less seriously, as secondary and 
rhetorical” (Baraz (2012) 44). While I agree with Baraz’ argument that Cicero’s philosophy has a strong political 
dimension, I do not think the two motivations are mutually exclusive.
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In this chapter, I argue that Cicero puts the Aratean cosmos on trial in the De natura deorum 
and De divinatione. By “Aratean cosmos,” I mean a worldview which generally accords with 
that of Aratus’ poem, entailing: (i) a beneficent god (Zeus) who created the universe to be 
intelligible, (ii) natural phenomena (including constellations and meteorological occurrences) 
that serve as “signs” for humankind, and (iii) a fundamental connection between Zeus-qua-
demiurge and humans-qua-creators. This final point needs further elaboration. Aratus’ famous 
craftsman simile compares the creation of the celestial spheres to a human artifact, implying an 
overlap between divine and human craftsmanship (Phaen. 529–33). The simile thus suggests that 
human artistry mirrors the very universe itself, the handiwork of Zeus.  219
Cicero tests the Aratean worldview in two ways in the De natura deorum and De divinatione. 
First, the dialogic format sets philosophical viewpoints against one another. In good Academic 
fashion, Cicero takes advantage of the multiple speakers to voice various schools’ ideas without 
explicitly committing to a single viewpoint. In both the De natura deorum and De divinatione, 
the Aratean worldview is called into question. In the former, the Stoic Balbus asserts that a 
divine mens animates the universe against the ripostes of the Epicurean Velleius and the 
Academic Cotta. In the latter, Cicero’s brother Quintus defends the practice of divination against 
Cicero himself.  
Scholars have spilled much ink trying to determine which side of the debates Cicero comes 
down on in both texts.  Two details complicate the matter further. In the De natura deorum, 220
Cicero ends the dialogue by declaring he finds the Stoic Balbus’ account closer to the truth (Nat. 
 See Phaen. 529–33. On the parallel between human and divine artistry in Aratus, see Volk (2012).219
 On De divinatione, see Schofield (1986) 47–65 and Beard (1986) 33–46.220
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D. 3.95).  In De divinatione, Cicero argues sua voce against divination. How should we read 221
Cicero’s statements? Should we take Cicero at his dialogic persona’s word, or should we read 
between the lines, so to speak? In what follows, I will argue that we readers should approach the 
texts with a critical eye when it comes to pinning Cicero down philosophically. Rather than 
identifying with a single character (even his own personae), Cicero, I will argue, allows the truth 
(or the closest thing to it) to emerge from the tension of the dialogue itself. Thus, in large part I 
circumvent the question of Cicero’s philosophical affiliations. After all, it seems to me that his 
own philosophical views are precisely what Cicero is trying to work out in writing these 
dialogues.  222
This brings me to my second point. Cicero tests the Aratean cosmos through the very act of 
writing itself. If the Aratean worldview is correct, and there is a fundamental connection between 
the god who created the cosmos and the human who creates a work of art, then the very act of 
writing a philosophical dialogue (a type of human art) serves as a sort of proof for that 
worldview. To put it more simply, humans create because god created. The ordered structure of a 
human work of art (=the dialogue at hand) mirrors on a smaller scale the ordered structure of the 
cosmos itself. Cicero performs his own consolation by the very act of writing. The suggestion is 
that the world can be illuminated by words, because a fundamental link connects the crafting of 
the text and the crafting of the cosmos itself. The connection between text and cosmos, author 
 See Pease (1913) 25–37.221
 The timeline of Cicero’s philosophical affiliations has been greatly debated. Glucker (1992) argues that the 222
expression of preference for Balbus’ argument at the end of De natura deorum indicates that Cicero as a young man 
ascribed to Antiochus’ views, which DeFilippo (2000) rightly overturns by pointing out the difference between the 
dramatic persona of the dialogue and the young Cicero of the 70s. Glucker (1988) and Steinmetz (1989) argue that 
Cicero’s philosophical commitments went through an Antiochean period and then turned to Skepticism, a view 
contested by Görler (1995). Linderski (1982) sees Cicero moving towards greater skepticism at the end of his life 
but does not detect as strict of periodization in Cicero’s philosophy as Glucker and Steinmetz. Tarán (1987) sees the 
conclusion of De natura deorum as evidence of Cicero’s sympathy for Stoicism.   
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and Demiurge, is more than mere analogy: the design of the text itself becomes a proof for the 
design of the cosmos. Thus, Cicero’s own writing is what I call a “performative proof” of the 
Aratean worldview.  
The link between human creation and divine creation becomes extremely important. The 
stars, as the consummate example of divine creation—the most transcendent, the most beautiful
—are particularly suited to demonstrating divine design. It is fitting, then, that Cicero uses his 
astral poetry in its service. Cicero, however, maintains distance from any single philosophical 
point of view, both by testing ideas via the dialogic form and by putting his poetry into the 
mouths of others rather than quoting it sua persona.  
3.2 De natura deorum and the Beauty of Art 
Written in 45 BCE, the De natura deorum, along with its companion dialogues De divinatione 
and De fato, forms the core of Cicero’s philosophical-theological works.  De natura deorum is 223
set in Cicero’s youth, with a dramatic date of around 77 BCE, thirty years before Cicero’s writing 
of the dialogue.  The primary characters—Gaius Velleius, Quintus Lucilius Balbus, and Gaius 224
Cotta, adherents of Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism, respectively —debate the nature 225
 In addition to these three dialogues, we could also include Tusculan Disputations and his translation of the 223
Timaeus as well as the Dream in the DRP.
 On the dramatic dating of the dialogue (77–6 BCE), see Dyck (2003) 7.224
 In the dialogue, the character Cicero remarks that all the philosophical schools would be represented if Marcus 225
Piso were present as an adherent of the Peripatetics, but Cotta responds that the Peripatetics and the Stoics are so 
close in their philosophical positions that there is no real difference between them, a position which Balbus rebuts 
(Nat. D. 1.16).
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of the gods and their involvement (or lack thereof) in human affairs.  De natura deorum falls 226
into three books, with Velleius and Balbus offering Epicurean and Stoic arguments and Cotta 
dismantling them in turn.   227
In the preface to De natura deorum, Cicero sua voce provides two explanations for writing 
this dialogue, which I will address in reverse order. Cicero confesses that his grief turned him to 
philosophy (Nat. D. 1.9):  
Hortata etiam est ut me ad haec conferrem animi aegritudo fortunae magna et gravi 
commota iniuria. 
The injury of my mind, stirred by the grave and heavy blow of fortune, drove me to apply 
myself to these concerns (i.e. the writing of philosophy). 
Cicero’s pain almost seems to come through these words. The participles hortata and commota 
are separated at the extremities of the sentence, depending on the word aegritudo that stands in 
the center. Cicero is not subject, but object, buffeted by the great injuries of fortune. The strained 
structure of the sentence mirrors the state of a man beleaguered by filial loss. Grief is a disease, 
an aegritudo afflicting his person on both a physical and verbal level.  Philosophy, however, 228
offers solace, if not cure (Nat. D. 1.9):  
 Cicero himself also plays a part in the dialogue, primarily as an observer. Careful distinction, however, must be 226
made between Cicero the author and Cicero the character of the dialogue. Not only is the dialogue’s Cicero thirty 
years younger than his authorial counterpart, but Cicero the author is also capable of creating a persona for literary 
and philosophical purposes that does not necessarily overlap with his own views in every regard. The tendency to 
collapse Cicero-the-character with Cicero-the-author rests upon an old assumption that Cicero’s dialogues are not 
complex works of literary and philosophical excellence but rather compilations of other scholarly sources. In recent 
years, the literariness of the dialogue has been more widely appreciated, and along with this scholarly approach 
comes recognition that the characters of the dialogue operate on several layers. Thus, to distinguish between the 
literary persona of the dialogue and its author, I henceforth will call the former “Marcus” and the latter “Cicero.” 
 The prodigious two-volume commentary on De natura deorum of A.S. Pease (1955, 1958) remains unsurpassed. 227
Pease’s commentary, however, preceded the scholarly revolution in Roman philosophy. The commentary on Book 1 
by Dyck (2003) redresses some of these difficulties but only covers the Epicurean position. 
 Cf. Acad. 1.3, where Cicero, “struck by the most serious wound of fortune” (fortunae gravissimo percussus 228
vulnere), calls philosophy a “medicine for grief” (doloris medicinam).
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Cuius si maiorem aliquam levationem reperire potuissem, non ad hanc potissimum 
confugissem, ea vero ipsa nulla ratione melius frui potui quam si me non modo ad 
legendos libros sed etiam ad totam philosophiam pertractandam dedissem. Omnes autem 
eius partes atque omnia membra tum facillume noscuntur cum totae quaestiones 
scribendo explicantur; est enim admirabilis quaedam continuatio seriesque rerum, ut alia 
ex alia nexa et omnes inter se aptae conligataeque videantur.  
If I had been able to find any better remedy than it (=philosophy), I would not have fled 
to this relief above all; but I could enjoy it in no way better than by dedicating myself not 
only to reading books but also to treating all of philosophy. For all its parts and all its 
members are known most readily when all its investigations are set out in writing; for 
there exists a certain wonderful interconnection and order of things, so that one thing is 
tied to another and all things seem connected and joined together.     
Cicero portrays himself as coming to philosophy with reluctance. Even reading philosophy is not 
sufficient solace. For Cicero, philosophy must be “worked through” and sorted. Philosophy 
hangs together as a cohesive and orderly whole, apprehended through the act of writing itself 
(scribendo).   229
 Why does Cicero emphasize philosophy’s “wonderful interconnection and order of 
things” (admirabilis quaedam continuatio seriesque rerum)? It seems likely that philosophy’s 
ordered system stands in contrast to the fragmented experience of his grief. By writing, Cicero 
provides himself a consolation of philosophy, organizing its elements and progressing from 
disorder (a state of chaos, if you will) to interconnectedness and harmony (a state of cosmos). If 
philosophy itself is orderly, then perhaps this same rational structure extends to the natural world. 
We can think of Cicero’s writing of philosophy as a “performative proof” of the world’s inherent 
intelligibility and order: the Aratean worldview. 
 Cf. Pease (1955) 5: “The interrelation of the parts of philosophy—epistemology, logic, physics, ethics, politics 229
and even rhetoric—Cicero clearly recognizes.” The classic branches of philosophy are logic, physics, and ethics, a 
tripartite division that was originally put forth by the Stoics and subsequently generally adopted by other schools. 
For an introduction to Hellenistic philosophy, see Long (1986).
 140
 The other reason Cicero says he undertakes the project of writing the De natura deorum is 
to create philosophy in the Latin tongue.  Expounding philosophy in Latin, Cicero writes, is for 230
the glory and benefit of the state (ad decus et ad laudem civitatis, Nat D. 1.7), since it behooves 
Rome to have such “weighty and admirable things expressed in Latin letters” (res tam gravis 
tamque praeclaras Latinis etiam litteris contineri, Nat. D. 1.7). Cicero asserts that writing 
philosophy in Latin magnifies the commonwealth, rendering his beloved state more glorious and 
brighter.  Cicero illuminates Rome with the Latin language itself, making her achievements 231
clearer to her citizens and thus increasing her glory and reputation.  For Cicero, the Latin 232
tongue rivals Greek for such a purpose. Thanks in no small part to his own efforts, Latin has 
developed to such a degree that its “abundance of words” (verborum quidem copia, Nat. D. 1.7) 
rivals Greek’s—a bold claim on Cicero’s part.  After all, Lucretius famously lamented the 233
inadequacy of the Latin tongue for expounding philosophy: it is difficult, he writes, “to 
illuminate the hidden discoveries of the Greeks with Latin verse” (obscura reperta/ difficile 
inlustrare Latinis versibus, Lucr. 1.136–7). 
 The clarity of Latin is an essential component of the dialogue, I suggest, because it 
corresponds to the intelligibility of the cosmos itself, which is directly tied to the involvement of 
 See Woolf (2015) 34–92.230
 Cf. the prologue of Tusculan Disputations 1, in which Cicero speaks of his project as bringing the light of the 231
Latin letters to philosophy: (Philosophia iacuit usque ad hanc aetatem nec ullum habuit lumen litterarum Latinarum 
quae illustranda et excitanda nobis est, ut, si occupati profuimus aliquid civius nostris, prosimus etiam, si possumus, 
otiosi, Tusc. 1.6).
 Lehoux (2012) 30–3 argues that for Cicero, an understanding of the natural world—and particularly the laws that 232
govern the cosmos—is foundational for the Roman state. On the political dimensions of Cicero’s philosophical 
“translations,” see Baraz (2012) 96–127.
 For an extended study of Cicero’s philosophical translations, see White (2015). See also Acad. 1.25–6.233
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the gods in the cosmos.  At the opening of the dialogue, Cicero says that the nature of the gods 234
is the most obscure branch of philosophy (perobscura quaestio est de natura deorum, Nat. D. 
1.1).  To this shadowy branch of philosophy Cicero brings light and order with Latin. This 235
inquiry into the nature of the gods is most excellent for considering the soul (ad cognitionem 
animi pulcherrima est, Nat. D. 1.1) and essential for moderating religion (ad moderandam 
religonem necessaria, Nat. D. 1.1). Although pulcherrima here means something like “well 
suited,” it may also add an aesthetic dimension to the phrase. The pursuit of philosophical 
inquiry—particularly regarding the divine—is pulcherrima and necessaria, and both modifiers 
are suggestive of some sort of greater order.  236
 The order of Cicero’s own philosophical writing corresponds to the cosmos itself. The 
analogy is made explicit by Balbus, who connects human and divine artes. In Book 2 of the De 
natura deorum, in response to the Epicurean Velleius, the Stoic Balbus argues that the gods are 
involved in the creation of the world. In order to make the case for the gods’ concern for human 
affairs, Balbus draws an analogy between the structures of the universe and the elements of a 
text. Balbus scoffs at the idea that anyone could believe that the chance collision of atoms and 
void could create such a magnificent and beautiful world (Nat. D. 2.93): 
Hic ego non mirer esse quemquam qui sibi persuadeat corpora quaedam solida atque 
individua vi et gravitate ferri mundumque effici ornatissimum et pulcherrimum ex 
eorum corporum concursione fortuita?  
 As David Konstan puts it, “Beauty is achieved by the balance among parts, in language as in the visual arts and 234
the human form or even the entire cosmos, which contribute collectively to the integrity of the whole” (Konstan 
(2014) 159).
 Cf. the assessment of Plato’s Timaeus in De finibus; it is obscure because of its difficult subject matter, not 235
because of its style (Fin. 2.15).
 A useful comparison might be Cicero’s understanding of rhetoric, which he likewise sees as an ordered whole. 236
On the connection between rhetorical style, ethics, and aesthetics, see Worman (2015) 274–82.
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At this point, should I not wonder that there is anyone who could convince himself that 
certain solid, singular bodies are carried about by force and gravity and that this most 
decorated and beautiful world is made by the chance meetings of these bodies?  
Balbus conceptualizes the universe as beautiful and ordered. For him, it is mundus, a word that 
emphasizes the aesthetic aspect of the world. Mundus, which is often used for personal 
adornment (OLD s.v. 2), emphasizes the aesthetic dimension of the universe, as do the modifiers 
ornatissimum and pulcherrimum. Ornatus means well arranged and decorated (OLD s.v. 1). 
Similarly, Cicero often uses ornatus as a noun to refer to his own speeches, highlighting their 
excellent order.  Pulcher also draws attention to the aesthetic dimension of these words, 237
evoking the fine quality of the universe. According to Balbus, the universe is so beautiful that it 
is beyond comprehension that it could be created by chance. If beauty is predicated upon order, 
then that order must be the handiwork of an intelligent mind. Hence, it is illogical to attribute 
such beauty to elements bouncing off of one another and randomly coalescing into such order, as 
the Epicureans maintain.  
 As a proof of this point, Balbus uses the example of writing (Nat. D. 2.94): 
Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intellego cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius 
et viginti formae litterarum vel aureae vel qualeslibet aliquo coiciantur, posse ex iis in 
terrram excussis annales Enni ut deinceps legi possint effici; quod nescio an ne in uno 
quidem versu possit tantum valere fortuna. 
He who thinks it is possible for this to happen, I do not understand how he could not 
likewise think that if an infinite number of the 21 letters, made of gold or anything else, 
were thrown together somewhere, that the Annales of Ennius could be made from those 
letters thrown on the ground, so that they could then be read! But I don’t know whether 
fortune would be strong enough to produce even a single verse.  
 See De or. 96–108 with commentary by Mankin (2011) 184–96. As Fantham (2004) 243 points out, ornatus is the 237
Latin equivalent of kosmos (in terms of oratory). On Cicero’s connection of cosmos and oratory, see Gee (2001) 
529–36. Gee argues that just as the arrangement of words can be used as an analogy for the order of the universe, so 
also can the order of the universe be used as an analogy for the arrangement of words (Gee (2001) 530). Both 
oratory and cosmic order are governed by the same principle of ratio.
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Balbus offers a thought experiment. If you took an infinite number of letters of the alphabet, and 
tossed them on the ground, what are the chances that Ennius’ Annales would be produced? Of 
course, it seems absurd to think that the work of Rome’s poet laureate could randomly be 
produced by tossing letters on the ground (even golden letters!). The production of a single verse 
would be all but inconceivable. How, then, could the universe—more glorious than any poem—
be the chance product of atoms meeting?   238
 Cicero’s golden letters vignette is an ancient relative of the “Infinite Monkey theorem,” which proposes that a 238
monkey tapping on a keyboard over an infinite period of time will type any given text, even Ennius’ Annales. This 
image, now a scientific trope, probes the relationship between an apparent pattern and intelligent design. Although 
prima facie it is ridiculous that a monkey could blindly produce Shakespeare’s corpus, given an infinite amount of 
time, such an unwitting literary production is not only possible but even probable. The argument at this point 
accords with the ancient idea that our ordered universe could arise if given an infinite number of universes. Cicero’s 
De natura deorum, though understudied today, is the antecedent of William Paley’s Natural Theology (1802), which 
presents the famous watchmaker analogy: simply put, a watch is an artifact because it has an artifex. In modern 
parlance, the debate is between evolution and creationism. Richard Dawkin’s seminal work The Blind Watchmaker 
(1986), whose title alludes to Paley’s watch, tackles the assertion that apparent design necessitates a designer. Nature 
herself, through a series of natural selections, can produce highly complex organisms. For Dawkins, the watchmaker 
is “blind” because it is not an intelligent ratio but a natural random process. At the beginning of his 1998 
monograph, William Dembski quotes this very passage on Ennius and the golden letters from the De natura deorum. 
Dembski, contra Dawkins, leaves open the possibility that the appearance of design can imply a designer, which he 
calls the “design inference.” Although the production of Ennius’ Annales and a random string of letters of equal 
length share the same degree of improbability, we see the former as a masterpiece and the latter as gibberish because 
of the presence of a pattern (Dembski (1998) 3). Of course, such a pattern could be pure chance, and for this reason 
a positive assertion of design cannot be proven, but only inferred.  
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 But Balbus’ argument does other work in the dialogue. With the vignette of Ennius and the 
golden letters, Balbus connects letters and matter, the written word and the cosmos.  The 239
design and order required to create the text at hand—the De natura deorum itself—invites us to 
make an analogous inference. As a cosmos in miniature of words and letters, the De natura 
deorum qua text works a performative proof of the universe’s intelligible design. Thus, with the 
dialogue itself we have the same golden letters proof writ large.  240
 As further evidence for my argument, let us consider the extended quotation of Cicero’s 
Aratea in the De natura deorum. As we saw in Chapter One, Cicero presents the Aratea as a text 
that creates a new world made out of words. The opening vowels, for example, suggest that the 
text is a “song of the universe” that showcases the demiurgic power of language—Latin in 
particular—to create a new Rome, a cosmos made not of stars and elements but rather of 
building blocks of a different sort: words and letters.  Furthermore, in Chapter 2 we 241
encountered Philus’ story of Archimedes’ two spheres—one beautiful but static, the other plain 
 The analogy of letters of the alphabet making up words and the elements of the universe forming matter is 239
perhaps best known from Lucretius, who plays on the Latin word elementa, which Lucretius uses to mean “atoms” 
as well as the letters of the alphabet (OLD s.v. 3). Cicero may be polemically engaging Lucretius on this point in 
Nat. D. 2.93–4. Zetzel (1998) has pointed out that Cicero and Lucretius are engaged in a philosophical and literary 
debate in the De rerum natura and the De re publica, and more recently, Gee (2013) has demonstrated Lucretius’ 
sustained engagement with Cicero’s Aratea. As Volk (2013) puts it in her discussion of Cicero’s De consulatu suo 
and its genre, “it is attractive to view these two writers as engaged in an extended discussion that is both 
philosophical and literary and extends across the boundaries of genres, from historical epic to didactic poetry to 
philosophical prose treatise.” If this is indeed the case, as I am inclined to think it is, then Cicero’s own usage of the 
letters-matter analogy may be a rebuttal of Lucretius’ use of the same analogy. The weakness of the analogy from an 
Epicurean point of view is that it implies some sort of design inherent within the construction of words (by the poet 
himself) and extensively, that the arrangement of the universe is similarly arranged by a divine designer. Perhaps, 
then, Cicero is using the analogy in the mouth of a Stoic to expose through allusive engagement with Lucretius the 
weakness of such imagery deployed for Epicurean purposes. It is important to note, however, that Cicero may have 
anticipated Lucretius in the letter-element poetic play, as a close reading of the opening line of Cicero’s Aratea 
suggests: A IOVE contains all of the vowels of the Latin alphabet, gesturing towards a sort of analogy between 
letters and the matter of the universe, suffused with divine song, on which see Katz (2013) 12–3. On the atoms-letter 
analogy, see Friedländer (1941) 16–34; Snyder (1980) 31–51 (with a rebuttal from West (1982) 25–7); and Steiner 
(1994) 116–22. In Lucr., see 1.823–7, 2.688–99; as well as 1.196–8 and 1.907–14. The analogy also has parallels in 
the Greek tradition (cf. στοιχεῖον LSJ s.v. 2.1 and 2).
 On the Stoic argument of creation from design, see Sedley (2008) 205–38.240
 See Katz (2013) 12–3 and Katz (2009) 79–84.241
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but technologically advanced (Rep. 1.21–2). The beautiful sphere, decorated with images, invites 
comparison with Aratus’ text and draws attention to the processes of translation, not only of the 
physical sphere itself from one place to another, but also of the rendering of the sphere into a 
verbal artifact: Eudoxus’ astronomical treatise and Aratus’ poem.  The transfer of the sphere 242
from Thales to Eudoxus to Aratus conflates sphere and text as if there were a seamless 
connection. Perhaps, then, we could say that the beautiful sphere is a metonymy for translation 
itself: from cosmos to object, from object to text. The connection between the sphere and the text 
also turns on beauty: the sphere is admired for its visual appeal, like Aratus’ Phaenomena. 
3.3. Balbus’ Aratea  
In De natura deorum, Balbus quotes Cicero’s Aratea at length, which I suggest serves as another 
example in addition to the Ennius example of the way that words and the cosmos are 
coterminous. Furthermore, the lengthy Aratea quotation works as a “performative proof” of 
intelligent design even more explicitly.  In De natura deorum, the Aratea works like a verbal 243
celestial sphere set before the other interlocutors (as well as us readers), one that on a smaller 
scale models the cosmic order.  The design of the celestial model necessitates a designer: as the 244
text requires an author, so also the cosmos requires a Demiurge. Both the Phaenomena and 
 The De re publica describes the sphere as an “arrangement” (ornatum, Rep. 1.22), the term we see deployed in 242
the De natura deorum to describe the design of the universe. Assuming that we can draw connections between 
Cicero’s various dialogues and the language he uses, I think we can see a connection between cosmos, text, and 
celestial sphere. Aratus’ poem in particular seems to represent such a sphere.
 The Aratea and the Phaenomena are informed by astronomical learning, certainly, but their primary effect is to 243
illustrate Zeus/Jupiter’s kindliness towards humankind through the design of the cosmos and the order of the stars. 
Possanza (2004) 80 puts it well: “Aratus shuns the technicalities of mathematical astronomy and puts the reader at 
the center of his poetic cosmos to observe Zeus’ universal order.” Cicero similarly highlights the position of the 
reader in the text and in the cosmos itself. 
 As Sedley points out, the Stoic argument from design coincided with the advent of Hellenistic technological 244
advancements, in particular, celestial models (2008) 207 n.6 and n.7. 
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Aratea invite such a connection between sphere-text-cosmos/artist-author-Demiurge, as 
showcased in the famous craftsman simile (Phaen. 529–33): 
οὔ κεν Ἀθηναίης χειρῶν δεδιδαγµένος ἀνὴρ 
 ἄλλῃ κολλήσαιτο κυλινδόµενα τροχάλεια 
τοῖά τε καὶ τόσα πάντα περὶ σφαιρηδὸν ἑλίσσων, 
ὡς τά γ᾿ ἐναιθέρια πλαγίῳ συναρηρότα κύκλῳ 
ἐξ ἠοῦς ἐπὶ νύκτα διώκεται ἤµατα πάντα.  245
In no other way could a man skilled in the arts of Athena fit together the revolving belts of 
such a kind and so many, rounding the whole into a sphere, just as those in the heavens 
joined together by a transverse belt speed from dawn until night for all days.  
  
The craftsman welding the metal cosmic bands of the celestial model is connected to Athena 
herself, the great goddess of technical craftsmanship and arts. As scholars have pointed out, the 
analogy also extends to the poet, Aratus, who likewise shapes and fashions the words of the 
poem.  The process of writing points to a divinity in the author himself, because creation (on 246
the Aratean view) is a divine act.  Moreover, the craftsman simile assimilates the poem to the 247
cosmos. 
 I suggest that Balbus’ extended recitation of the Aratea similarly connects written word to 
the natural world, particularly the stars, which Balbus characterizes as the pinnacle of the cosmic 
design.  Although Cicero does not have Balbus include his Latin counterpart to Aratus’ 248
 Text is Kidd (1997).245
 See Gee (2000) 88–90, who surmises: “The poem is parallel to a model made by a craftsman, which in turn is 246
mimetic of the universe” (90). For an in-depth argument that Aratus’ Phaenomena invites a comparison between the 
letters of the poem and the “letters” (=stars) of the sky, see Volk (2012), with a discussion of the craftsman simile at 
210–2. Kidd (1997) ad loc. notes that the verb used for “welded” (κολλήσαιτο, Phaen. 530) is the same verb used of 
the Demiurge in Plato’s Timaeus (κολλάω, Ti. 75d) when he fashions human beings.
 Gee (2001) 532 suggests that Cicero may see himself as a “divine artist.” Speaking of Aratus and the craftsman 247
simile at Phaen. 529–33, Volk (2012) draws attention to the verses’ “implicit claim to poetic demiurgy” (211). The 
epigram by Leonidas of Tarentum that characterizes Aratus as a “second Zeus” (Διὸς εἶναι/ δεύτερος, Anth. Pal. 
9.25.5–6) also implies a certain divinity in the poet. See pg. 25–7 of this dissertation. 
 Gee (2001) emphasizes the kinship between words and the world they describe. The Aratea in Book 2 of De 248
natura deorum showcases this connection. As Gee puts it, “Cicero’s order of words in the Aratea describes, and in a 
sense creates, the kosmos” (532). 
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craftsman simile (Phaen. 529–33), his quotation of the Aratea functions like a verbal celestial 
model, an observation that was first pointed out by Hannah Čulík-Baird and to whom I am 
indebted for this discussion.  Balbus uses Cicero’s Aratea as proof for the marvelous cosmic 249
order (Nat. D. 2.104–5):  
“Sequitur stellarum inerrantium maxima multitudo, quarum ita discripta distinctio est ut 
ex notarum figurarum similitudine nomina invenerint.” Atque hoc loco me intuens, 
“Utar,” inquit, “carminibus Arateis, quae a te admodum adulescentulo conversa ita me 
delectant quia Latina sunt ut multa ex iis memoria teneam. Ergo, ut oculis adsidue 
videmus, sine ulla mutatione aut veritate: 
 Cetera labuntur celeri caelestia motu 
 Cum caeloque simul noctesque diesque feruntur 
“The great multitude of the fixed stars follows, whose ornament was delineated so that they 
might find their names from the resemblance of their well-known figures.” And looking at 
me, he said, “I shall use your Aratean verses, translated by you when still a young man, 
that delight me because they are in Latin, and so I hold many of them in my memory. 
Therefore, as we constantly see with our eyes, without any change or variation: 
 The other stars glide with swift heavenly motion 
 They are carried along together with the sky through the days and nights…”  
Balbus’ quotations of the poem paint the image of the sky before our eyes, like a celestial model, 
emblazoning in our mind the stars so we can see the constellations glide almost as if we were 
watching the rotating night sky. The passage privileges the sense of sight. Balbus, looking at 
Marcus (intuens), begins to recite the Aratea as he asks us to see (videmus) the fixed stars with 
our eyes (oculis). Cicero’s poem, too, is a work of art. The quality of the universe as a work of 
art is highlighted by the way that it is perceived: through the eyes. In this sense, the poem 
“creates” the universe—or at least, an image of it—before our (mind’s) eye with Latin.    250
 As Čulík-Baird (2018) 746 puts it: “The Aratea is brought into Balbus’ prose here just as an orrery might be 249
brought into a classroom to discuss planetary motion – both objects are smaller scale simulations of aspects of the 
universe which aid in conceptualizing the operations of the natural world.”
 Gee (2001) 529 argues that Cicero’s Aratea is even more concerned with artistic metaphor than Aratus.250
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 Balbus’ description of the cosmos and the Latin poem invites a connection between nature 
and art. Discripta, the perfect passive participle of discribo, most immediately refers to the 
arrangement of the fixed stars (OLD s.v. 2). Confusion between the de and di prefix aside, 
-scribo can refer to both drawing figures (OLD s.v. 1) and writing words (OLD s.v. 2). Balbus 
slides between visual and textual registries. The very boundary between text and image is 
porous; people are able to discover (invenerint) the names (nomina) of the stars because of their 
figural likeness (ex notarum figurarum similitudine). The names of the stars are embedded in 
their very appearance, implying an inherent connection between the appearance of the heavens 
and words.  
Aratus recounts how humans first named the stars. Although he has no name himself, a 
single person names the stars, grouping them into the constellations (Phaen. 373–82): 
 τά τις ἀνδρῶν οὐκέτ᾿ ἐόντων 
ἐφράσατ᾿ ἠδ᾿ ἐνόησεν ἅπαντ᾿ ὀνοµαστὶ καλέσσαι 
ἤλιθα µορφώσας. οὐ γάρ κ᾿ ἐδυνήσατο πάντων 
οἰόθι κεκριµένων ὄνοµ᾿ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ δαῆναι. 
πολλοὶ γὰρ πάντη, πολέων δ᾿ ἐπὶ ἶσα πέλονται 
µέτρα τε καὶ χροιή, πάντες γε µὲν ἀµφιέλικτοι. 
τῶ καὶ ὁµηγερέας οἱ ἐείσατο ποιήσασθαι 
ἀστέρας, ὄφρ᾿ ἐπιτὰξ ἄλλῳ παρακείµενος ἄλλος 
εἴδεα σηµαίνοιεν. ἄφαρ δ᾿ ὀνοµαστὰ ἐγένοντο 
ἄστρα, καὶ οὐκέτι νῦν ὑπὸ θαύµατι τέλλεται ἀστήρ 
…the [stars] which someone of men who are no longer contrived and perceived to call 
them all by names, giving them shape carefully; for he could not speak or learn the names 
of all the stars separated alone. For they are many on every side, and the size and 
appearance of many are alike, and they all are wheeled about. Therefore it seemed good to 
him to assemble the stars into groups, so that different stars arranged in different orders 
could signify forms. After that, the named constellations came to be, and no longer does a 
star rising take us by surprise.   251
 The text is Kidd (1997); the translation is mine.251
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The name-giver pointed out (ἐφράσατ᾿) and noted (ἐνόησεν) the stars, giving them their forms 
that we now know as constellations. The naming of the constellations suggests a fundamental 
link between the stars and their names. The name-giver is able to name the constellations, which 
in effect creates the patterns of constellations that we now see in the sky. Furthermore, this 
passage may have a meta-poetic valence. The name-giver of the stars stands in parallel to the 
name-giver of the poem, namely the poet himself.  Furthermore, such power to give names to 252
the stars and to create constellations by naming them evokes the beneficent Zeus, who is the 
supreme name-giver. Thus, connection between stars and language invites the reader to consider 
the connection between the stars and text at hand.   253
 Like Aratus’ unnamed name-giver, Balbus attributes to human beings the power to discover 
the names of the stars. Furthermore, picking out the stars and forming them into constellations 
necessitates an activity akin to reading. In other words, the people who discover the names of the 
stars go through the same process as the reader of a text. As Katharina Volk points out in her 
discussion of the semiotics of Aratus’ poem, “A reader of signs is also always a ποιητής, a re-
creator and hence a writer of sorts.”  Along with Marcus, Cotta, and Velleius, we readers are 254
invited to “pick out” the signs in the text as we construct our own signification of meaning for 
the dialogue, which is especially salient since the dialogue requires such discerning and reading 
of “signs” to arrive at meaning, through arrangement of ideas, much as Cicero does in his task of 
 Gee (2001) 532 discusses Aratus’ name-giving passage and compares it to Cicero’s version, highlighting Cicero’s 252
foregrounding of artistic language vis-a-vis his Greek model.
 This passage has generated debate as to whether or not the name giver discovered constellations that had already 253
been been there by Zeus (Martin (1998)) or created the constellations himself by naming them (Kidd (1997)). Volk 
(2012) 20 offers a third solution, pointing out that the name giver “must go through the same process of mental 
ordering” as the “writer” himself, in this case, Zeus. The first “reader” of the sky (the name giver) makes the 
constellations; in a similar vein, the reader of the poem must make sense of the text.
 Volk (2012) 221.254
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writing philosophy. The involvement of the gods—and their signifying capacity in the natural 
world—is precisely the concern of the dialogue. Yet here we readers, like the first star gazers and 
namers, pick out details in the text in order to make sense of it, thereby becoming co-creators in 
the dialogue itself, and, through a performative proof, demonstrating analogically the presence of 
some sort of divine name giver who first created a text of a different sort: the cosmos.  
 Whether watching the stars or reading a book, vision is essential. It is fitting, then, that 
Balbus excerpts passages of the Aratea that are particularly visual. Omitting the a iove 
introduction, Balbus jumps immediately to the circumpolar constellations to begin with the Great 
and Little Bears (Nat. D. 2.105). Balbus oscillates between verse and prose, and as I hope to 
show, cuts lines from the poem which do not serve his purposes.  255
 In the next section, I will analyze the verses Balbus chooses to quote, arguing that he 
selects verses that (a) are particularly vivid; (b) emphasize the order and stability of the universe; 
and (c) showcase the superiority of Latin for capturing the “sign-system” of the stars.  By 256
quoting verses that draw attention to these three aspects of the cosmos, Balbus most effectively 
generates a celestial model in the text itself, an important component of Balbus’ overall argument 
for cosmic design.  257
 Pease (1957–8) 838 suggests that Cicero chooses to include the constellations he does for two reasons: “(a) to 255
reveal something of the variety to be seen in the firmament; and (b) to give a generous sample of his own 
versification.” It does not seem to me, however, that Pease’s reasons account for how these constellations in 
particular highlight the visual and linguistic virtuosity of Latin. 
 Čulík-Baird (2018) 739 argues that Balbus chooses quotations from the Aratea that best suit the citational 256
practices of Stoic principles. While I am indebted to her excellent discussion, as will become evident in the 
following sections, I disagree that Stoic principles drive the selection of verses. 
 See Čulík-Baird (2018) 746.257
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3.4 Latin Stars  
Let us turn to Balbus’ recitation of the Aratea (2.104–5): 
Ergo, ut oculis adsidue videmus, sine ulla mutatione aut varietate 
 cetera labuntur celeri caelestia motu 
 cum caeloque simul noctesque diesque feruntur, 
Quorum contemplatione nullius expleri potest animus naturae constantiam videre 
cupientis; 
 extremusque adeo duplici de cardine vertex 
 dicitur esse polus. 
Hunc circum Arctoe duae feruntur numquam occidentes: 
 ex his altera apud Graios Cynosura vocatur, 
 altera dicitur esse Helice,  
cuius quidem clarissimas stellas totis noctibus cernimus, 
 quas nostri Septem soliti vocitare Triones 
 Thus, as we continuously see with our eyes, without any change or inconstancy,  
  the other celestial signs glide with swift motion, 
  they are carried along with the sky through the days and nights  
at whose contemplation the mind of no human desirous of seeing the constancy of nature is 
able to be sated, 
 and the furthest tip of both turning points is called the pole. 
Around it the two Bears are carried along, never setting: 
 of these one is called Cynosura among the Greeks, 
 the other is called Helice, 
whose brightest stars, to be sure, we perceive every night, 
 which our people are accustomed to call the Septemtriones. 
At the outset, Balbus emphasizes the stars’ constancy. The stars move predictably and 
continuously “without any change or inconstancy” (sine ulla mutatione aut varietate, Nat. D. 
2.104), and they glide along eternally through every day and night (noctesque diesque feruntur, 
Nat. D. 2.104). The harmony of nature (naturae constantiam, Nat. D. 2.105) inspires an 
unending desire to contemplate its order and regularity (quorum contemplatione nullius expleri 
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potest animus naturae constantiam videre cupientis, Nat. D. 2.105). The predictable courses of 
the stars and their ordered patterns are emblematic of the order of the cosmos itself.   258
 The two Bears that move around the North Pole also point to the regularity of the cosmos 
since they move constantly and consistently, “never setting” (numquam occidentes, Nat. D. 
2.105). The Great Bear is particularly conspicuous, which makes it a useful reference point in the 
sky. Furthermore, highlighting the constellation’s visibility also contributes to the “verbal 
celestial model” effect of Balbus’ recitation.  We “see” (cernimus, Nat. D. 2.105) these “most 259
bright stars” (clarissimas stellas, Nat. D. 2.105) throughout the whole night (totis noctibus, Nat. 
D. 2.105): the Greater Bear constellation is both visible and constant. 
 Perhaps even more significantly, Balbus cites verses that draw attention to the names of 
these circumpolar constellations. As Balbus intonates before quoting the Aratea, the names of the 
stars are encoded, so to speak, within the constellations themselves (Nat. D. 2.104).  260
Introducing the two constellations, Balbus initially refers to them as Arctoe, a Latinization of the 
 Balbus, though a Stoic, omits the opening of the poem, the so-called “hymn to Zeus” proem. The only part of the 258
proem preserved in the Latin Aratea is a iove primordia Musarum, but presumably Cicero created his own rendition 
of the rest of the opening. In Aratus’ Phaenomena, the proem highlights Zeus’ pervasiveness, which many scholars 
have pointed to as proof of the poem’s Stoic intent. While I do not think that the proem is Stoic, it arguably is the 
most Stoically inflected part of the poem. Thus, it is rather marked that Balbus as a Stoic passes it by completely, 
which suggests to me that Balbus’ purpose in quoting the Aratea is not merely to bolster Stoicism but rather to 
further his argument of cosmic design by generating a verbal celestial model. For a contrasting view, see Čulík-
Baird (2018) 729–62.
 On the Aratea as a celestial model, see Čulík-Baird (2018) 746.259
 On this point, I am indebted to Bishop (2016), who discusses the Bears at pp. 158–60 and 162–4. Bishop (2016) 260
and Čulík-Baird (2018) both see Balbus’ choice of constellation and attention to their names as part and parcel of the 
Stoic practice of using etymology for philosophical argument. I would point out, however, that etymological 
wordplay—although it held appeal for the Stoic worldview of the connection between words and the natural order—
is by no means the exclusive purview of Stoicism. For example, Greek literature that predates Stoicism makes use of 
puns: in the Iliad, Achilles’ name means “grief of the people” (ἄχη λᾶος), the chorus of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon 
connects Apollo with destruction (ἀπόλλυµι), and Plato’s Cratylus links Zeus’s name Di- to the preposition 
“through” (διά) because he permeates everything. On etymological wordplay among the Greeks, see O’Hara (2017) 
7–21. On the pre-Socratic interest in etymology and the nature of words, see Baxter (1992). In addition to Homer 
and the tragedians, he also discusses Pherecydes, Empedocles, the interpreters of Homer, Anaxagoras, the Derveni 
Commentator, Protagoras, Prodicus, and Democritus. Aratus’ Phaenomena is also concerned with etymology, on 
which see Pendergraft (1996) 43–67.
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Greek ἄρκτοι, which simply means “Bears.” While Aratus explains in a mythological digression 
that these bears were the Cretan caretakers of infant Zeus who were subsequently catasterized for 
their service (Phaen. 31–5), the Aratea (at least, the parts Balbus quotes) focuses on their names. 
In Latin, the circumpolar constellations are not called Ursae (vel sim.); rather, Balbus draws 
attention to the alternative agrarian nomenclature.   
 Balbus chooses to quote the lines that address the names of the Great and Little Bears: 
“from these one is called Cynosura among the Greeks; the other is called Helice” (ex his altera 
apud Graios Cynosura vocatur/ altera dicitur esse Helice, Nat. D. 2.105). The Greek name is 
mentioned first, but then the Latin: “which our people are accustomed to call the Seven 
Triones” (quas nostri Septem soliti vocitare Triones, Nat. D. 2.105). If Latin in particular is 
supposed to “bring pleasure” (delectat, Nat. D. 2.104) and provide an abundance of verbal 
wealth (copia verborum, Nat. D. 2.104),  then it makes sense to attend to the Latin 261
nomenclature of the constellations, especially when the difference between Greek and Latin is 
called to attention.   262
 In the Attic Nights, Aulus Gellius provides an explanation for why the Greeks call the 
constellation ἅµαξα and the Latins septentriones (Gell. NA 2.21). Gellius relates a vignette in 
 Cf. Acad. 1.10: Immo vero et haec qui illa non poterunt et qui Graeca poterunt non contemnent sua. Quid enim 261
causae est cur poëtas Latinos Graecis litteris eruditi legant, philosophos non legant? An quia delectat Ennius, 
Pacuvius, Attius, multi alii, qui non verba sed vim Graecorum expresserunt poëtarum? Quanto magis philosophi 
delectabunt, si, ut illi Aeschylum, Sophoclem, Euripidem, sic hi Platonem imitentur, Aristotelem, Theophrastum? 
Oratores quidem laudari video, si qui e nostris Hyperidem sint aut Demosthenem imitati.
 Already in Homer, the constellation is referred to both as “Bear” and “Wagon.” On the shield of Achilles, it is one 262
of the few constellations mentioned (Ἄρκτον θ’, ἣν καὶ Ἄµαξαν ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσιν, Il.487). In the Odyssey, 
Odysseus uses the Bear as a sign for navigation as he leaves Calypso’s island, and the formulation is the exact same 
line (Ἄρκτον θ', ἣν καὶ ἄµαξαν ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσιν, Od. 5.273). In the Odyssey, however, Homer provides 
additional details about the constellation, namely that it turns in place, watches Orion, and never sets in the ocean 
(Od. 274–5). Interestingly, Homer only mentions the Great Bear, which, as Kidd (1997) points out, is “one of the 
earliest recorded constellations” (181). In Plautus the constellation is referred to as Septentriones (Amph. 273), 
although here Cicero employs timesis, separating septem and triones, on which see Pellacani (2015) 88–9. On the 
history of the constellation, see Montanari Caldini (2006) 123–36 and Le Boeuffle (1977) 82–92. See also Bishop 
(2016) 158–60 and 162–4.
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which he and some companions, both Greek and Roman, were sailing from the little Greek 
island Aegina to the port of Piraeus on a summer evening.  Above them shone the ἅµαξα/263
septentriones. Gellius explains to the others that the constellation is not just named for its seven 
stars (hence the septem), but also for the word triones itself. Citing Varro and Lucius Aelius 
Stilo, Gellius argues that triones is not a nonsense word but a derivation of terriones, a name for 
oxen which is itself derived from “earth” (terra).  Stilo, under whom both Varro and Cicero 264
studied, was extremely interested in etymology.  Although his works are lost, his pupil Varro in 265
De Lingua Latina provides an explanation for the origin of the constellation’s name (7.74):  
has septem stellas Graeci ut Homerus vocant ἅµαξαν et propinquum eius signum βοώτην, 
nostri eas septem stellas triones et temonem et prope eas axem: triones enim [et] boves 
appellantur a bubulcis etiam nunc, maxime cum arant terram; e quis ut dicti 
 valentes glebarii, 
qui facile proscindunt glebas, sic omnes qui terram arabant a terra terriones, unde triones 
ut dicerentur e detrito.  266
The Greeks (such as Homer) call these seven stars Wagon and the constellation 
neighboring it Ploughman; we call these seven stars Oxen and Wagon Pole and near these 
Axle: for oxen are called triones by rustics even now, especially when they plough the 
earth; just as those of them are called 
 “the strong dirt clobbers”  
that easily cut up the dirt clods, thus all that ploughed the land were called terriones from 
the land, so that from this they were called triones but with the “e” worn off. 
Varro connects the name triones (Oxen) to the land itself, since they “plough the land” (arant 
terram). The name of the poet Aratus sounds like the word arator, or “ploughman.” The 
 For a discussion of this episode, see Gunderson (2009) 153–5.263
 Bishop (2016) 163–4 argues that Cicero’s decision to use the name Septemtriones and to split it apart into two 264
words is not only due to metrical necessity but also indicates that Cicero attributes meaning to triones since 
otherwise the line would make no sense.
 See Bishop (2016) 157 on Stilo’s influence on Cicero’s astral language. On Roman interest in etymology, see 265
Rawson (1985) 117–31 and O’Hara (1996) 42–50.
 On the text, see De Melo (2019) 986–90, esp. p. 464 n. 368.266
 155
connection between Aratus and ploughing is already present in the Phaenomena, because the 
stars and weather signs are essential for farming. The Latin language brings the use of such 
language to the fore, since arat (and its various forms) puns on Aratus’ name and strengthens the 
link between farming and the stars. For example, as Joshua Katz has shown, Vergil alludes the 
Aratus at the beginning of the Georgics with the phrase “turn the earth” (terram/ vertere, G. 1.1–
2).  The letters also can be re-arranged (loosely) to spell Aratus’ own name, suggesting that 267
within the earth itself is a “sign” (like the stars and weather phenomena) that points to Aratus, the 
poet par excellence of natural semiotics. Indeed, it is attractive to think that Cicero’s own 
employment of septem triones in his Aratea is a clever allusion to Aratus. It would be a hidden 
“sign” within Cicero’s own poem that simultaneously nods to his predecessor and at the same 
time stresses the superior semiotic capacity of the Latin language.   268
After the Bears comes Draco, at whose head stands a mysterious individual (Nat. D. 
2.108): 
Id autem caput 
attingens defessa velut maerentis imago  
vertitur, 
quam quid Graeci 
Engonasin vocitant, genibus quia nixa feratur. 
hic illa eximio posita est fulgore Corona 
However, touching that head turns the tired image of one who grieves (as it were), 
which the Greeks call Engonasin, because it is carried on its knees. Next to this is placed 
Corona with its distinguished gleam.  
 See Katz (2008).267
 Granted, Cicero does not refer to ploughing explicitly in the quoted passage, but the name of the constellation 268
implies farming.
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While Aratus’ description of the constellation is seven lines long (Phaen. 64–70), Balbus quotes 
only three and a half. Furthermore, the lines that Balbus quotes focus on the name of the 
constellation, omitting details about its upper-body posture which are not directly relevant to its 
moniker. In the Greek, Aratus expresses uncertainty about the identity of the man: “No one 
knows how to call him for certain” (τὸ µὲν οὔτις ἐπίσταται ἀµφαδὸν εἰπεῖν, Phaen. 64). As 
commentators have noted, there was some ancient controversy over the identity of the individual. 
While in late antiquity the constellation came to be identified with Hercules—the name by which 
it is called today, in the classical period his identity was ill-defined, prompting suggestion that 
the constellation is Near Eastern in origin.  Whatever the case may be, in Aratus, the crouching 269
constellation is called Engonasin. Such a position was associated with some sort of labor, which 
may have later contributed to his association with Hercules and his labor of slaying the snake 
(=Draco) guarding the apples of the Hesperides.   270
Whereas Aratus conveys uncertainty about what to call the constellation, Cicero expresses 
no such hesitation. First, Cicero glosses the Greek “on the knees” en and gonasin with the Latin 
nixa and genibus, a move that imitates Aratus’ own etymological explanation for the 
constellation’s name: “They call it Engonasin (On His Knees) because the man toiling on his 
knees resembles someone crouching down” (ἐν γόνασιν καλέουσι· τὸ δ᾿ αὖτ᾿ ἐν γούνασι 
κάµνον/ ὀκλάζοντι ἔοικεν, Phaen. 66–7). Furthermore, the De natura deorum draws attention to 
the difference between the Greek and Latin terminology. In his own voice, Balbus supplies “the 
Greeks” (Graeci) before resuming his recitation of the poem with “call” (vocitant), thereby 
 Kidd (1997) 200–1. See also Volk (2009) 189–90.269
 The controversy in antiquity over the constellation’s name seems to be long standing. Hyginus suggests various 270
identities, including Orpheus. Some of these stories may explain the epithet of maerentis, as the notion of grieving 
may better capture some of these other alternative mythologies. 
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highlighting the Latin in the poem, Cicero drops the “on the knees” (genibus), referring to the 
constellation only as Nixa.  Not only does he give it a new Roman name, he moreover 271
concisely captures the constellation’s salient characteristics of kneeling and toiling in the past 
participle of nitor. With a single Latin word, Cicero beautifully shows how Latin captures the 
constellation and surpasses Greek nomenclature. Thus, Nixa is no calque but a Latin innovation.   
To a similar effect, Cicero draws attention to the difference in the Greek and Latin names 
for the stars with the constellation Ophiuchus (Nat. D. 2.108–9):  
Atque haec quidem a tergo, propter caput autem Anguitenens, 
  quem claro perhibent Ophiuchum nomine Graii. 
  hic pressu duplici palmarum continet Anguem, 
  atque eius ipse manet religatus corpore torto, 
  namque virum medium serpens sub pectora cingit. 
  ille tamen nitens graviter vestigia ponit 
  atque oculos urget pedibus pectusque Nepai.  
[Engonasin] is at [Draco’s] back, but Anguitens close to its head, 
  whom the Greeks call Ophiuchus with a famous name. 
  This one holds the snake with the double hold of his palms, 
  and he himself remains bound by its twisted body, 
  for the serpent binds the middle of the man under his chest.  
  Nevertheless, this shining one weightily places his steps 
  and presses upon the eyes and breast of the Scorpion. 
Rather than using the Greek name, Cicero coins a Latin equivalent: Anguitenens. Like the Greek 
name Opiuchus, a combination of “snake” (ὄφις) and “hold” (ἔχω), Anguitenens is  derived from 
the Latin equivalents, “snake” (anguis) and “hold” (teneo).  Then, the poem glosses the new 272
 As Volk (2009) 190 points out, “It is clear that Cicero, through his designation of the Kneeler as nixus, 271
contributed crucially to the way in which the constellation was conceived by Latin writers. Once the first step had 
been taken, the description of Engonasin with some form of nixus and either genu or genibus apparently became 
commonplace, and Manilius is but one witness to this development.”
 Cicero coins his own name for the constellation with Latin: anguem and teneo. Bishop (2016) 168 n. 48 points 272
out that frr. XV (= Nat. D. 2.109) refers to the constellation with the transliterated Greek Ophiuchus, while it is 
Balbus who employs the Latin name Anguitenens (Nat. D. 2.108). However, the constellation is referred to as 
Anguitenens at frr. 34.358. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that Cicero does not himself use the name 
Anguitenens in the Aratea. See Pellacani (2015) 94–5. 
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Latin name with continet Anguem (Nat. D. 2.109), demonstrating how the name Anguitenens 
applies to the constellation in action. The importance of naming the constellations—as well as 
the relationship between Latin and Greek—is showcased in the preceding line, where Balbus 
juxtaposes the Latin name Anguitenens with the Greek Ophiuchus, drawing attention in 
particular to the difference in nomenclature: “called by the Greeks Ophiuchum, with a famous 
name” (quem claro perhibent Ophiuchum nomine Graii, Nat. D. 2.109). “A famous 
name” (claro…nomine) especially underscores the importance of names for the constellations as 
well as the correspondence between the verbal signs of the Latin and star signs in the sky.   273
3.5 Seeing the Stars 
Resuming my discussion of Balbus’ quotation of the Aratea, I would like to now focus on 
passages that appeal to the sense of sight as viewed in the mind’s eye. The vividness of the 
constellations further serves to generate a celestial model in the text that the reader can “see.”  As 
the great art historian David Summers points out,  
Vision is sight and seeing, but the same word also refers to many kinds of mental activities, 
and although it is hard to explain how or why it is so, we know at once what it means to 
“see” a solution to a problem, to “visualize” a future event, to “remember’ or “recollect” a 
past one, or to “reflect” on our lives. These higher-order “visions” are in fact ongoing, 
sometimes separable only with difficulty from our experience of the here and now. 
Furthermore, these higher order visions, like sight itself, are shaped and directed by 
culturally specific spaces, times, and habits (2007 (2)).  
 Sometimes Greek outstrips Latin astral nomenclature. For example, when Balbus comes to Taurus, he observes 273
that constellation is “covered with many stars” (stellis conspersum est frequentibus), which the Greeks call Hyades, 
he notes, because they cause it to rain (ὕειν). Balbus reprimands the Romans for missing the etymological link 
between the name of the Hyades and the meteorological phenomenon: “we stupidly call them little pigs, as if they 
were named from pigs, not from rain” (nostri imperite Suculas, quasi a subus essent, non ab imbribus nominatae, 
Nat. D. 2.111). In the case of this constellation, the Greek name captures the star sign more accurately. But as Čulik-
Baírd (2018) points out, Balbus sneaks in liquid language with conspersum in describing the Hyades, alerting the 
attentive reader that Latin can describe the constellations aptly. Furthermore, Bishop (2016) 170 detects a pun with 
“pig” (sus) in Graeci vocitare suerunt.
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Using Summers’ characterization of mental visualization as a “higher order vision,” I suggest 
that Cicero crafts Balbus’ presentation of the Aratea to make it an art object that we can see. To 
illustrate this, I would like to examine a couple of constellations that are especially “visual,” as 
well as the overall structure of the Aratea quotations, which for the ease of reference I present in 
a table of constellations comparing the Phaenomena to Balbus’ quotations of the Aratea (see 
Table 2).  
Draco 
The constellation Draco is introduced by Balbus in terms of its visual appeal. The constellation is 
designed “so that the appearance of these stars might be more spectacular” (et quo sit earum 
stellarum admirabilior aspectus, Nat. D. 2.), making the image of the stars more distinct in our 
eyes. Hence, it is fitting that Draco is so vividly described (Nat. D. 2.106):  
Has inter, veluti rapido cum gurgite flumen, 
Torvus Draco serpit subter superaque revolvens 
Sese conficiensque sinus e corpore flexos. 
Among these, just as a river with a speedy eddy, fierce Draco slithers, winding itself 
above and beneath itself and making bending curves from its body. 
The comparison of Draco to a river heightens the visual drama of the constellation.  274
Furthermore, the accumulation of sibilant sounds (torvus…serpit subter superaque revolvens/ 
sese conficiensque sinus…flexos) makes the picture of a slithering serpent more distinct in our 
mind’s eye.  The descriptor torvus may also have a visual shading; the grimness of the word 275
 The corresponding line in Aratus is τὰς δέ δι᾽ ἀµφοτέρας οἵη ποταµοῖο ἀπορρώξ (Phaen. 45). Cicero elaborates 274
on Aratus’ “like a branch of a river” (οἵη ποταµοῖο ἀπορρώξ) with “with a speedy eddy” (rapido cum gurgite). Pease 
(1957–8) 810 observes that the comparison of a snake (a dragon-like figure) to a river appears as early as Hesiod. 
 Cf. Pease (1957–8) 810, who notes that the “sigmatic alliteration (serpit supter superaque …sese…sinus) befits 275
the snaky sinuosity of the serpent.”
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comes from the sideways glance (L&S s. v. 1), and may even allude to the etymological link 
between between δρακών and δέρκοµαι.  Thus, torvus could serve as a gloss on Cicero’s Latin 276
coinage for the constellation, Draco.   277
 The emphasis on the visual register continues. Balbus’ language appeals to the sense of 
sight: “bright appearance” (praeclara species, Nat. D. 2.107), “must be seen” (aspicienda, Nat. 
D. 2.107), “the gleam of the eyes” (ardor oculorum, Nat. D. 2.107), and “we 
perceive” (cernimus, Nat. D. 2.107). As he proceeds to describe the head of the Dragon, deemed 
the most visually striking, Balbus quotes the Aratea again, choosing the passage that illustrates 
the radiance of his eyes (Nat. D. 2.107): 
huic non una modo caput ornans stella relucet, 
verum tempora sunt duplici fulgore notata 
e trucibus oculis duo fervida lumina flagrant 
atque uno mentum radianti sidere lucet;  
opstipum caput at tereti cervice reflexum  
obtutum in cauda maioris figere dicas 
Not just one star gleams forth, adorning its head, but its brows are marked with a double 
glow and from its piercing eyes two fiery lights blaze, and its chin shines with a single 
shining star; you could say that its gaze is fixed on the tail of the Greater Bear, its head is 
inclined and bent with a turned neck 
Here, the constellation is not only an object to be seen, but itself a seeing object. Draco’s eyes are 
emphasized. With stars for eyes, he blazes forth with his own fiery gaze. As we behold his 
brilliant form, we are asked to imagine that Draco itself is gazing upon the tail of the Greater 
Bear: “you could say his gaze is fixed” (obtutum figere dicas, Nat. D. 2.107). Obtutus, from  the 
 See Pellacani (2015) 90. Pease (1957–8) 810 notes that torvus here may here be related to torqueo.276
 Le Boeuffle (1977) 98–9 notes that the name of the constellation derives from its sinuous appearance which 277
resembles a snake. Other snaky constellations, including the serpent of Ophiuchus and the Hydra, are also 
sometimes referred to as Anguis. Thus, likely to distinguish between these, Cicero’s Draco became the dominant 
name for the constellation after Vitruvius (IX.4, 5, 6). 
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verb obtueor, makes it clear that the constellation itself is seeing. The act of seeing is mirrored 
between the reader (who is asked to “see” the constellation in her mind) and the constellation 
(which itself sees its neighboring constellation). The complementary acts of stargazing of both 
reader and Draco is suggested in the very words of the poem. Opstipum mirrors obtutum, as both 
words begin with “o” followed by a labial (“p” and “b”) and a “t” and end with -um.  The 278
mirroring continues with the “c,” “a,” and “u” of caput and cauda, which are adjacent to their 
corresponding op/b- words and located above one another in (nearly) the same position in the 
line.  
Cepheus and His Neighbors 
I would now like to turn to the constellation group mythologically related to Cepheus.  The king 
of Ethiopia in Greco-Roman mythology, Cepheus chained his daughter the Princess Andromeda 
to a rock as a sacrificial offering to the sea-monster Cetus, which Poseidon had sent forth from 
the sea as punishment for the Queen Cassiopeia for her boast that her daughter’s beauty 
surpassed that of the Nereids. Although Aratus’ version does not provide the entirety of this 
mythological backstory, it does allude to it, characterizing the constellation group thus: “Nor will 
the grievous family of Cepheus, son of Iasius, be thus left unmentioned; their name has also has 
come into heaven, for they were near to Zeus” (Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα Κηφῆος µογερὸν γένος Ἰασίδαο/ 
αὕτως ἄρρητον κατακείσεται: ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα καὶ τῶν/ οὐρανὸν εἰς ὄνοµ᾽ ἦλθεν, ἐπεὶ Διὸς ἐγγύθεν 
ἦσαν, Phaen. 179–81). In De natura deorum, however, no mythological context at all is given 
(2.111), allowing the mind’s eye to visualize the constellation more readily (minorem autem 
 Gee (2013) 86 observes that “Cicero seems to strive for originality with obtutum (the form picking up 278
opstipum).”
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Septentrionem Cepheus passis Palmis [terga] subsequitur, 2.111). Cassiopeia and Andromeda 
are also extremely vivid, portrayed without details that might distract from “seeing” these stars. 
Balbus passes over Aratus’ comparison of Cassiopeia to a double-barred door (Phaen, 192–5), 
which introduces an alien image that distracts the reader from visualizing the constellation qua 
constellation. In a similar vein, while Aratus gives detailed directions on how to spot Andromeda 
in the sky (Phaen. 198–204), Balbus keeps his chosen quote brief and clear  (hanc autem inlustri 
versatur corpore propter/ Andromeda aufugiens aspectum maesta parentis, Nat. D. 2.111), 
focusing on the stars themselves. 
 Not only does the De natura deorum illustrate these constellations concisely, it also depicts 
them with “seeing” words. For example, Cassiopeia, although “with a dim appearance of 
stars” (obscura specie stellarum) nevertheless illuminates our mind with visual cues; obscura 
and specie are both visual words. Furthermore, her daughter Andromeda wheels next to her with 
a “gleaming body” (inlustri corpore), and the Horse touches her head and shakes his mane with 
its “shining gleam” (fulgore micanti). These visual cues encourage the reader to utilize her 
mental vision to see the constellations more clearly. 
 Balbus’ quotations of the Aratea pass over longer mythological explanations and 
instructions for visualizing the stars. Although Pease criticizes Cicero for choosing which 
constellations to include in Balbus’ discussion rather haphazardly,  to me the choice seems 279
quite intentional. Cicero follows Aratus’ order of the constellations perfectly, making certain 
salient omissions (see Table 2). Most obviously, perhaps, Cicero passes over the famous Hymn to 
Zeus that opens Aratus’ poem. The most overtly Stoicizing part of the poem, the proem 
 Pease (1958) 803.279
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showcases the omnipresence of Zeus and his care for mankind. If Balbus’ primary purpose in 
quoting the poem is to prove the design of the universe and the beneficence of the divine, why 
does Balbus fail to include this important Stoic part of the poem?  Furthermore, Balbus omits 280
several passages that showcase the connection between humankind and the stars, especially as 
regards farmers and sailors. Kindly signs for humankind and tokens of Zeus’ involvement with 
human affairs, the stars mark seasons of sailing and agriculture, two pursuits that are vital for the 
flourishing of humankind.  Would not these be the perfect examples for Balbus’ argument that 281
the gods are involved in human affairs and have designed the world for their benefit? Yet Balbus 
skips over these passages, condensing the poem so that the constellations themselves are 
highlighted rather than their practical roles.  
 With the exception of only a couple of constellations, Balbus follows the order of the 
named stars in the first 450 lines of Aratus’ poem closely.  Yet, he greatly condenses the poem 282
into ten sections, not by skipping over constellations, but by describing them very succinctly. 
Balbus omits the mythological backstories of the constellations. Though the Aratea seems 
interested in Hellenistic mythography, Balbus does not; he skips over the role of the Bears as the 
nurses of Zeus (Phaen. 30–5, see Table 2), the vivid Myth of Dike and Myth of Ages (Phaen. 
98–136), Capra and the story of infant Zeus (Phaen. 163–4), and the story of how the Lyre was 
the hollowed-out turtle shell of Hermes (Phaen. 268–72). By omitting the mythological 
 For a different view on the role of Stoicism in the Aratea as quoted in De natura deorum, see Bishop (2016) and 280
Čulík-Baird (2018).
 Consider, for example, the Pleiades (254–67) and the etesian winds suitable for sailing (149–55).281
 See Table 2: Delton (Phaen. 233–8), Arrow (Phaen. 311–2).282
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ecphrases, Balbus whittles down the poem and focuses on the vividness of the constellations 
themselves.   283
 The omnipresence of Zeus resonates with Stoic doctrine and recalls Cleanthes’ Hymn to 
Zeus.  In a similar vein, the Dike passage shows the possibility of connection and 284
communication between the divine and human. Unlike Hesiod’s Justice, who flees earth, never to 
be seen again, Aratus’ Dike continues to communicate with humankind rather than severing all 
connection.  We do not possess the full versions of Cicero’s corresponding Latin passages 285
(though we have no reason to suppose he did not translate them in their entirety); however, 
Cicero chose not to include those “Stoic-friendly” portions of the poem in Balbus’ quotation. I 
argue that Cicero chose portions of the poem which reveal the order and beauty of the stars rather 
than particularly “Stoic” passages. The argument for the order and beauty accords with Stoic 
principles but is not Stoic per se.  What is important is to generate a verbal celestial model before 
our eyes that we can “see.” The celestial model is itself a “sign” for the cosmos itself, and if we 
can see its beauty in miniature, we can more readily recognize the beauty of the cosmos itself.  
 It is also worth noting that the constellations that Balbus includes are Aratus’ initial fixed stars. He terminates his 283
quotation of the poem at the point where Aratus mentions the planets (Phaen. 454–61) and the celestial circles 
(Phaen. 462 ff.); in other words, when the poem begins to offer more technical explanations for the operations of the 
cosmos on the move. Balbus creates the picture of the constellations in our mind, so that they serve more like an 
image. The Aratea quoted thus becomes itself a visual sort of ecphrasis in the text. 
 Aratus’ Phaenomena and Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus are contemporary poems, and Hunter (1995) 21–2 argues that 284
Aratus’ poem, whether expressly Stoic or not, swiftly became attached to the Stoic tradition.
 Kidd (1997) 216 observes that ending the story with the Maiden in the sky “suits his purpose to stop at this point 285
and correct Hesiod’s pessimistic ending by making Justice still watch over men.”
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Table 2 
Cicero Aratus Observations of similarities and differences
Omitted Invocation to Zeus 
(1–18)
Cicero seems to have translated the proem of 
the poem in its entirety, but we only have the 
initial line A Iove. Nevertheless, in De natura 




The numerous stars 
(19–20)
The poles, 2.105 The poles and axis 
(21–26)








In the De natura deorum, Balbus passes by the 
mythological aetiology for the Bears’ 
catasterism for tending infant Zeus on Crete





Aratus’ version includes in brief the myth of 
Dionysus and Ariadne.
Anguitenens, 2.109 Ophiuchus (74–87) Aratus’ version includes more detail about the 
constellation.






Virgo, 2.110 Parthenos, (96–7)
Omitted Parthenos myth, 
Dike, myth of ages 
(98–136)
Omitted nameless stars 
(136–46)





Twins, Crab, Lion 
(147–8)
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Omitted Hotness of sun’s 
track, sailing (149–
55)
Auriga, 2.110 Charioteer (156–
61)
Aratus offers a more extended description than 
Cicero.
Capra and Haedi, 
2.110
Capra and Haedi 
(162–6)
De natura deorum omits the myth of Capra and 
Zeus.
Taurus, 2.110 Taurus (167–8) Lines 168–71 are omitted in Balbus’ quotation 
of Cicero’s poem.
Omitted Taurus, cont. (168–
71)
Hyades, 2.111 Hyades, cont. (172–
4)
Names are discussed by Balbus in Cicero’s 
version.
Omitted More discussion of 
position of Taurus 
relative to the 
Charioteer (174–8)
Omitted Cepheus and his 
family as kin of 
Zeus (179–81)
Cepheus, 2.111 Cepheus (182–7) Instructions on finding Cepheus are omitted in 
Balbus’ quotation of the poem (184–7).
Cassiepia, 2.111 Cassiepeia (188–
96)
Aratus’ version mentions the full moon, which 
is omitted in Cicero, as is the discussion of 
double-barred door comparison.
Andromeda, 2.111 Andromeda (197–
204)
Aratus mentions how to find her in the night 
sky, as well as her outstretched arms, but Cicero 
does not; however, the mention of sad mother 
(i.e. Cassiepeia) is transferred from Aratus’ 
description of Cassipeia to Andromeda’s 
description in Cicero’s version.
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Equus, 2.111 Equus (205–24) In Cicero’s version, Equus vividly shakes it 
mane. Omitted in Cicero is Aratus’ discussion 
of the myth of the Hippocrene’s origin. Pease 
(1957–8) 825 notes that Cicero includes 
aeternum as a modifier for nodum, a collocation 
that Aratus does not have. 
Aries, 2.111 Aries (225–32) Cicero’s version of Aries is more abbreviated, 
while Aratus describes how to see Aries in the 
night sky.
Omitted Delton (233–8) Cicero does not mention this constellation in De 
natura deorum, as Pease (1957–8) also 
observes. It is interesting to note that it is not 
included on the Farnese globe (Kidd (1997) 
266).
Pisces, 2.111 Pisces (239–47) Cicero’s version corresponds to Aratus’ at lines 
239–40, but Aratus’ goes on for several more 
lines, describing how the two Fishes fit together 
as well as instructions on how to locate them in 
the night sky.
Perseus, 2.112 Perseus (248–53) Innovating upon Aratus, Cicero explains how 
Perseus is buffeted by blasts from the North. In 
Aratus, Perseus is described as “taller than the 
other figures in the North” (αὐτάρ ὅ γ᾽ ἐν 
βορέω φέρεται περιµήκετος ἄλλων, Phaen. 




Pleiades (254–67) Cicero follows Aratus fairly closely in 
describing the Pleiades as faint (tenui cum 
luce). Aratus, however, elaborates, explaining 
how they are seven in number, though only six 
are observable. Cicero also omits Aratus’ nod to 
Zeus as the preserver of the stars who does not 
allow knowledge of them to fail. Cicero also 
does not mention the role of the Pleiades as 
signs of farming, marking the beginning of 
summer and winter. 
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Lyre (Fides), 2.112 Lyre (268–72) Aratus gives the mythological backstory of the 
Lyre as the hollowed-out tortoise of Hermes (cf. 
Hymn. Hom. Merc. 25–54). (NB, Maia is one of 
the names of the Pleiades sisters that Aratus 
mentions; is this the same Maia that is the 
mother of Hermes in the Homeric Hymn?). 
Cicero omits the myth altogether. Cicero also 
names the constellation Fides, although it is 
often called Lyra in Latin (Kidd (1997) 281). 
See also Varro, who says that “the Greeks call it 
Lyre, but we Latins call Fides” (quod Graeci 
Lyram vocant, Fidem nostri, R. 2.5.12).
Avis, 2.112 Ornis (275–81) Cicero devotes one line to the Avis 
constellation, as opposed to Aratus’ seven. 
Cicero’s version refers to the roof of the sky, 
whereas Aratus refers to the sky as Zeus (Ζηνὶ, 
Phaen. 275), and as Kidd (1997) 285 points out, 
Zeus-qua-sky “is also a reminder of the 
omnipresent Stoic god” that is so important for 
the poem. Cicero omits such Stoicizing 
tendencies (sub tegmine caeli).
Aquarius, 2.112 Aquarius (282–5) Cicero’s Aquarius is not mentioned in the poem 
itself, but rather in Balbus’ framing comments. 
Aratus’ description of Aquarius is also brief.
Capricorn, 2.112 Capricorn (284–99) Aratus’ version is more elaborate, describing 
the reactions of the sailors. Cicero’s only talks 
about his icy chill (tum gelidum valido de 
pectore frigus anhelans).
Omitted Suffering at sea and 
trusting night 
interlude (300–2)
Cicero’s version focuses on the constellations 
rather than their affects on human beings.




Ales, Aquila, 2.113 Ornis, Aetos (312–
5)
Delphinus, 2.113 316–8 The Dolphin is not in the quoted poem in DND, 




between the north 
and the south (319–
21)
Orion, 2.113 Orion (322–5) Cicero’s version is simplified. Aratus includes 
discussion of the clearness of the sky and the 
ease with which Orion can be discerned. 
Canis, 2.114 Canis (Kuon) and 
Sirius (326–37)
Cicero does not include a discussion of the star 
Sirius, but he alludes to it with the descriptor 
“glowing hot” (fervidus), nodding to common 
astronomical knowledge of Sirius as an 
intensely bright star associated with the summer 
heat. 
Lepus, 2.114 Lagos (238–41) Cicero translates Phaen. 238–9 closely, but 
omits the discussion of Sirius as the hare’s 
pursuer. 
Canis, Argo, 2.114 Canis and Argo 
(342–52)
Aratus’ description is more detailed than 
Cicero’s and alludes to the myth of Jason and 
the Argonauts. 
Vincla, 2.114 Andromeda, and 
tail chains of the 
fishes, proximity to 
Monster (353–66)
Cicero focuses on the chains of Pisces, omitting 
discussion of Andromeda. According to Kidd 
(1997), Aratus uses Andromeda and the other 
neighboring constellations as a way for the 
reader/viewer to orient herself in the sky.
Omitted Unnamed stars 
(367–401)
Ara, 2.114 Altar (402–30) Aratus’ text discusses the relevance of the altar 
for sailors, which Cicero omits.
Centaur, 2.114 Centaur (431–42)
Hydra, 2.114 Hydra (443–51)
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3.6 The Cosmos as a Celestial Model 
The idea that the Aratea works like a celestial model in the text itself is corroborated by the fact 
that Balbus uses a celestial model as a metaphor for the cosmos. In a passage where he discusses 
art (ars) as a demonstration of intelligence, Balbus brings up the beauty and excellence of the 
cosmos to make an argument for the intelligent design of the universe (Nat. D. 2.87):  
Quodsi omnes mundi partes ita constitutae sunt ut neque ad usum meliores potuerint esse 
neque ad speciem pulchriores, videamus utrum ea fortuitane sint an eo statu quo 
cohaerere nullo modo potuerint nisi sensu moderante divinaque providentia. 
But if every part of the world is set in order so that they could not be better in use or more 
beautiful in appearance, let us consider whether they are the product of chance or whether 
they are unable to hold together in such an arrangement without sensation guiding them 
and divine foresight. 
Balbus appeals to two criteria as a standard to measure whether or not the world is governed by a 
divine mind or by chance: its supreme utility (ad usum meliores) and its outstanding beauty (ad 
speciem pulchriores). Excellence of construction and beauty go hand in hand. Balbus next turns 
to the contrast of nature (natura) and art (ars). He argues the following:  
- Nature is superior to art (meliora sunt ea quae natura quam illa quae arte perfecta sunt, 
Nat. D. 2.87) 
- Art is never made without “reason” ratio (nec ars efficit quicquam sine ratione, Nat. D. 
2.87) 
- Nature must also have ratio (ne natura quidem rationis expers est habenda, Nat. D. 
2.87) 
After providing this syllogism, Balbus turns to three specific examples of artistry (Nat. 2.87): 
Qui igitur convenit, signum aut tabulam pictam cum aspexeris, scire adhibitam esse 
artem, cumque procul cursum navigii videris, non dubitare quin id ratione atque arte 
moveatur, aut cum solarium vel descriptum vel ex aqua contemplere, intellegere declarari 
horas arte non casu, mundum autem, qui et has ipsas artes et earum artifices et cuncta 
conplectatur, consilii et rationis esse expertem putare?  
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How is it possible, that when you observe a statue or painted picture, you know that art 
has been used; and when you see from a distance the course of a ship, you do not doubt 
that it is moved by reason and art, or when you consider a sundial or water clock, you 
understand that its hours are declared by art not chance, however the cosmos, which 
encompasses these arts themselves and their artificers and all things, you think is free of 
plan and reason? 
Balbus appeals to the arts of painting, navigation, and timekeeping to demonstrate that ratio and 
ars fit together. Although the three crafts are distinct—making two-dimensional images, steering 
ships, and creating devices—they each have their own inherent ratio, which is the extension of 
the ratio of the one who devised it, whether painter, sailor, or inventor.  
 In his great work Natural Theology, the 18th c. philosopher William Paley argues for a 
designed universe with the famous watchmaker analogy. If you stumbled across a watch lying on 
the ground, you would not doubt that a watchmaker created it. By the same token, the universe 
also has a grand Watchmaker, “for every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of 
design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference on the side 
of nature of being greater and more and that in a degree which exceeds all computation.”  286
Deeply indebted to Cicero, Paley chooses the watch in particular as an analogy for the 
craftsmanship of the universe. Like the universe, a watch is both beautiful and useful (the two 
criteria Balbus mentions for evidence for design). Its circular shape and intricate gears work in 
harmony to tell time as well as to please its owner as a prestige object. It also relies on the 
motions of the sun and earth to tell time, since our measurement of time itself is tied to celestial 
 Paley (1831) 19.286
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phenomena. In this regard, the watch is a simplified and miniature representation of the cosmos 
itself.  287
 The stars in particular serve as a sign of divine order, even over and above other aspects of 
the natural world. Balbus praises the beauty of the world as an object worthy of contemplation 
(oculis quodam modo contemplari pulchritudinem rerum, Nat. D. 2.98).  The earth itself, 288
situated in the middle of the universe, is clothed with flowers, streams, and other natural physical 
figures of wondrous beauty. It is almost as if these features are decorative, like the fine dress of a 
woman or a beautiful building. In fact, Balbus even uses the word “clothed” (vestita, Nat. D. 
2.98). In addition to these natural features, the wonder of the world is so great that it is also 
decorated with living creatures. While an ecphrasis pretends to describe the movement of 
creatures and their sounds, but in reality can generate sound and movement only in the visual 
imagination of the reader, the artist of the cosmos is so great that he is able to create a true 
ecphrasis with actual moving and breathing creatures that decorate his great work of art. The 
artistry of the universe is also proved by the wide variety of natural features and living creatures.  
 As beautiful as the earth is, it is surpassed by the celestial spheres, which gird the earth in 
their ordered cycles. Balbus describes the path of the sun, from its daily patterns creating day and 
night to its ecliptic turns twice a year, bestowing upon earth the seasons (Nat. D. 2.102). He 
mentions the moon, with her ordered paths giving borrowed light, more diffuse for the needs of 
the night, and in addition on occasion but at regular intervals creating eclipses (Nat. D. 2.103). 
 Sedley (2008) observes that “the Stoics’ appeal to contemporary astronomical mechanisms makes their version of 287
the Argument from Design even more powerful than Paley’s watch. In an age of geocentric astronomy, such as this, 
the structural resemblance of the state-of-the-art planetary mechanisms to the celestial globe as we see it around us 
was much greater and more direct than in Paley’s heliocentric age” (207).
 Note the visual cue Balbus provides; we are to see the beauty of the heavens with our “eyes” (oculis, Nat. D. 288
2.98).
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Finally, the planets, which are really not planets at all (as the Greek πλανάω would suggest), are 
moved in patterns that are sometimes in forward movement, sometimes retrograde, and 
sometimes without motion altogether (Nat. D. 2.103). The sun, the moon, and the planets are, in 
Balbus’ words, the most beautiful sight anyone could ever behold (quo spectaculo nihil potest 
admirabilius esse, nihil pulchrius, Nat. D. 2.104). The earth, in all its beauty, is eclipsed by the 
beauty of the planets and stars.   289
 As a thought experiment, Balbus turns to Aristotle’s now-lost treatise De Philosophia. In 
this dialogue, Aristotle asks his reader to imagine that people lived beneath the earth in an abode 
equipped with comforts and light, decorated with statues and pictures (ornata signis atque 
picturis, Nat. D. 2.95). Although they had never seen the outside world, the subterranean people 
had heard that above them existed a certain force and power of the divine (quoddam numen et 
vim deorum, Nat. D. 2.95). Then, one day, the earth suddenly opened and the inhabitants were 
able to enter the land which we now inhabit, where they could see the natural world in its full 
glory (Nat. D. 2.95), including the earth, the waters, the sky, the clouds, and the winds. The 
celestial phenomena, of both the day and night, provoke the greatest response from these 
earthborn peoples (Nat D. 2.95): 
Cum repente…aspexissentque solem eiqusque cum magnitudinem pulchritudinemque 
tum etiam efficientiam cognovissent, quod is diem efficeret toto caelo luce diffusa, cum 
autem terras nox opacasset, tum caelum totum cernerent astris distinctum et ornatum 
lunaeque luminum varietatem tum crescentis tum senescentis eorumque omnium ortus et 
occasus atque in omni aeternitate ratos immutabilosque cursus—quae cum viderent, 
profecto et esse deos et haec tanta opera deorum esse arbitrarentur. 
 This passage echoes Timaeus 47a–b, where Timaeus praises sight as the greatest of all the senses since it is by 289
sight alone that we are able to grasp the beauty of the stars, which in turn benefits our souls. On vision in the 
Timaeus and other Platonic dialogues, see Nightingale (2015) 57–62.
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And when suddenly they saw the sun and recognized not only its size and beauty but also 
its influence, because it creates the day with its light diffused in the entire sky, and when 
the night had darkened the lands, then they perceived the whole sky marked and adorned 
with stars and the variety of the moon in light, now waxing, now waning, and the risings 
and settings of all these and the courses fixed and immutable in all eternity—when they 
saw these things, they immediately believed there were gods and that all these great 
works were their handiwork. 
This vignette of course recalls Plato’s cave allegory (Rep. 7.514a2–517a7). The story, however, 
departs from its Platonic counterpart in a few important regards. Balbus describes the cave as 
ornata, a word, which, as we have seen, is closely associated with the concept of kosmos and 
which is picked up on when the heavens are revealed to the cave dwellers. This cave is filled 
with artifacts, “statues and pictures” (signis atque picturis). Signum most immediately refers to 
statues within the cave but simultaneously evokes the idea of an astral signum, a valence that is 
confirmed by the parallel between the world outside the cave and the world within it. Likewise, 
pictura refers both to painted pictures and to the constellations of the night sky, which are like 
astral pictures.  
 The cave/cosmos parallel plays upon the micro/macro analogic theme that runs through the 
dialogue. The cave is filled with artworks, and the cave-dwellers have no concept of what a 
world outside the cave would look like. Nevertheless, they are able to recognize the beauty and 
excellence of their condition—though limited—within the cave. Once the cave breaks open and 
the cosmos is revealed, they experience the same sort of marvel that they had for the beauties of 
their own cave but on a much grander scale. The wonder of the stars, their regularity, and their 
beauty immediately lead the cave-dwellers to recognize that some divine craftsman rendered 
such transcendent cosmic works of art.  
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 Conversely, works of human craftsmanship model the cosmos (Nat. D. 2.88) : 
Quodsi in Scythiam aut in Britanniam sphaeram aliquis tulerit hanc quam nuper 
familiaris noster effecit Posidonius, cuius singulae conversiones idem efficiunt in sole et 
in luna et in quinque stellis errantibus quod efficitur in caelo singulis diebus et noctibus, 
quis in illa barbaria dubitet quin ea sphaera sit perfecta ratione? 
But if someone brought into Scythia or Britain that sphere which our friend Posidonius 
recently made, whose every rotation makes happen the same thing in the sun and moon 
and five wandering stars which happens in the sky every day and night, who is there in 
the foreign land who would doubt that this sphere was fashioned by reason? 
The image of the sphere functions on several levels in the text. It is an object that not only 
reveals its intrinsic design, hence pointing to a designer, it is also an object that mimics the 
planetary patterns of the cosmos, which, as we have seen, are most perfect aspect of the cosmos 
itself. Hence, Posidonius’ celestial model serves as a proof of the design of the universe, as well 
as the fundamental connection between ars, natura, and ratio. In a sense, Posidonius’ orrery is 
coextensive with the cosmos itself.  
 Posidonius’ sphere also evokes the Aratea, which likewise models the celestial realm, 
albeit without moving parts. Furthermore, the poem also demonstrates that ratio subtends 
throughout the natural order, even though the poem is itself a product of human ars. Thus, the 
Aratea itself functions like Posidonius’ sphere, and like it, the Aratea is in a sense coextensive 
with the cosmos itself. Hence, the Aratea serves not only as an example of what craftsmanship 
looks like but itself embodies the same ratio (albeit on a smaller scale) that orders the stars 
themselves. As Balbus laments, people appreciate the celestial model more than the original 
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itself: natura ipsa (Nat. D. 2.88–9). Posidonius’ and Archimedes’ celestial models (and the 
Aratea) are imperfect imitations of their cosmic counterpart.  290
 Cicero uses the Aratea like a celestial model to demonstrate the divine design of the 
cosmos, which is most readily apparent in the celestial order itself. Poetry, which is carefully 
constructed in terms of meter, imagery, and diction, is also a clear example of design. Hence, 
Cicero’s Aratea, which brings together both the celestial order and the poetic medium, serves as 
a consummate example of design.  
 The use of Cicero’s own writing (=the Aratea) to demonstrate the design of the universe 
invites us to also consider the role of Cicero’s own writing in the medium of the dialogue at 
hand, the De natura deorum. Like the Aratea, the De natura deorum is also made up of carefully 
crafted words and verbal structures that are governed by the underlying ratio of the author. As 
we saw with Balbus’ example of the golden letters cast on the ground, there is a fundamental 
connection between the elementa of words (=the alphabet) and the elementa of matter (Nat. D. 
2.94). Thus, the ordered structure of the dialogue itself serves as a “performative proof”  for the 
design of the cosmos, which is coextensive with the text itself. 
3.7 Skepticism and the Art of the Dialogue 
My theory, however, is complicated by the fact that Cicero does not locate his voice in a single 
character. Rather, Cicero sets Cotta’s Skepticism, Balbus’ Stoicism, and Velleius’ Epicureanism 
 The connection between poetry and design is confirmed with Balbus’ next example, in which he turns to Accius’ 290
description of the Argo. The shepherd in the poem, who had never seen such a vessel, compares it to natural 
phenomena: “a bursting storm cloud” (interreptum…nimbum, Nat. D. 2.89). After gazing upon the object, the 
shepherd comes to realize that it is not a natural object but a manmade one. The fact that Cicero uses a poem to 
demonstrate the concept of design suggests a connection between the two, since the poem itself is also a product of 
design. 
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against one another in the form of the dialogue. Granted, Cicero does conclude the dialogue by 
saying in his own narratorial voice that he finds Balbus’ argument more convincing (Nat. D. 
3.95), a point which I will discuss further in due course. Nevertheless, at the outset of the 
dialogue, Cicero enjoins the reader that his philosophical attitude is one of skepticism, not 
dogmatism.  He critiques the Pythagoreans, who subscribe to the teaching of their founder 291
without criticism, simply because “he himself said it” (ipse dixit). For Cicero, the strength of the 
argument, rather than the opinion of the master, should be the guide (Nat. D. 1.10): 
non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt. Quin 
etiam obest plerumque iis qui discere volunt auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur; 
desinunt enim suum iudicium adhibere, id habent ratum quod ab eo quem probant 
iudicatum vident. 
For in debate one must seek to be guided not so much by authority as by reason. For very 
often the authority of those who profess that they teach is a barrier to those who wish to 
learn, for they stop using their own judgment, and what they perceive to be the judgment 
of him whom they approve, they considered decided.    
Cicero resists the idea that the authoritative opinion of the master should outweigh the rational 
opinion of the seeker of truth. In fact, the very expression of a teacher’s opinion can deter the 
student in his own quest for philosophical understanding. Hence, the Pythagoreans, rather than 
employing their own rational investigation, rely on the authority of their master Pythagoras. 
Cicero does not wish to be a Roman Pythagoras, at least not in terms of unquestioned 
philosophical authority. Rather, he emphasizes from the beginning of the dialogue the importance 
of personal philosophical conviction. 
 Thus, the dialogical format of the De natura deorum is an essential component of Cicero’s 
own philosophical outlook. Instead of the authoritative voice being located in a single persona, 
 On Cicero’s Skepticism in the De natura deorum, see Fox (2007) 3–9.291
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Cicero crafts his literary dialogue to reflect his philosophical position. Various schools are set 
against one another in dialogic form, allowing the reader to draw her own conclusions about the 
merits of each argument and engage in the act of philosophy herself.    292
 Cicero does not wish to come to an opinion too decisively or too hastily. In good Academic 
fashion, he acknowledges that many different people have various opinions about the nature of 
the gods, which is a topic of the utmost importance. Therefore, it is the virtue of Skepticism to 
withhold assent from uncertain beliefs rather than come to a hasty conclusion based on 
inadequate knowledge and cursory investigation (Nat. D. 1.1). Cicero points out that scholars of 
the utmost integrity and standing have come to very different conclusions on the subject, 
although the majority has affirmed that the gods do indeed exist. Those who uphold the existence 
of the gods, however, have widely differing opinions about the nature of these deities (Nat. D. 
1.2). The crux of the debate, Cicero asserts, revolves on the question of whether the gods are 
self-sufficient and removed from the concerns of mankind (the Epicurean position), or if the gods 
take part in the creation and sustained governance of the world (the Stoic, or Aratean viewpoint). 
Our view of the gods has political implications. If we do not uphold that the gods have any 
power to aid or hinder us, then our religious offerings (and the political institutions bound up 
with them) are to no avail, for they can exert no influence for good or for ill upon the lives of 
humankind. In this case, the order of society and religious piety dissolves, and life itself becomes 
 Schofield (2008) 63 points out that Ciceronian dialogue works as a real philosophical investigation that weights 292
the merits and deficiencies of each character’s position: “In dialogues such as Academica, De Finibus, De natura 
deorum and De divinatione Cicero gives properly argued alternatives a real run for their money, and adopts a variety 
of literary strategies for indicating that further reflection on their merits and choice between them is left to the 
reader.”
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one of disorder, chaos, and societal breakdown.  Thus Cotta, although a Skeptic, subscribes to 293
traditional authority, which is especially important given his role as Pontifex.  294
 Does Cicero, politically inclined as he is, thus have an incentive to demonstrate the 
involvement of the gods in human affairs in order to justify the social unions of humankind and 
the establishment of justice itself? Cicero certainly displays his concern for the maintenance of 
societal and religious order. At the same time, Cicero declares his allegiance to philosophical 
truth and the process of finding it. As Raphael Woolf puts it, “If this approach represents, in his 
view, the best of the Academic tradition, it is so in virtue of its permitting the individual to treat 
philosophy as a living discipline, not one to be reverentially adhered to on the authority of a 
founder (cf. Nat. D. 1.10 on Pythagoras); philosophy might as well be dead if that were the case” 
(Woolf forth.).  
 As Woolf argues, there seem to be two modes of Academic Skepticism offered in the 
dialogue: Marcus and Cotta. Cotta, as Woolf points out, is keen to dismantle his opponents 
without offering a positive alternative. Marcus, by contrast, operates within the realm of 
probability but still seeks to affirm some positive propositions:  “Cicero presents himself, both in 
his authorial preface and in the words he puts into the mouth of his young counterpart, as one 
who will assess each argument fair-mindedly. Cotta by contrast is portrayed as oriented simply 
towards refutation” (Woolf forth.). While Cotta does not offer his own viewpoint but rather only 
dismantles Balbus’ and Velleius’, Marcus confesses that he finds Balbus’ account more 
 Cicero also expresses his concern about atheism and the breakdown of the social fabric (Nat. D. 1.3–4). As Woolf 293
(2015) 35 puts it, “Cicero is not concerned with religion as an important vehicle for individual expression. Rather, 
its role is seen chiefly in terms of its ability to help sustain social order.”
 On Cotta’s Skepticism, see Wynne (2015) 245–74, who argues that Cotta avoids “true” beliefs but rather follows 294
views which seem like the truth, allowing traditional practices and psychological histories to guide his practices but 
not his philosophical convictions.
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proximate to the truth. This expression of preference for Balbus’ account does not mean that 
Marcus has subscribed to Stoicism wholesale, but rather that Marcus, based upon his current 
knowledge and reasoning, finds Balbus’ argument closer to the truth (Nat. D. 3.95).    295
 Even though Marcus gives his opinion, the reader is not obliged to follow him. In fact, the 
dialogue ends with an invitation to the reader to consider which of the arguments she considers 
the most similar to the truth. We see two different examples: Velleius prefers Cotta’s argument, 
while Marcus favors Balbus’.  For Marcus, Balbus’ account is the victor. But let us take a 296
closer look at what this means (Nat. D. 2.95):  
Haec cum essent dicta, ita discessimus ut Velleio Cottae disputatio verior, mihi Balbi ad 
veritatis similtitudinem videretur esse propensior.  
When he had said these things, and thus we parted, the reasoning of Cotta seemed truer to 
Velleius, but to me the reasoning of Balbus seemed closer to the likeness of truth.  
Although Marcus certainly expresses preference for Balbus’ philosophical argument about the 
nature of the gods, this preference is cloaked in skepticism, allowing Marcus to have distance 
from committing to a specific philosophical position wholesale. Several layers of distance are 
interposed between Marcus and a full assent to Balbus’ philosophical position. Balbus’ account 
“seems” (videretur, Nat. D. 2.95) to be more compelling; Marcus does not declare that it is 
actually more truthful. Furthermore, Marcus does not say that Balbus’ account hits the truth, only 
that it is “closer” (propensior, Nat. D. 2.95). Even then, it is not even enough for it to be close to 
 Woolf (forth.) suggests that Cicero is more inclined to Balbus’ Stoicism because of his quotation of Cicero’s own 295
poetry. Given Cicero’s youth at the time of the dialogue’s dramatic setting, Woolf proposes that Cicero succumbs to 
his propensity for flattery. By contrast, I think that the Aratea as an object of design is linked to larger arguments 
about the design of the universe. Hence, Cicero qua author finds more sympathy with Stoicism as a philosophy 
which supports the notion of rational cosmic design.
 It is interesting to note that Cotta does not put forth a substantial argument in the text, but rather deconstructs the 296
various views of Velleius and Balbus without offering any positive philosophical position of his own. What does this 
say about Velleius’ reasoning? Does it mean that Velleius’ judgment is obscured, or that he perhaps is more inclined 
to a sort of nihilistic position? 
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the truth; it must be closer to the “likeness” (similitudinem, Nat. D. 2.95) of the truth. Marcus is 
careful to express his preference for Balbus’ account in very distancing terms, which allows him 
to maintain skepticism without succumbing to nihilism.  
 In Academica II (Lucullus), Cicero explains his philosophical approach (2.66):  
Sed, ut hoc pulcherrimum esse iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa 
turpissimum est. Nec tamen ego is sum qui nihil umquam falsi adprobem, qui numquam 
adsentiar, qui nihil opiner, sed quaerimus de sapiente. 
But, as I judge this to be the most beautiful, to see true things, thus it is most base to 
approve of false things in place of true ones. Nevertheless, I myself am not the type of 
man who never approves of anything false, who never grants assent, who has no opinion, 
but we are making inquiry concerning a wise man.  
Cicero uses an aesthetic term (pulcherrimum) to describe his philosophical position, and he 
describes knowledge in terms of sight: to see the truth is “beautiful.” By the same token, to 
exchange truth for falsehood is turpissimum, another aesthetic term: “ugly.” As we saw in in the 
discussion of the De natura deorum, aesthetic terms are used of the Aratea as well as the cosmos 
itself in order to demonstrate its design. Cicero portrays himself as one who has not achieved the 
status of a sapiens, who never gives assent to anything false, but rather as an “opinion-
giver” (opinator, Luc. 2.66). 
 As a demonstration of this philosophical approach, Cicero uses his own Aratea (Luc. 2.66):  
Ego vero ipse et magnus quidem sum opinator (non enim sum sapiens) et meas 
cogitationes sic derigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram qua 
 fidunt duce nocturna Phoenices in alto, 
ut ait Aratus, eoque derectius gubernant quod eam tenent quae 
 cursu interiore brevi convertitur orbe, 
sed Helicen et clarissimos Septemtriones, id est rationes has latiore specie, non ad tenue 
elimatas. 
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But I myself am both a great opinion holder (for I am not a wise man) and I direct my 
thoughts thus, not to that small Cynosura which  
 The Phoenicians at sea trust as their nighttime leader, 
as Aratus says, and thus steer straighter because they follow the star that 
 is turned on an inner course in a brief orbit 
but rather to Helice and the most bright Septemtriones, that is, to these explanations with 
a wider appearance, not to those dilineated subtly. 
What do we make of Cicero’s use of the Aratea here? We have seen him quote his own poetry in 
the De natura deorum, De re publica, and De divinatione. In those examples, Cicero has another 
character quote his poetry. Yet in the Academica, Cicero quotes his own poetry sua voce, and 
furthermore, uses his poetry to describe his own philosophical method. Unlike the Phoenician 
sailors, who prefer to follow Cynosura, which follows a narrower and hence more accurate 
course, Cicero makes his guide Helice and the Septemtriones, which roam a wider ambit, 
portraying his own philosophical method in astral terms but with room for imprecision. 
 Helice is useful as a metaphor for his own philosophy because it circles the North Pole 
more widely than Cynosura. This is useful for Cicero’s Skepticism, because it allows him more 
freedom and space in his philosophical outlook. If Cicero’s Aratea represents his philosophical 
outlook, what other conclusions can we draw? Cicero follows the stars as a guide of truth, albeit 
in a less fixed way. Furthermore, as we have seen, the Aratea is associated with beauty, order, 
and design. Yet Cicero does not wish to commit to all of those concepts wholesale, and so he 
chooses stars which follow wider paths, allowing him to philosophically do the same thing, 
exploring various ideas and testing the truth of each. The quotation of this poetry suggests that 
Cicero is drawn to the rational order of the stars, even as he is hesitant to follow them too 
closely. In other words, the stars (and all they represent—order, beauty, transcendence) are an 
essential part of his philosophy but are followed without full commitment. Hence, Cicero draws 
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upon the wider roaming constellations to allow for his own academic Skepticism, which remains 
an essential part of his own philosophical outlook.   297
3.8 Reading the Signs of De divinatione 
The De divinatione naturally follows the De natura deorum, and indeed, serves as its 
complement.  Both dialogues consider the involvement of the gods in earthly affairs and the 298
existence of gods who are concerned for the welfare of human beings. Sending signs through 
nature is one way in which the divine cares for humans. In this regard, the chief inquiry of De 
divinatione shares much with the Aratea, since De divinatione seeks to explore the topic of the 
possibility of communication between the human and divine realms via signs. The possibility of 
such human-divine communication rests upon an assumption that the gods exist in the first place, 
and furthermore, that the gods deign to communicate with humankind, a position which the 
Epicureans in particular would refute since the gods exist but only in their own state of ataractic 
bliss.  
 Although Cicero is far from an Epicurean, his persona in the dialogue (whom I shall again 
refer to as “Marcus”) does take an antagonistic position against his Stoic brother Quintus, who 
 Wynne (2015) 256–7 refers to this passage in his evaluation of Cicero’s and Cotta’s Skepticism in the De natura 297
deorum. Wynne makes a distinction between what he terms the “Mitigated Reply” and “Radical Reply”; the former 
is a less radical skepticism that allows dogmatism, the latter does not take any beliefs to be true (Wynne (2015) 248). 
Wynne considers this passage to be evidence for Cicero’s “Radical Reply” form of Skepticism.
 The opening dialogue of De divinatione invites us to read it closely with De natura deorum, as Quintus informs 298
his brother that he has just finished reading the end of De natura deorum (Div. 1.8). In the prologue, Cicero also 
mentions the three books of De natura deorum and the careful comparing of argument with argument (Div. 1.7). On 
reading De natura deorum and De divinatione as a unity, see Wynne (2019) 46–9. For the place of De divinatione in 
Cicero’s philosophical corpus, see Wardle (2006) 9–10. Wardle (2006) also sees the two dialogues as being tied 
closely together: “Indeed, De Divinatione can be seen as the continuation of the argument which Balbus had desired, 
but which was artificially terminated by sunset (ND 3. 94)” (10 n. 40). De fato also goes along with De natura 
deorum and De divinatione (Div. 2.3), but is fragmentary.
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argues in favor of divination. In this respect, Quintus mirrors the De natura deorum’s Balbus, 
with Marcus taking up the corresponding role of Cotta or perhaps even Velleius. The De 
divinatione’s structure is straightforward. Following a preface, Quintus argues in favor of 
divination in the first book, and in the second, Marcus discredits it. Yet, as we saw in the case of 
De natura deorum, the artistry of the form of the philosophical dialogue resists a simple reading 
where Marcus is Cicero’s mouthpiece.  Rather, the dialogic form beckons the reader into the 299
conversation so that she must engage in the philosophical discourse herself to interpret the text. 
With the addition of De divinatione, the exercise becomes even more complex, because the 
reader must also construct meaning between the two dialogues in conversation with one another.  
 In this second part of the chapter, I will attempt to provide such a reading of De divinatione 
alongside De natura deorum. As I argued above, the De natura deorum utilizes metaphors of 
human artistry and technologies—the celestial model in particular—to demonstrate the design of 
the cosmos. Since conceiving of the cosmos as a whole is beyond human ken, miniaturizing the 
cosmos and translating it into more concrete illustrations not only makes the inconceivable 
cosmos conceivable (and envisionable), but it also analogically serves as a performative proof of 
cosmic design. As Posidonius uses his godlike genius to fashion his celestial sphere and Ennius 
arranges his letters to compose the inspired Annales, so also Cicero, the craftsman—or 
Demiurge, if you will—of the dialogue orchestrates the arrangement of the text. The parallel 
between the text and cosmos is made even more poignant with the extended quotation of the 
Aratea, which unites the other analogies the De natura deorum uses to sketch a portrait of the 
cosmos: poetry and celestial models. Indeed, the Aratea is a celestial sphere within the dialogue 
 For the argument that Marcus does no espouse Cicero’s own views, see the influential pair of articles by 299
Schofield (1986) and Beard (1986), and more recently, Wynne (2019). See Wardle (2006) 10–7.
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itself, a cosmos-in-miniature drawn before our mind’s eye, whose poetic beauty points to an even 
grander cosmic beauty. And yet, Cicero is able to have his proverbial cake and eat it, too, since 
the hermeneutic labor the dialogic format requires precludes us from drawing conclusions any 
more certain than the wider course of the constellation Helice (Luc. 2.66). Like Cicero, we look 
to the stars for guidance in our philosophy, though their beacon is imprecise. 
 In what follows, I address three main aspects of De divinatione. First, I argue that the 
poetry quoted in De divinatione, much like the Aratea in De natura deorum, serves as a 
suggestive “performative proof” of divination. If divination is a series of signs allowing 
communication between one party (the gods) to another (human beings), then perhaps we can 
draw an analogy with the “signs” in the text itself: its very words. Words are themselves “signs” 
that enable the communication between the author and the reader, much like the cosmic signs of 
the gods that appear in entrails and lightening bolts. In particular, the quotation of Cicero’s 
poetry, I argue, parallels the divinatory signs of the cosmos. Whereas the Aratea as quoted in De 
natura deorum painted the cosmos in our mind, engaging a more visual register, the Prognostica 
(the second half of Cicero’s translation of Aratus’ Phaenomena) and De consulatu suo are 
particularly concerned with the signs the gods send to humankind. It is fitting that the poetry 
Quintus quotes is focused on cosmic signs rather than an image of the cosmos (as with the 
Aratea), since signs are the concern of the dialogue at hand. 
 Next, I provide a close reading of the long quotation of Cicero’s De consulatu suo (Div. 
1.17–22), a three-book poem on Cicero’s consulship of 63 BCE and his suppression of the (so-
called) Catilinarian conspiracy.  We have only a few fragments of the poem, unfortunately (at 300
 On the genre of De consulatu suo and its innovative style, see Volk (2013) 93–112.300
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least in my view!),  and Cicero’s self-quotation of the Muse Urania’s speech from Book 3 of 301
De consulatu suo is the largest fragment of the poem we possess. This fragment in particular 
emphasizes the connection between the Horizontal and the Vertical, since its central idea is that 
the gods communicate with humans through signs, namely the portents that appeared before 
Catiline attempted to overthrow Cicero’s consulship. Although it has been pointed out that the 
poem has strong Stoic undertones,  I would like to resist reading it as a Stoic poem per se. Like 302
Aratus’ Phaenomena, the De consulatu suo permits a Stoicizing reading, but the worldview it 
advances—one in which the Horizontal and Vertical intersect and the cosmos is charged with 
meaning and design—seems to me to transcend a single philosophy, though it is certainly 
compatible with Stoicism and its teachings of cosmic sympatheia. The De consulatu suo, 
particularly the speech of Urania quoted in De divinatione, is concerned with the possibility of 
human beings communing with the gods: after all, the gods not only send signs through natural 
phenomena but in Cicero’s poem speak with our protagonist face to face. In the same spirit as the 
Somnium Scipionis, human beings come near to the divine and their home in the stars. 
 Finally, I consider why Cicero chooses to have Quintus quote his poem rather than 
assigning it to his own persona Marcus. Of course, on my own reading we should not make too 
much of Cicero’s decision to have his brother quote Urania’s speech; after all, neither Marcus nor 
Quintus offer the “correct” philosophical interpretation of divination. Navigating the sets of 
arguments is the very philosophical work we readers are being asked to do. That said, I would 
like to suggest that Cicero distances himself from his poem on his consulship in order to 
 The reputation of Cicero’s poetry is notorious, even within his lifetime (see Cic. ad Q. fr. 2.15.5, Pis. 29.72, Phil. 301
2.8.20, Off. 1.22.77). For a synoptic view of Cicero’s reputation as a poet, see Marcinak (2015) 81–111.
 See Volk (2013) 98 and Gildenhard (2011) 292–298.302
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downplay the strength of the connection between the Horizontal and the Vertical, especially as 
regards political life. If Cicero’s project of linking Rome to the stars in the Aratea, De consulatu 
suo, and De re publica made it possible for men to become gods and rise to the heavens 
themselves—“know then, that you are a god” (deum te igitur scito esse, Rep. 6.26), as Africanus 
reminds Scipio at the end of the De re publica—then Africanus’ exhortation also has the potential 
to apply to other statesman, and indeed, one prominent individual in particular seems to have 
taken such a sentiment to heart: Julius Caesar. In fact, Caesar was assassinated on the Ides of 
March, 44 BCE, during which time Cicero was writing the De divinatione.  Both before and 303
especially after Caesar’s death, when the possibility of posthumous apotheosis loomed, Cicero 
likely wished to minimize Caesar’s deification.  And yet, an aging Cicero whose beloved 304
Republic had permanently changed surely longed for the cosmic ascent he had imagined ten 
years earlier in the Dream, not only for himself, but also for the loved ones he had lost, his 
beloved Tullia especially. 
3.9 Cosmic Semiotics 
As most of Cicero’s dialogues, the De divinatione opens with a preface in Cicero’s own authorial 
voice. Cicero begins by pointing out that the practice of divination is an old one that extends into 
the recesses of human memory and the shadows of history (Div. 1.1). Furthermore, divination is 
 See Wynne (2019) 49, Wardle (2006) 38–43, and Pease (1920–3) 13–5. 303
 On Caesar’s connection of his rise to supremacy to the gods, and Cicero’s desire to distance himself from that 304
position, see Krostenko (2000) 380–5. Caesar was bestowed divine honors, making him a state divinity and giving 
him the name Divus Iulius, though whether or not these divine honors were bequeathed while Caesar was still alive 
is a matter of debate (see Rawson (1975) 171). After Caesar’s assassination, Cicero’s Philipics suggest that Antony 
(who had been appointed as his flamen) put off the deification rites of Caesar and the adoption of Octavian. On 
Cicero’s relationship to the rise of deification at Rome and Caesar in particular, see Cole (2013) 170–84.
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a long-standing practice amongst the Roman people, which suggests that Cicero gives heed to it 
because of its traditional Latin roots.  305
As we saw in the De natura deorum, Cicero is especially interested in the development of 
philosophy in the Latin language. Cicero takes the chance to demonstrate the suitability—even 
superiority—of Latin by pointing out how its terminology for divination surpasses the Greek. 
Whereas the Greeks call divination µαντική, in Latin it is divinatio. Μαντική, as Cicero reminds 
us, is connected to “madness,” furor in the Latin and mania in the Greek. Divinatio, by contrast, 
is bound up with the word for gods (divi) (Div. 1.1).  
Cicero here adumbrates a connection between words and external reality. Latin is superior in 
its terminology because it better describes divination. Whereas Greek connects divination to 
madness, Latin more accurately describes it in terms of the divine. Cicero’s preference for the 
Latin over the Greek signals a bolstering of Latin over Greek, and significantly, Cicero’s own 
role in moving the Latin language forward in its development.  This preference, however, also 306
suggests that Latin is more accurate than Greek in this respect, implying that divination is more 
closely connected to the divine than to madness. Perhaps, then, at the start of the dialogue we see 
some affirmation of divination’s veracity. 
Furthermore, the etymological connection between words and the world they describe recalls 
the wordplay we saw in the De natura deorum, where words served as an example of the 
underlying ratio driving every layer of reality, from stars to the arrangement of letters. In a 
 Romulus, for example, was imagined as an augur (e.g. Div. 1.31, 1.107–8, 2.80). On Roman politics and religion, 305
see Beard-North-Price vol. 1 (1998) 114–40, Liebeschuetz (1979) 7–29, and Bouché-Leclercq (1963).
 It is interesting to note that Cicero seems to have been the first to use divinatio as its own abstract category, 306
drawing together all of the arts that we would consider divination (astronomy, haruspicy, augury, dream 
interpretation, etc.) into a single topic, on which see Volk (2017) 331.
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similar vein, the connection between the divination and the divine points to a sort of “sign” 
within the word itself that is part and parcel of the connection between the Horizontal and 
Vertical that makes divination possible.  It is fitting, then, that Quintus deploys the same sort of 307
artistic analogy that Balbus used in De natura deorum, mentioning Apelles’ painting of Venus of 
Cos as well as a textual analogy (Div. 1.23): “If a pig marked the letter A on the ground with its 
snout, would you therefore suppose that Ennius’ Andromache could be written by it?” (Sus rostro 
si humi A litteram impresserit, num propterea suspicari poteris Andromacham Ennii ab ea posse 
describi?). But here, the argument from design is used not only to demonstrate the craftsmanship 
of the universe, but moreover, to impress upon the reader that the signs we see encounter are the 
communications of an intelligent divine mind. 
The connection between divination and language comes to the fore with Quintus’ quotation 
of Cicero’s poetry: the Prognostica and De consulatu suo. After distinguishing between two 
types of divination, one by art, the other by nature (Div. 1.11–2),  Quintus probes the natural 308
world as a benefactor for humankind. Nature gives signs, which through careful observation and 
record, have allowed physicians to know which herbs to use. Quintus divides the usefulness of 
nature from divination proper, but nevertheless maintains that it is “more similar to 
divination” (divinationi sunt similiora, Div. 1.13). Quintus points to the Prognostica as a prime 
example of these sorts of natural signs. Cicero’s Prognostica is a Latin translation of the second 
half of Aratus’ Phaenomena, which lists the weather signs and other meteorological and 
 As Denyer (1985) 5–6 observes,“it is striking how, whether rightly or wrongly, the vocabulary of ostenta, 307
portenta, monstra, and prodigia is given etymologies from verbs of communication.” Denyer (1985) also points out 
that “there is the analogy between divination and philology. Diviners are interpretes of signs, ut grammatici 
poetarum (Div. 1.34; cf. 1.116 and N.D. 2.12)” (6).
 Cf. Div. 1.34, 1.72, 2.26–7, 2.100. On Quintus’ distinction between artificial and natural divination, see Woolf 308
(2015) 69 and Wynne (2019) 208–21.
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terrestrial phenomena that benefit humankind because of their regular and predictable patterns. 
Quintus quotes the following lines (Div. 1.13):  
Atque etiam ventos praemonstrat saepe futuros 
inflatum mare, cum subito penitusque tumescit, 
saxaque cana salis niveo spumata liquore  
tristificas certant Neptuno reddere voces,  
aut densus stridor cum celso e vertice montis  
ortus adaugescit scopulorum saepe repulsus. 
And often the inflated sea portends winds to come, when suddenly and from the depths it 
begins to swell, and the white rocks covered with hoary foam strive to return saddening 
voices to the sea, or when from the mountain’s lofty peak a continuous whistling has 
come forth, which again and again increases as it rebounds off the crags.  
The poem here describes the completely natural occurrence of an imminent storm (ventos…
futuros, Div. 1.13). The sea and the mountains give telltale signals that a storm is coming. The 
sea suddenly swells from its depths (subito penitusque tumescit, Div. 1.13) and dashes its waves 
against the rocks, creating a battlefield of “saddening voices” (tristificas…voces, Div. 1.13). 
Nature herself follows a consistent series of patterns (a ratio, if you will) that is comprehensible 
to human ratio and can hence be used to make reasonable predictions about natural occurrences. 
In quoting the Prognostica, Quintus seems to suggest that nature itself is encoded with an 
intelligible pattern that can be used to understand the past, read the present, and predict the 
future.  
Whereas De natura deorum focuses on an aesthetic component of the universe as a proof of 
its divine artistry, in De divinatione we have less emphasis on the aesthetic appeal of nature and 
more emphasis on its ability to “speak” to us, as it were. Hence, it makes sense that Quintus 
would quote Cicero’s poetry where nature “speaks,” which demonstrates a fundamental 
connection between the Horizontal and Vertical realms.  
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“These forewarnings of things” (his rerum praensionibus, Div. 1.13), as Balbus calls them, 
are tied to causes which we can attempt to explain, as he says the Stoic Boethius has 
“tried” (conatum, Div. 1.13) to do, but only has met success in describing those that occur in the 
“sea or sky” (mari caelove, Div. 1.13). But the causes of other phenomena are more difficult to 
describe, Quintus says, asking “who can say probabiliter why they happen?” He then proceeds to 
quote more of Cicero’s Prognostica (Div. 1.14):  
Rava fulix itidem fugiens e gurgite ponti 
nuntiat horribilis clamans instare procellas 
haud modicos tremulo fundens e gutture cantus. 
Saepe etiam pertriste canit de pectore carmen  
et matutinis acredula vocibus instat, 
vocibus instat et assiduas iacit ore querellas, 
cum primum gelidos rores aurora remittit. 
Fuscaque non numquam cursans per litora cornix 
demersit caput et fluctum cervice recepit.  
And so a gray water fowl, fleeing from the abyss of the sea, cries out and announces that 
dreadful gales draw nigh, pouring out immoderate cries from its quivering throat. Often 
the nightingale sings a dire song from its breast, and threatens with its early-morning 
calls, when the dawn sends forth its first icy dew. And the dark crow continuously 
traversing the shores, submerges its head and catches the wave with its neck. 
This portion of the text has to do with three birds: water fowl, nightingales,  and crows. The 309
birds signal their presages of coming storms. “We see that these signs almost never are deceptive 
nevertheless we do not see why they happen in this way” (videmus haec signa numquam esse 
mentientia nec tamen cur ita fiat videmus, Div. 1.14). Quintus then turns to another animal: frogs 
(Div. 1.15): 
Vos quoque signa videtis, aquai dulcis alumnae, 
cum clamore paratis inanis fundere voces 
 “Nightingale” is one possible translation of acredula, which is attested nowhere else in Latin literature. Acredula 309
is a translation of Aratus’ ὀλολυγών (Phaen. 216).
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absurdoque sono fontis et stagna cietis. 
And you also see signs, you nurslings of the sweet water, when with a cry you prepare to 
pour forth your empty voices and you stir the springs and pools with your absurd croak.  
Quintus focuses on the sonorous qualities of these creatures. The herons “announce” (nuntiat, 
Div. 1.14) and “shout” (clamans, Div. 1.14). The nightingale pours “immoderate songs” (haud 
modicos cantus, Div. 1.14) from its throat (gutture, Div. 1.14). The frogs utter cries that are 
“empty voices” (inanis…voces, Div. 1.15) and with an “absurd sound” (absurdoque sono, Div. 
1.15). Quintus avers that there is present even in frogs a “force and certain sign-making 
nature” (vis et natura quaedam significans, Div. 1.15). The emphasis on sound contrasts with the 
visual register of the Aratea. Furthermore, the quotations from Prognostica showcase the 
capacity of nature to serve as the point of communication between the gods and humans. Natura 
ipsa speaks to us with a “cosmic semiotics” that is made possible by the intelligibility of the gods 
and their desire to speak to us through the world. 
 Before turning to the longest and most striking quotation of Cicero’s poetry, Urania’s 
speech from De consulatu suo, I would first like to consider another poem that Quintus quotes, 
Cicero’s epic poem Marius (Div. 1.106). The quoted passage of the Marius is also concerned 
with signs from the divine. In a section about the validity of augury, Quintus asserts that he will 
use his brother’s poem Marius as a source of authority for the auspices (Quid est illo auspicio 
divinius quod apud te in Mario est? Ut utar potissimum auctore te, Div. 1.106), a sentiment that 
echoes Quintus’ introduction of De consulatu suo (sed quo potius utar aut auctore aut teste quam 
te? Div. 1.17). The Marius was an epic poem about the Roman statesman Gaius Marius (157–86 
BCE), who held the office of consulship seven times over his life. Like Cicero, Marius was a 
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novus homo who hailed from Arpinum. We have very little of the poem, but it apparently was 
influential: we can detect several of Vergil’s allusions to these lines, and can only wonder how 
many other references exist that we can no longer determine.  310
 Like the quotations from the Prognostica, the passage from Marius focuses on the 
legitimacy of communication between the gods and the divine (Div. 1.106):  
hic Iovis altisoni subito pinnata satelles 
arboris e trunco serpentis saucia morsu 
subigit ipsa feris transfigens unguibus anguem 
semianimum et varia graviter cervice micantem; 
quem se intorquentem lanians rostroque cruentans. 
iam satiata animos, iam duros ulta dolores, 
abicit ecflantem et laceratum adfligit in unda, 
seque obitu a solis nitidos convertit ad ortus. 
Here, suddenly from the trunk of a tree the winged attendant of high-sounding Jove, 
wounded by the bite of a serpent which she carried, piercing with her fierce talons the 
snake—half alive and glistening fatally on its variegated neck—which she lacerated 
while it slithered, dripping blood from her beak. At last satisfied in her passion and 
avenged in her harsh pains, she hurled down the dead snake and flung it lacerated in the 
wave, and turned from the direction of the sinking of the sun to its shining risings.  
The first quoted line posits a connection between the natural world and the gods. The eagle, 
Jupiter’s favored bird, is referred to as the “attendant of Jove” (Iovis…satelles, Div. 1.106) rather 
than by ales or aquila, thereby emphasizing the eagle’s role as the messenger of Zeus and 
highlighting the connection between the natural and divine realms. The struggle between the 
eagle and the snake serves as a sign for Marius to interpret (Div. 1.106):  
hanc ubi praepetibus pinnis lapsuque volantem 
conspexit Marius, divini numinis augur, 
faustaque signa suae laudis reditusque notavit; 
partibus intonuit caeli pater ipse sinistris. 
sic aquilae clarum firmavit Iuppiter omen. 
 On Marius’ influence on Vergil, see Gee (2013) 98–101.310
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When Marius, the augur of divine will, caught sight of the eagle flying with its striving 
wings and course, he took note of the signs of his glory and of his return; and the Father 
himself thundered on the left side of the sky. Thus Jupiter confirmed the clear omen of 
the eagle. 
The poem names Marius an augur (divini numinis augur) who is able to interpret the signs 
(faustaque signa) of nature correctly, as confirmed by Jupiter’s thundering approval on the left. 
Marius is a model interpreter who is able to read the signs of nature sent by Jove correctly, and in 
this regard, may in the context of the dialogue serve as an example for the reader herself, who 
must also interpret the “signs” of the text.  Even the wings of the eagle have a portentous 311
quality; the prae of praepetibus suggests they tell of the future.  The existence of divine signs 312
sent from Jove operates in the same philosophical universe as the Aratea, which itself begins a 
Iove, as well as its companion the Prognostica, which focuses on animals and other natural 
features to speak to humankind. The key point is that the phenomena of the world are messengers 
of the gods themselves.  
3.10 De consulatu suo and Physics’ Preamble to Politics 
 The importance of Marius to Cicero is evident from the opening of De legibus, in which Atticus and Quintus 311
make remarks about an old oak tree (quercus) from Marius (Leg. 1.1). The tree of the poem, which Quintus says is 
planted by “genius” (ingenio), will last longer than any tree tended by a farmer (Leg. 1.1), suggesting that poetry 
provides some path to immortality. Quintus mentions the eagle, “the golden messenger of Jove, a wondrous figure to 
be seen” (nuntia fulva Iovis miranda visa figura, Leg. 1.2), which may very well be the very eagle mentioned at Div. 
1.106. If that is the case, the tree in Div. 1.106 (arboris e trunco) is presumably the quercus of Leg. 1.1, although a 
fiction.
 Gee (2013) 99 points out that praepes is used by Ennius in an augural context at Ann. 1.86–9, but the collocation 312
of pinnis praepetibus is uniquely Ciceronian and is interestingly picked up on by Vergil in Aen. 6.15 (though notably 
in a rather inauspicious context). 
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The strength of the connection between the terrestrial and celestial realms is most forcefully 
presented in Urania’s speech,  quoted by Quintus from Book 2 of Cicero’s De consulatu suo. 313
Urania, the Muse of Astronomy, begins her speech to Cicero by declaring that Jove’s divine 
presence extends throughout the cosmos (Div. 1.17): 
principio aetherio flammatus Iuppiter igni 
vertitur et totum conlustrat lumine mundum, 
menteque divina caelum terrasque petessit, 
quae penitus sensus hominum vitasque retentat 
aetheris aeterni saepta atque inclusa cavernis. 
In the beginning Jupiter, enflamed by the ethereal fire turns and fills the entire cosmos 
with his light, and seeks out the heavens and earth with his divine mind, which holds 
deeply the senses and lives of human beings, although hedged in and enclosed by the 
vaults of the eternal ether. 
As is fitting, Urania’s speech begins with an encomium to Jove who suffuses the entire world 
with his divine presence, which she portrays in terms of light with words like conlustrat, lumine, 
flammatus, and igni. By using light-filled imagery to describe Jove’s cosmic omnipresence, 
Urania also seems to evoke the role of Jupiter as the sun god and light source, while at the same 
time alluding to the Stoic idea of pneuma, which would appeal to Quintus and accord with his 
own philosophical beliefs.  
 But more importantly, in my view, is the way in which Urania’s opening lines sketch a 
vision of the cosmos which is fundamentally connected in the terrestrial and celestial realms. 
Jove’s divine mind seeks out the earth and the heavens alike (menteque divina caelum terrasque 
petessit), suggesting that the same rational and enlightened order permeates both. The overlap 
between the realm of Jupiter and the world of humans recalls the opening of Aratus’ 
 As Pease (1920) points out, Urania is “an appropriate Muse to recite to Cicero these phenomena, many of which 313
were in the heavens” (260). For a discussion of Urania’s speech, see Jocelyn (1984), who criticizes the poem rather 
harshly. For a more positive appraisal, see Kubiak (1994) 52–66. 
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Phaenomena, which emphasizes Zeus’ omnipresence—a prerequisite for the divine’s 
communication with humankind through astral and other natural signs.  Furthermore, Urania 314
suggests that human beings partake in Jove’s divine mind, which “holds deeply holds their lives 
and senses” (quae penitus sensus hominum vitasque retentat). Humans’ very lives and senses—
the seat of perception and hence knowledge of the phenomenal world—are animated by Jove’s 
divine mind, the same mind which drives the natural order. Thus, we are able to read the signs of 
the natural world and comprehend them because we ourselves are a part of the same cosmic 
fabric, which is intelligible because of Jove’s kindliness and orderliness, even though that divine 
mind is enclosed in the heavenly ether above (saepta…inclusa). Even so, humans have the divine 
mind required to read the cosmic signs.  
 The correspondence between human rationality and the order of the cosmos becomes 
especially clear in the following lines, in which Urania speaks of the motions of the stars and 
planets (Div. 1.17): 
Et, si stellarum motus cursusque vagantis 
nosse velis, quae sint signorum in sede locatae 
(quae verbo et falsis Graiorum vocibus errant, 
re vera certo lapsu spatioque feruntur), 
omnia iam cernes divina mente notata. 
And, if you wish to know the motions of the stars and their roving courses, which are 
located in the seat of signs (which in name and the false terminology of the Greeks 
“wander,” but in truth are carried about by a certain gliding course and interval), you will 
perceive that all things are designated by the divine mind. 
 The connection between the Aratea and De consulatu suo is also noted by Gildenhard (2011) 295 and Kubiak 314
(1994) 52–66. The worldview furthered by Urania is in direct opposition to the Epicurean cosmos of Lucretius, and 
the quotation of De consulatu suo in De divinatione may be part of Cicero’s philosophical-literary rebuttal of the De 
rerum natura. It is important to note, however, that De consulatu suo preceded Lucretius’ poem, in which case the 
De rerum natura would be responding to Cicero, with Cicero then re-deploying his cosmic poetry as a sort of 
allusive rebuttal in De natura deorum (with the Aratea) and in De divinatione (with the De consulatu suo). On the 
interaction of De consulatu suo and De rerum natura, see Volk (2013) 98–9. On Cicero and Lucretius’ literary and 
philosophical exchange, see Zetzel (1998).
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This passage suggests that there is a cognitive correspondence between the divine mind and the 
human mind, which, in the second person context of the poem, is that of none other than Cicero 
himself (and perhaps, by extension, anyone else who participates in the life of the divina mens). 
The knowledge Cicero obtains of the courses of the stars (as indicated by nosse) is picked up in 
the language of Jove’s intellectual activity, which, as Urania tells us, has designated all things 
(omnia…divina mente notata). By implication, the motions of the stars and the planets are the 
manifestations of this divine mind, which the observer perceives with his own divinely-inspired 
mind. Thus, a sort of cosmic sympathy resonates between the revolutions of the stars and the 
thought process of those who looks at the stars—in this case, Cicero.  
 Urania then turns to Cicero’s time as consul (Div. 1.18):  
Nam primum astrorum volucris te consule motus 
concursusque gravis stellarum ardore micantis 
tu quoque, cum tumulos Albano in monte nivalis 
lustrasti et laeto mactasti lacte Latinas, 
vidisti et claro tremulos ardore cometas, 
multaque misceri nocturna strage putasti, 
quod ferme dirum in tempus cecidere Latinae, 
cum claram speciem concreto lumine luna 
abdidit et subito stellanti nocte perempta est. 
When you were consul, you also observed the flying motions of the stars, the grave paths 
of the planets shining with their gleam, and the tremulous comets with the bright blaze, 
when you had ritually purified the snowy hills on the Alban mount and celebrated with 
sacrifices the Latin festival with happy milk. You thought that many happenings were 
mixed with nocturnal destruction, because the Latin festival had fallen into an entirely 
dire time, when the moon with darkened light hid her bright visage and suddenly 
vanished on a starry night.  
The speech pivots from the workings of the cosmos and Jove’s role in it to Cicero’s consulship, a 
rhetorical move that implies a deep connection between the cosmos and the state of Rome. As 
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Ingo Gildenhard (2011) points out, “abstract, philosophical exposition gives way to an account of 
recent Roman history and religious practice” (295). Despite Cicero’s carrying out of the requisite 
religious duties, namely the lustration rites of the feriae Latinae performed for Jupiter Latiaris,  315
the fabric of the cosmos falls apart. The stars run off course, comets blaze, and the moon is 
eclipsed. These dire omens are not the result of Cicero’s inappropriate sacrifices; rather, they are 
signs that Cicero can read perfectly well precisely because of his piety. As we have seen, Cicero 
has tuned his mind to the revolutions of the heavens and set it in accordance with the cosmic 
mens; therefore, he can mark these portentous phenomena and interpret them correctly. Even 
Cicero’s movements across the mountains are in tune with the stars; the word lustrasti is used to 
describe his patterns of motion, a word elsewhere Cicero commonly uses for heavenly bodies.   316
 Ironically, the cosmic dissolution is a sign of the gods’ providence. The world speaks and 
thus indicates that something is amiss. The fact that the cosmos sends forth these terrible signs is 
a product of its intelligibility and its connection to political happenings. In the Dream, we learn 
that nothing is more important to the god than the political associations of human beings (Rep. 
6.13). In that text, the connection between the political and cosmic realms paves the way for 
statesmen to rise to the stars for their service. The same principle is at play in De consulatu suo, 
although in the opposite direction: Rome is so important to the gods that nature comes apart at 
the seams when her wellbeing is at risk. The cosmos is in tune with the city, and Cicero is the 
intermediary between the two. Thus, physics is a prelude to Roman politics and political action. 
 On the Latin festival, see Wardle (2006) 147–8 and Jocelyn (1984) 52–3.315
 Ewbank (1997).316
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 The connection between the Horizontal and Vertical continues to be made manifest with 
more baleful signs (Div. 1.18–9):  
quid vero Phoebi fax, tristis nuntia belli, 
quae magnum ad columen flammato ardore volabat, 
praecipitis caeli partis obitusque petessens? 
aut cum terribili perculsus fulmine civis 
luce serenanti vitalia lumina liquit? 
aut cum se gravido tremefecit corpore tellus? 
iam vero variae nocturno tempore visae 
terribiles formae bellum motusque monebant, 
multaque per terras vates oracla furenti 
pectore fundebant tristis minitantia casus, 
atque ea, quae lapsu tandem cecidere vetusto, 
haec fore perpetuis signis clarisque frequentans 
ipse deum genitor caelo terrisque canebat. 
But what of the torch of Phoebus, the sad messenger of war, which was flying to the great 
vault with its fiery gleam, and seeking out the heights of heaven’s realm and then her 
lower settings? Or when a Roman citizen struck by a terrible lightening bolt left the lights 
of life, though the day was serene? Or when the earth caused itself to shake with a heavy 
body? Straightaway terrible forms of all kinds were seen at night, warning of war and 
sedition. And throughout the lands prophets were pouring from their inspired breasts 
many oracular responses warning of grave disasters, and the things which had happened 
at last by a long-established outcome, these the father of the gods was singing would 
happen, using continuous and clear signs in earth and in heaven. 
Urania enumerates prodigies that happen throughout the cosmos, from the skies above to the 
earth to human prophets. The “torch of Phoebus” (Phoebi fax) declares that war is at hand and is 
itself a messenger (nuntia), highlighting its role as Jupiter’s mouthpiece.  The connection 317
between Jupiter and his messenger is further strengthened by the word petessens, which is the 
same verb Urania used earlier to describe Jove’s divine mind permeating the cosmos (petessit). 
The list of portents transitions from sky to land with the lightening bolt that strikes a civis, 
though this dreadful event is also the handiwork of Jove: the bolt appears on a “clear day” (luce 
 Pease (1920) 108 suggests that the Phoebi fax is a meteoric phenomenon, which is especially suitable since 317
meteors are often omens of war. See also Wardle (2006) 149.
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serenanti). The word serenanti may imply divine providence, since sereno is often used of Stoic 
Jove.   318
 The earth itself also participates in cosmic signification; it gapes open in an earthquake 
and specters are seen roaming the earth. Moreover, vates utter prophecies throughout the earth. 
Even human beings become the conduit of the divine. All of these events, we learn, are fated to 
happen and announced by Jove through “clear and consistent signs” (perpetuis signis clarisque), 
who sings of them (canebat) through a cosmic song.  Jove’s cosmic song recalls the song of the 319
poet himself, who also sings of portentous signs—namely, Cicero himself. Thus, Cicero fulfills 
the same sort of role that Jove does in singing of the signifying cosmos, albeit in the world of the 
poem which is itself a reflection of the world of the cosmos. 
 The events of Urania’s speech closely align with the portents that appear in Cicero’s 
Third Catilinarian. Cicero attributes his success in suppressing the conspiracy to the gods, and he 
purposefully blurs the boundary between divine and human in that speech (much as he does in 
De consulatu suo). Rather than seeking a divine monument to commemorate his deeds, Cicero 
rather asks for himself to be held in the hearts (animis) of his countrymen (Cat. 3.26). As long as 
his memory lives on, so will Rome. The destiny of Rome is bound up with Cicero’s own fame, 
through which he achieves an apotheosis of a sort. In this same passage, Cicero even connects 
the boundaries of Rome to the stars, thanks to Pompey’s efforts (Cat. 3.26).  
 Although Cicero says he does not want any statue, a statue of a different sort is installed 
on the very day Cicero delivers his Third Catilinarian—a statue of Jupiter (3.21): 
 Pease (1920) 169 provides a list of instances in ancient literature where lightning appears in a clear sky, which he 318
notes is “always ominous.” Pease (1920) 169 also observes that the word serenanti “is unique in this absolute use.”
 The gods are also said to sing in Cat. 3.18 (ut haec quae nunc fiunt canere di immortales viderentur).319
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Illud vero nonne ita praesens est ut nutu Iovis Optimi Maximi factum esse videatur, ut, 
cum hodierno die mane per forum meo iussu et coniurati et eorum indices in aedem 
Concordiae ducerentur, eo ipso tempore signum statueretur? 
But surely the fact that, on the morning of that day when at my command both the 
conspirators and their judges were being brought through the forum to the temple of 
Concord, at that very time the statue was being erected, is so timely that it seemed to be 
done by the will of Jupiter Optimus Maximus?  
Cicero presents the statue of Jupiter as a portent—a sign (signum)—that legitimizes his defeat of 
Catiline and the conspirators. As we learn from the speech and from the De consulatu suo, the 
statue had begun to be made during the consulship Torquatus and Cotta in 65 BCE at the 
injunction of the Etruscan diviners. Yet the fact that the statue of Jupiter was erected during 
Cicero’s consulship and on the very day that conspirators were taken through the Forum to the 
temple of Concord is itself a sign of divine approval. Cicero plays on the word signum, which 
can mean both statue and sign. The timing of the installation of the statue is portrayed a 
cosmically significant event. After Jupiter had sent destruction upon the monuments of the 
Capitol, this new statue seems to serve as a sign of renewed peace and order that was established 
at just the right time. 
 In De consulatu suo, the same statue is portrayed as essential for the cessation of cosmic 
dissolution. The Etruscan diviners explain (Div. 1.21), 
atque haec fixa gravi fato ac fundata teneri, 
ni prius excelsum ad columen formata decore 
sancta Iovis species claros spectaret in ortus; 
tum fore ut occultos populus sanctusque senatus 
cernere conatus posset, si solis ad ortum 
conversa inde patrum sedes populique videret. 
And these portents would be fixed and established by a grave fate, unless beforehand a 
sacred image of Jove with a beautiful form on a high column look out into the bright east; 
then it would happen that the sacred senate and the people would be able to venture to 
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descry hidden things, if it, turned towards the rising of the sun, should look from that 
position at the seats of the fathers and the people.  
Establishing the statue of Jupiter not only averts the dire cosmic events, it also serves as a means 
for the people and senate to perceive “hidden things” (occultos). The statue of Jupiter is both a 
reminder of the god’s presence as well as the guarantor of the people’s knowledge of the 
workings of the world, including the secrets of nature. In the De consulatu suo, once the statue is 
established, another sign is given: the scepter of Jupiter shines forth, announcing the disaster 
Catiline was preparing for the state (Iuppiter excelsa clarabat sceptra columna,/ et clades patriae 
flamma ferroque parata/ vocibus Allobrogum patribus populoque patebat, Div. 1.21). The piety 
and wisdom of the Roman people is praised by the Muse because they honored the gods. 
 Urania then addresses the relationship of leisure and service to the state (Div. 1.21–2): 
Haec adeo penitus cura videre sagaci, 
otia qui studiis laeti tenuere decoris, 
inque Academia umbrifera nitidoque Lyceo 
fuderunt claras fecundi pectoris artis. 
e quibus ereptum primo iam a flore iuventae 
te patria in media virtutum mole locavit. 
tu tamen anxiferas curas requiete relaxas, 
quod patriae vacat, id studiis nobisque sacrasti.  
With wise care they looked deeply into these things, who happily spent their leisure in the 
pursuits of beauty, and in the shady Academy and shining Lyceum they poured forth the 
bright arts from a fruitful breast. Torn from these men already from the first flower of 
youth your fatherland had located you in the middle of toil for virtues. You, nevertheless, 
relax your anxious cares in respite, and the time that is not required for the fatherland you 
dedicate to studies and to us.  
The Muse commends Cicero for devoting himself to study, suggesting that it was his study and 
pursuit of wisdom that allowed him to handle the situation with Catiline so deftly. Although she 
does not mention the study of the cosmos explicitly, the time Cicero devoted to learning the arts 
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of the Muses surely included natural philosophy—the arts of Urania in particular. The artes of 
leisure form the foundation for Cicero’s greatest political moment. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
astronomical learning and political service go hand in hand. As in the Dream, the Horizontal and 
the Vertical intersect and make it possible for humans to draw closer to the gods. The mention of 
the Academy and Lyceum nod to the gymnasia Cicero’s own estate, which he named after the 
schools of Plato and Aristotle. At the outset of the dialogue, Marcus says that he and his brother 
had been discussing divination in the Lyceum of his estate (Div. 1.8).  Perhaps, then, we are to 320
see a connection between the end of the quoted De consulatu suo passage and the conversation 
of the dialogue: the philosophical conversation that Marcus and Quintus are having now will also 
honor the gods and serve the Roman state.  
3.11 Caesar and the Skeptical Statesman’s Path to Heaven 
In the De consulatu suo, the portents that appeared leading up to Catiline’s conspiracy, as I 
argued in the last section, showcase the connection between the Horizontal and the Vertical. The 
cosmos and Rome are so connected that when trouble roils the state, even the stars respond. 
Much as two suns appeared portending Scipio’s imminent death in De re publica, so also the 
cosmos recoils when Rome is under threat because of the conspirators’ machinations. Nineteen 
years later, when Cicero was in the middle of writing De divinatione, dire signs appeared again
—this time around the death of Julius Caesar. The end of the first book of Vergil’s Georgics 
 See Volk (2017) 98 n. 24: “One wonders whether line 73 contains an in-joke about Cicero’s own ‘Academy’ and 320
‘Lyceum,’ the two gymnasia on his Tusculan estate.” See also Pease (1920–3) ad loc. 
 
describes portents that accompanied Julius Caesar’s death: the sun hid its face, Mt. Aetna sent 
forth fiery globes, animals were able to speak, statues began to weep, and comets burned in the 
sky (G. 1.461–97).  Cicero’s De divinatione does not make mention of these portents, although 321
it does mention the ill omens that led up to Caesar’s assassination.  In his argument for the 322
existence of divine signs, Quintus brings up portents that occurred before Caesar’s death, which 
the gods sent “in order that he might foresee his death, not that he might prevent it” (quae 
quidem illi portendebantur a dis immortalibus ut videret interitum, non ut caveret, Div. 1.119). 
First, when Caesar was offering sacrifices, the bull was found not to have a heart (qui cum 
immolaret illo die quo primum in sella aurea sedit et cum purpurea veste processit, in extis bovis 
opimi cor non fuit, Div. 1.119). The diviner Spurinna offered Caesar a warning, interpreting the 
missing heart as a portent of Caesar’s doom since the heart is the seat of thought and life 
(timendum esse ne et consilium et vita deficeret, Div. 1.119).  Nevertheless, this warning, 323
Quintus notes, was not intended to avert his death but to give him forewarning of what would 
come (Div. 1.119). 
 In his rebuttal of his brother’s promotion of divination, in Book 2 Marcus alludes to the 
dire signs that preceded Caesar’s death, but takes issue with Quintus’ argument that such signs 
are of any benefit. After all, he argues, Caesar would not have been able to prevent his death, and 
the possessing knowledge that he would fall at the hands of friends would make life excruciating 
(Div. 2.23).  Furthermore, the notion that the heart would suddenly disappear at the moment of 324
 For commentary on this passage, see Thomas vol. 1 (1988) 145–55.321
 See Suet. Iul. 81.322
 Cf. Suet. Iul. 77.323
 See Denyer (1985) 2–3.324
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sacrifice seems absurd. As Marcus quips, it seems much more plausible the bull lost its heart 
(corde privatus) when it saw Caesar had lost his mind (excordem).  The surety of such signs 325
seems dubious, Marcus argues: Chaldean seers had predicted that Caesar would die at home in 
old age with great reputation (Div. 2.99), and Caesar himself ignored a warning that he should 
not cross into Africa before the winter solstice to no ill effect (Div. 2.52).  326
 Marcus’ critique of Quintus’ argument extends far beyond the signs that preceded 
Caesar’s assassination. In fact, many scholars have found Marcus’ critique so scathing (and 
Quintus’ arguments so weak) as to undermine utterly the position presented in favor of divination 
in Book 1. Some have interpreted Marcus’ arguments to reflect a change in Cicero’s stance 
towards divination. Whereas the dialogues of the 50s—namely the De re publica and De legibus
—were friendly towards divination, or at the very least, warmly positive, in the 40s Cicero’s 
regard for the practice took a more skeptical turn. The optimism of the Dream and the tepid 
appraisal of De legibus—“I do not deny that divination exists” (non uideo cur diuinationem 
negem, Leg. 32) and “I think that divination exists” (divinationem…esse sentio, Leg. 32)—shifts 
to outright denial: divinationem nego (Div. 2.74).  Despite his close friendship with the seer par 327
excellence, Nigidius Figulus (98–45 BCE), and despite his own tenure as augur in 53–52 BCE, 
Cicero, when applying a rigorous lens in writing the dialogue, found the practice untenable. 
 An quod aspexit vestitu purpureo excordem Caesarem, ipse corde privatus est? (Div. 2.37).325
 On Cicero’s skeptical attitudes towards divination, especially regarding Julius Caesar, see Momigliano (1984) 326
210 and Krostenko (2000).
 For the apparent evolution of Cicero’s views towards divination, see Wardle (2006) 5–8 and 12–14, Goar (1968) 327
241–8, Linderski (1982) 22–32, and Lehoux (2012) 34–7.
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Nevertheless, in its role for the good of the state, Cicero supported divination, but not as a 
legitimate vehicle of divine communication.   328
 On the other side of the debate, scholars have read the dialogue as the exercise of setting 
one argument against another, and do not attach Cicero’s own views to his avatar Marcus. In a 
pair of particularly influential articles, Malcolm Schofield (1986) and Mary Beard (1986) both 
advocate for this interpretation, though with different emphases.  David Wardle (2006) argues 329
against Schofield and Beard, making the case that Cicero’s demolishes Quintus’ argument. Brian 
Krostenko (2000) explains Cicero’s distancing from divination in terms of his relationship to 
Caesar: as Caesar moved closer to becoming a god, Cicero moved further away from his own 
writings that could encourage such an apotheosis. Cicero, however, was still able to partake in 
the sort of self-promotion that is characteristic of his infamous personality by having Quintus 
quote his own poetry at length, allowing Cicero “to have his cake and eat it too.” I will discuss 
this position more fully at the end of this chapter. 
 Cicero certainly does have his persona Marcus distance himself from his earlier poetry. 
Marcus directly attacks the events mentioned in his De consulatu suo, specifically the lightning 
that struck the statues and monuments on the Capitol, as well as the installation of the statue of 
Jupiter during the conspiracy (Div. 2.45).  Marcus even quotes a couple of the verses that 330
 See Volk (2017) 329–47. On the role of divination in the late Republic, see Rawson (1985) ch. 20.328
 Schofield (1986) sees the setting of one argument against another as the fruit of oratorical practice “to be 329
followed in the two books of Div., of presenting both sides of an argument. For that method gives the writer maxima 
dicendi exercitatio: the scheme of arguments pro and contra attracts Cicero because it affords the opportunity for 
rhetoric, for using the advocate's skill in presenting a case as powerfully as his resources permit (TD II. 6 
ff.)” (1986) 51. Beard (1986) complements Schofield (1986) but focuses on political and religious aspects of the 
dialogue, taking the approach of a cultural historian. 
 See Goar (1968) 244: “This much, at least, is clear: in order to build a strong, consistent case against divination, 330
Cicero is ready to go so far as to hint that his own use of haruspicine, in a time of crisis, was undertaken for reasons 
of political expediency, and had nothing to do with belief.”
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Quintus had cited (nam pater altitonans stellanti nixus Olympo/ ipse suos quondam tumulos ac 
templa petivit/ et Captiolinis iniecit sedibus ignis, Div. 2.45 = Div. 1.19). Marcus complains to 
his brother: “you are oppressing me with my own verses” (sed urges me meis versibus, Div. 
2.45). After quoting his De consulatu suo, Cicero says (Div. 2.46):  
‘Tu igitur animum induces (sic enim mecum agebas) ‘causam istam et contra facta tua et 
contra scripta defendere?’ Frater es; eo vereor. Verum quid tibi hic tandem nocet? resne, 
quae talis est, an ego, qui verum explicari volo? Itaque nihil contra dico, a te rationem 
totius haruspicinae peto. 
‘Will you therefore resolve’ (for thus you were arguing with me) ‘to defend that case of 
yours against your own accomplishments and your own writings?’ You are my brother. 
For that reason, I have respect. But what in the world is bothering you so? Is it the topic
—which is of such a sort as it is—or is it me—I who desire that the truth be made clear? 
Therefore I say nothing in response, but I trouble you for an account of the practice of 
haruspicy in its entirety.  
Marcus paraphrases what his brother said in Div. 1.22, sharply pointing out the difficult position 
he has been put in to argue against himself: his own consulship and verses. His response is 
notoriously enigmatic; what, precisely, is the effect of vereor?  And what is the effect of 331
pointing out their brotherhood? As we consider these lines, we must remember that the entire 
dialogue is orchestrated by none other than Cicero himself. Cicero intended his avatar’s response 
to be ambiguous. As Raphael Woolf (2015) puts it, Cicero takes on a Socratic role of self-
 As Katharina Volk (2017) 339 puts it, “This response is evasive in the extreme.”331
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examination, examining his own mind for truthfulness.  If nothing else, it seems safe to me to 332
say that Cicero does not reject his brother’s quotation of his poetry in its entirety.   333
 Furthermore, the portion of the poem that Marcus derides is quite specific: namely, the 
destruction of the statues. Marcus contests the idea that the lightning that struck the Capitol was 
a sign of Jupiter’s displeasure at the political events. As he argues elsewhere, it is ridiculous to 
think that Jupiter’s thunderbolts are warnings or signs since so many thunderbolts strike the sea 
or desert (scilicet, si ista Iuppiter significaret, tam multa frustra fulmina emitteret!, Div. 2.45). 
Furthermore, the Stoics have naturalistic explanations for thunderbolts, so, Marcus says, it is 
vain to use them to descry future events (Div. 2.44). Marcus is bitingly sardonic in his rebuff: 
“How clever Jupiter thought of this!” (Hoc tam callide Iuppiter cogitavit, Div. 2.47). But on my 
view, it is notable that Marcus focuses his rebuttal of the De consulatu suo on Jupiter’s lightening 
and the installation of his statue at a seemingly fortuitous hour (Div. 2.47). No other part of the 
poem is attacked.  Most notably, the cosmic opening of Urania’s speech, which advances a 334
worldview of design and providence, remains unscathed. Although Marcus questions whether the 
 Woolf (2015) 68–9.332
 Marcus treats Quintus’ quotation of the Prognostica similarly. He criticizes his brother for advocating for 333
divination without providing an account for the causes behind signs: what happens, not why it happens, is the 
question (Div. 2.46). In this context of causes versus effects, Marcus brings up the Prognostica, saying that Quintus 
quoted his poem and discussed medicinal herbs. Quintus had said that the variety of herbs used in medicine by 
physicians are put to good use, even though “their power and nature reason had never explained” (quorum vim atque 
naturam ratio numquam explicavit, Div. 1.13). Quintus goes on to say that much like herbs, nature often gives 
predictable signs, though he points out that these signs are different from divination though they resemble it (quae 
quamquam ex alio genere sunt, tamen divinationi sunt similiora, Div. 1.13). Quintus uses Cicero’s poetry to 
showcase the predictable natural order of the world, which can be studied and used to make inferences about what 
will happen, even if the precise natural cause remains unknown. Marcus concedes that a connection exists between 
seemingly unrelated natural occurrences, such as the moon and the tides of the ocean (Div. 2.34). Nevertheless, 
Marcus avers, this connection does not imply that cosmic sympathy provides any correlation between, say, a cleft in 
a liver and personal fortune. It seems, then, that Marcus allows for some sort of connection that subtends through the 
cosmos even as he rejects divinatio. 
 Even Wardle (2006) 145 observes that Marcus’ rebuttal “altogether fails to respond to Quintus’ argument.”334
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statues’ demolition should be viewed as a portent, he does not seek to undermine the 
fundamental philosophical outlook of Urania’s cosmos.  
 Even as he dismantles the practice of divination, Marcus seems to continue to support the 
sort of cosmic connection and order that characterizes the opening of Urania’s speech. For 
example, Marcus’ rejection of extispicy is—perhaps surprisingly—based upon an understanding 
of divine nature and its pervasive laws (divina cum rerum natura tanta tamque praeclara in 
omnes partes motusque diffusa, Div. 2.29). Near the end of the dialogue, Marcus reasserts the 
beauty of the cosmos and the existence of some transcendent being (Div. 2.148): 
Nec vero—id enim diligenter intellegi volo—superstitione tollenda religio tollitur. Nam 
et maiorum instituta tueri sacris caerimoniisque retinendis sapientis est, et esse 
praestantem aliquam aeternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque 
hominum generi pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum caelestium cogit confiteri. 
But—for I want to be understood correctly—religion is not destroyed by the destruction 
of superstition. For it is the part of a wise man to preserve the institutions of our 
forefathers by holding onto the sacred rites and ceremonies, and the beauty of the 
cosmos and the order of the celestial realms compels me to confess that there is some 
outstanding eternal nature and that it deserves to be contemplated and admired by the 
race of human beings. 
Marcus makes a sharp distinction between superstition and religion. The former pertains to the 
interpretation of dubious signs—from entrails to the conjunctions of stars—while the latter 
consists of two major components: (i) the honoring of Roman tradition and ancestors and (ii) 
recognizing the beauty of the cosmos and stars and admiring and wondering at the eternal divine 
nature. This is the attitude of the wise man (sapientis, Div. 2.148).  Marcus has not utterly 335
abandoned the sort of Aratean worldview that Urania describes in her speech of De consulatu 
suo. Even in his diatribe against divination and superstition, he clings to the beauty (pulchritudo, 
 On the relationship of nature and politics, and for a discussion of Div. 2.148, see Lehoux (2012) 38–40.335
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Div. 2.148) of the world. The “order of the celestial realms” (ordoque rerum caelestium, Div. 
2.148)—in other words, the stars and planets—also inspires a sense of religious awe. 
Furthermore, even as he denies that the gods send signs and oracles, Marcus nevertheless 
upholds some view of the gods—or rather, god—which he conceives as eternal, outstanding, and 
natural (praestantem aliquam aeternamque naturam, Div. 2.148).   336
 Following Schofield (1986) and Beard (1986), I do not see the character of Marcus as the 
mouthpiece of Cicero. Like them, I prefer to read the dialogue as a work of literary philosophy, 
in which we readers are asked to weigh the arguments against one another.  The De divinatione 337
concludes with a reaffirmation of the Skeptical viewpoint (Div. 2.150), suggesting that we too 
should read the dialogue with a Skeptical lens.  Yet, even if we are supposed to read Marcus’ 338
views as closely aligned with Cicero’s own opinions, it is notable that Marcus still holds onto the 
cosmic beauty and order that was articulated by Balbus in Book 2 of De natura deorum.  
 Reading De natura deorum and De divinatione as a literary unit invites us to compare 
Balbus’ quotation of the Aratea and Quintus’ quotation of the De consulatu suo, as well as the 
Prognostica and Marius. Both advocate Stoic positions and quote Cicero’s poetry, and to a 
 On the dialogue’s upholding of a belief in the gods, see Goar (1968) 243.336
 For a counter argument, see Wardle (2006) 10–14. Wardle (2006) maintains that since Cicero-qua-author could 337
pick and choose participants in his dialogues as he pleased, and that since his characters are portrayed in alignment 
with their own philosophical views, we should take the character Marcus as the mouthpiece of Cicero’s own 
philosophical views. Wynne (2019) 229, however, argues that Quintus is not a Stoic but attracted to the Stoic 
arguments of De natura deorum, pointing to Div. 2.100 as evidence.
 The conclusion of Book 2 of De divinatione is an important passage in the scholarly debate regarding Cicero’s 338
relationship to his persona Marcus and his personal philosophical views. Beard and Schofield point to Acad. 2.150 
as evidence that we readers are meant to take a Skeptical stance and that the debate is ultimately open. Wardle 
(2006) 14–15 disagrees: “To conclude from this that the dialogue is truly evenhanded is to misunderstand what 
Marcus has achieved in his argument and what he says in the words quoted above” (=Acad. 2.150). Woolf (2015) 
suggests that Marcus’ rebuttal “reflect[s] the Academic sceptic’s habit of adopting a critical stance towards positive 
claims” and that “the structure of the work as a whole, is firmly, fraternally two-sided” (64). Most recently, Wynne 
(2019) argues that the readers are not meant to accept Marcus’ views as Cicero’s own (see esp. 264–78). For my 
part, I also think that the dialogue is still open to interpretation.
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degree, Balbus and Quintus are natural pendants of one another. It seems unlikely to me that 
Cicero sua voce would prefer Balbus’ position on the gods in De natura deorum only to reject 
wholesale a world in which the gods have a hand in De divinatione,.  And, despite placing his 339
poetry in the mouths of others, the poetry is quoted at length and is a forceful presence in both 
works. Moreover, as I have argued above, Cicero’s persona does not renounce a crafted cosmos; 
he renounces the idea that gods communicate through signs which humans can use for personal 
and political gain.  
 Taken together, the poetry quoted by Balbus and Quintus conveys a worldview that is 
compatible with Stoicism but that ultimately transcends it. The Aratea and De consulatu suo in 
particular paint a picture of the cosmos that is ordered, beautiful, and connected to the stars. This 
Aratean worldview, as I would call it, is agreeable to Stoicism but not Stoic per se, much as the 
cosmos of Aratus’ Phaenomena is Stoic-friendly but not necessarily Stoic. On my view, the De 
divinatione does not overturn an Aratean cosmos.  
 But one important feature of an Aratean worldview is a beneficent deity who 
communicates with humans through consistent and intelligible signs. These signs are not clefts in 
livers or chickens portending doom, but wholly natural signs: the ordered constellations that 
appear at certain seasons, meteorological occurrences that animals sense, predictable weather 
 Wardle (2006) 10–11 aims to reconcile the views of Marcus in De natura deorum and De divinatione by pointing 339
out that Cicero “was free to choose individual doctrines from any philosophical school while rejecting others” (11) 
and furthermore, that even Stoics could reject divination while upholding the existence of the gods, which was the 
position of Panaetius (11). Thus, Wardle (2006) 11 concludes, Marcus’ position is consistent across the two works, 
and “Beard’s contrast is illusory.” I agree with Wardle (2006) that a rejection of divination does not necessitate a 
rejection of the sort of gods that Stoics uphold to exist; however, I would allow Cicero more latitude as an author to 
let his characters (including his avatar Marcus) express views that are not necessarily his own. In this regard, my 
position is closer to Beard (1986) and Schofield (1986). Wynne (2019) much like Schofield and Beard, sees Marcus’ 
riposte to Quintus as “Cicero’s plain objective…to balance the case for divinatory phenomena” (263). 
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patterns, even the words on a page.  Even so, in De divinatione Marcus strives to overturn the 340
idea that the gods communicate through signs at all. Furthermore, Marcus does distance himself 
from the cosmic semiotics of the De consulatu suo and Prognostica, even though the latter’s 
signs are naturalistic.  Why does Cicero seem to distance himself from his poetry in the De 341
divinatione?  
 Here, I am inclined to follow Brian Krostenko’s (2000) lead, who argues that “Cicero’s 
insertion of his own poetry into Q.'s mouth was…a deliberate attempt to distance himself from 
that poetry and its claims of personal relationships, and even direct contact, with the 
divine” (383), which was especially relevant at the time of composition in 45/44 BCE, when 
divine honors were coalescing around Julius Caesar.  Caesar’s use of religious symbols to 342
bolster his own claims to divinity were distasteful to Cicero, who had allied himself with 
Pompey in the Civil Wars and who saw Caesar’s approach to the divine as dangerous for the 
Republic.  Of course, Cicero himself had previously cemented the link between cosmos and 343
state, between gods and statesman, most explicitly in the Dream at the end of De re publica and 
in his own De consulatu suo. Furthermore, Cicero had previously exalted Pompey as a divine, 
savior-like figure, even at one point saying he had fallen from the stars themselves.  With his 344
 Wynne (2019) 230–2 points out that Quintus’ definition of divination (the prediction of future events) is different 340
from Chrysippus’ (the science of explaining signs from the gods). As he puts it, “it is hard to pin down exactly what 
divination is. Of course, we know roughly what its goal is—to receive communications from the gods—but it is still 
hard to say what it consists in” (232). 
 Although, as Woolf (2015) 66 points out, perhaps we can “naturalize” divination: “if, for example, it turns out 341
that there are simply causal regularities built into, and admitting of being read off from, the natural workings of the 
universe, one might be inclined to say that knowledge of such regularities fall under one or other branch of the 
natural sciences, there no longer an additional place for the techniques of divination” (66–7).
 See also Lehoux (2012) 29–34.342
 See Weinstock (1971).343
 Att. 41.344
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poetry and philosophical dialogues, Cicero had developed the framework that made it possible 
for statesmen to rise to the stars.  Cicero had helped make it possible for Julius Caesar to 345
become a god. But the sort of cosmic ascent that Cicero had only dreamed of had become reality 
in the dictator.  Thus, by distancing himself from his poetry of cosmic aspirations, we can 346
understand Cicero as neutralizing the claim such a statesman might have to be located amongst 
the stars.  And indeed, it was only a few short months later that a comet appeared during the 347
Ludi Victoriae Caesaris, which became a sign of Caesar’s apotheosis.  The man would become 348
a star: the Sidus Iulium.  349
 At the same time, Cicero could not bring himself to utterly abandon his hope for human 
connection to the cosmos. The ordered beauty of the world, and the stars in particular, promise 
 Woolf (2015) 77–9 and 85 points out how Rome’s sacred status as the favored city of the gods, the cosmic state, 345
is threatened by Marcus’ sally against Quintus’ arguments. On Cicero’s role in contributing to the rise of deification 
at Rome, see Cole (2013).
 Although Cicero spends the first two Philippics objecting to the cult of Caesar and his deification, in his letters to 346
Atticus he privately extols the acts of the conspirators’ deed as “opening up a path to heaven” (aditum ad caelum 
dederunt, Att. 14.14.3). Privately, then, it seems that Cicero still held fast to the idea of deeds leading up a place to 
the stars—but he did not want to allot that privilege to the man who ended his most beloved country as he knew it. 
As Spencer Cole (2013) 171–2 points out, Cicero frames the First Philippic as “a principled objection to mixing 
human and divine honors,” and Cicero in the speech himself says “I could not be induced to connect any dead man 
with the worship of the immortal gods” (adduci tamen non possem ut quemquam mortuum coniungerem cum 
deorum immortalium religione, Phil. 1.13).
 For a similar reason, Cicero distances himself from the Marius. Although his persona Marcus does not quote 347
from the Marius, he brings up Marius’ appearance in a dream predicting his return from exile (Div. 2.136). On 
Cicero divinizing Marius, see Cole (2013) 80.
 Pandey (2013) argues that the association of comets with dire events is a later construction of the Augustan poets. 348
Pandey thinks that Augustus, contrary to the commonly held belief, did not have an active role in constructing a 
mythology around the comet that appeared during the games: She argues that “the widespread assumption that 
Octavian manipulated the crowd must therefore, in fact, be reversed: it was the crowd that initiated Caesar’s 
deification, and their support that allowed Octavian to begin developing an independent power base” (415). 
Resisting pro-/anti-Augustan readings, Pandey (2013) points out that Augustus’ rise to power was much more 
complex and that he likely did not have the requisite influence in 44 BCE to implement a wide-spread mandate to 
believe in Caesar’s apotheosis. On the comet, see Ramsey and Licht (1997) and Gurval (1997) 39–71.
 The famous name Sidus Iulium appears only once in Latin literature, in Horace’s Odes 1.12.47.349
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some sense of transcendent divinity that is attainable for humans.  As Caesar was becoming a 350
god, Cicero himself was trying to make his beloved Tullia a goddess. This tension comes to the 
fore in De divinatione, in which Cicero plays “an elusive game,”  as Katharina Volk puts it, 351
distancing himself from his cosmic poetry even as he clings to the possibility of his daughter and 
presumably, himself, finding a place in the celestial realm. But the divine signs surrounding 
Caesar’s death, and most notably, the comet itself, were dangerous for Rome.  Cicero never 352
mentions the comet, not even in the First Philippic, which he delivered shortly after its 
appearance. The literary form of the dialogue is an ideal space in which to wrestle with the 
complexities of the situation at Rome and Cicero’s own ambivalent feelings towards deification 
and Rome as the chosen cosmic city.  Even while probing the possibility of portents and 353
prodigies, Cicero was dreaming of a sign of a different sort: a sacred σῆµα for his daughter.  
 It is interesting to note that Cicero later uses the existence of portents and prodigies to argue against Marc Antony 350
(Phil. 4.10), on which see Wardle (2006) 5. Wardle (2006) 12, however, rightly points out that Cicero’s positions in 
orations are often made for the sake of argument and do not reflect his own views.
 Volk (2017) 98 n. 23.351
 For ancient sources on the comet’s appearance, see Plin. NH 2.93–4, Suet. lul. 88, and Dio Cass. 45.6.4–7. Pliny 352
records that a comet—visible even during the daytime—appeared for seven days during the Ludi Victoriae Caesaris 
(NH 2.93–4), which bolstered Caesar’s cult and solidified his transformation into a star. The comet appeared mere 
weeks before Cicero gave the first Philippic (Sept. 2, 44 BCE), but Cicero makes no mention of Caesar’s comet.




Nullum saeculum magnis ingeniis clusum est, 
nullum non cogitationi pervium tempus.
No age is closed to great minds; and no time is 
not traversable with thought.
Sen. Ep. 102.22
In this dissertation, I have examined cosmological dimensions of Cicero’s work, organized 
around the topics of his poetry, politics, and philosophy, in order to show how Cicero contributed 
to the rise of astral culture at Rome in the 1st c. BCE and beyond. Although in recent years, 
Cicero has been appreciated for his philosophical contribution, his natural philosophy has been 
largely overlooked. Furthermore, his natural philosophy (especially De natura deorum and De 
divinatione) must be read in close connection with his cosmological poetry, since much of that 
poetry is integral to the dialogues themselves. Looking at Cicero’s life from youth to old age, we 
can observe a persistent and strong interest in the stars, from the Aratea translation he completed 
while a young man, to the De divinatione, penned (at least in part) after the death of Julius 
Caesar in 44 BCE and mere months before his own assassination. Cicero never left the stars, and 
the stars never left him. The stars, as the most beautiful and transcendent aspect of the cosmos, 
signified for Cicero many things, including: the hope for the immortality of the soul and glory in 
this life and the next (Dream of Scipio); the order and power of a cosmic city writ large, and 
conversely, the idea that the city (=Rome) can in some sense participate in that stellar 
community; and the demiurgic power of the artist (i.e. writer) to use words to create worlds 
(Aratea), with the elements and the individual stars standing parallel to the letters of words 
created at the power of the pen (De natura deorum).  
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 The next generations of authors (who, like Cicero, did not make a harsh distinction 
among poetry, philosophy, and politics) certainly used the stars in these ways in their own 
writings, from Vergil to Ovid, from Seneca to Lucan. Although it would take a very different sort 
of thesis to demonstrate that Cicero directly influenced these later poets and philosopher(s), I 
have in the preceding pages made a more modest argument, namely that Cicero pioneered the 
sort of Latin language and thought processes recorded in the written word that set the stage for 
the explosion in star culture of the 1st c. BCE. However, as a gesture towards where I may take 
this project in the future, I offer for your consideration one of the most famous lines of Latin 
poetry of all time (Aen. 1.1): 
Arma virumque cano… 
I sing of arms and the man… 
Although the opening three words of the Aeneid are not explicitly cosmological, they may 
contain an allusion to Cicero’s cosmological poem, De consulatu suo. As Servius notes in his 
commentary on the Aeneid, the metonymical use of arma for “war” goes back to the (in)famous 
line, cedant arma togae of Cicero, who precedes Vergil in using arma in this way.  Without 354
reading more than we should into the allusion, we can, perhaps, still see that the De consulatu 
suo’s protagonist (Cicero himself, of course) allows warfare to yield to peacetime as part of a 
larger cosmic picture, thanks to the advice he received amongst the council of the gods. In a 
similar sense, in the Aeneid, the subject matter of the poet’s cosmological song is warfare and the 
 Serv. A. 1.1. See Volk (2013) 109.354
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man (Aeneas), the near opposite of the sort of cosmic peacetime promised in Cicero’s line. 
However we interpret these lines, my point is that Cicero’s cosmological and poetic imagination 
may have an even more expansive reach than my dissertation suggests. 
 But that is the pursuit of another day. In this thesis, I have conducted my study in three 
main parts, organized chronologically and thematically around Cicero’s poetry, politics, and 
philosophy. In the first chapter, I provided a study of Cicero’s Aratea and its background and 
influence at Rome, including its impact on Lucretius’ De rerum natura. Next, I considered how 
the astronomy and politics of De re publica fit together, arguing that the dialogue brings together 
the cosmological and political (the Horizontal and Vertical, as I call it). In the final chapter, I 
suggested that Cicero put his Aratean worldview on trial in De natura deorum and De 
divinatione, testing the limitations of a cosmos in which the gods are designers and actively 
involved. In the end, I have come to the conclusion that Cicero did not undergo any seismic 
(cosmic?) changes in his philosophical outlook, but rather, throughout his life remained a 
cautiously optimistic Skeptic who looked to the stars for guidance, but preferred to keep his gaze 
fixed on the wider-ranging Helice rather than the more precise Cynosura, for about cosmic 
matters, one can never be too sure.  
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